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Foreword
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents is the thirty-third in the Naval War
College Press’s Newport Papers monograph series, and the third in a projected four-
volume set of authoritative documents relating to U.S. Navy strategy and strategic
planning during and after the Cold War. Edited by John B. Hattendorf, a distinguished
naval historian and chairman of the Maritime History Department at the Naval War
College, this volume is an indispensable supplement to Professor Hattendorf ’s uniquely
informed narrative of the genesis and development of the Navy’s strategy for global
war with the Soviet Union, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–
1986, Newport Paper 19 (2004). It continues the story of the Navy’s reaction to the
growing Soviet naval and strategic threats over the decade of the 1970s, as documented
in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30 (2007), and
sets the stage for the rethinking of the Navy’s role following the demise of the Soviet
Union at the end of the 1980s, as presented in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected
Documents, Newport Paper 27 (2006). Both of these volumes were also edited by John
Hattendorf. A fourth volume, of documents on naval strategy from the 1950s and
1960s, will eventually round out this important and hitherto very imperfectly known
history.
This project will make a major contribution not just to the history of the United States
Navy since World War II but also to that of American military institutions, strategy,
and planning more generally. Including as it does both originally classified documents
and statements crafted for public release, it shows how the Navy’s leadership not only
grappled with fundamental questions of strategy and force structure but sought as well
to translate the strategic insights resulting from this process into a rhetorical form
suited to the public and political arenas.
Finally, it should be noted that all of this is of more than merely historical interest. In
October 2007, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, unveiled (in a
presentation to the International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College) “A
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” the first attempt by the sea services of
this country to articulate a strategy or vision for maritime power in the contemporary
security environment—a new era of protracted low-intensity warfare and growing
global economic interdependence. It is too early to tell what impact this document will
have on the Navy, its sister services, allies and others abroad, or the good order of the
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global commons. To understand its meaning and significance, however, there is no
better place to begin than with the material collected in this volume and its forthcom-
ing successor.
C A R N E S L O R D
Director, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
vi T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Introduction
The decade of the 1980s was the decade of “the Maritime Strategy,” the U.S. Navy’s
widely known and publicly debated statement that was associated with President Ron-
ald Reagan’s buildup of American defense forces and Secretary of the Navy John
Lehman’s efforts to create “the six-hundred-ship navy.” The strategy is most widely
understood only in terms of the Navy’s January 1986 public statements published in
the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and summarized in testimony that the Navy’s lead-
ers had given to Congress. This volume is designed to complement and extend the
previously published history of The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy,
1977–1986,1 and to present publicly for the first time the detailed changes and develop-
ments that occurred during the decade in the five (now declassified) official versions of
the strategy and three directly associated unclassified public statements by successive
Chiefs of Naval Operations that were made in the years between 1982 and 1990.
At the outset, it is important to understand that all the internal versions of the Mari-
time Strategy were designed as secret-level classified briefings, using a prepared text
that was linked to graphics and presented to groups through Vu-Graph slides projected
on a screen. All of these statements involved the use of graphics that contained images,
words, and short phrases carrying the outline of the meaning of the prepared text. The
internal secret-level publications that were published and distributed within the Navy
for official use were printed copies of these same presentations. Beyond this, there were
no other overarching, conceptual, or analytical statements at the classified level, but
there was some activity at higher levels of classification to deal with certain aspects of
intelligence information and perception management. There were also a number of
important explanatory and supplementary thoughts that were included in the public
statements of Secretary Lehman, Admiral James Watkins, General P. X. Kelley, and
Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost in the key articles published in Proceedings and that are
included among the eight documents presented in this volume.
The purpose behind creating the Maritime Strategy in the 1980s was primarily to
inform the U.S. naval officer corps and to provide a consistent and widely agreed-upon
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strategic rationale to be used throughout the Navy in order to provide a sound and
realistic operational basis, built upon a careful analysis of intelligence on current naval
threats, with which to make force-structure decisions and budgetary plans. The strat-
egy was designed to show the Navy’s role in a global campaign in terms of geography as
well as in its sequential and cumulative effects. It was designed to be inclusive of a wide
range of naval functions. While it explained how the U.S. Navy would actually be used
in the event of a third world war in global-scale, forward operations against the Soviet
Union (not merely the Soviet navy), it also involved three phases in such a war with
options for horizontal escalation. In addition, the strategy also dealt with peacetime
operations, crises management, and war-termination issues.
Intelligence analysis and technical assessments of the Soviet navy and its capabilities
played an essential role in creating the Maritime Strategy. This work was initially done
in several places, including at the Vice Chief of Naval Operations level. There Admiral
William Small and his executive assistant, Captain William Studeman, coordinated
through the Advanced Technology Panel (ATP), and the ATP’s Soviet Strategy Study
Group, created in 1982, with Captain Linton Brooks and others initially involved at the
Office of Naval Warfare (OP-095), headed by Vice Admiral Kinnard R. McKee; the
Office of Naval Intelligence, under Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, with Captain Wil-
liam H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., and Commander Stephen Kime; Captain Thomas A. Brooks
at the newly established Fleet Operational Intelligence Office at Fort Meade; “Team
Charlie” in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-009J), with Rich Haver and
Alf Andreassen; the Center for Naval Analyses, with James M. McConnell; and the
Naval Intelligence Detachment in the War Gaming Department at the Naval War College.2
The process of creating the strategy took place in 1982–84 through a series of ever-
changing briefing slides that summarized as well as elicited opinions, information, and
judgments that began to develop a consensus from existing theater war plans, concepts
of operations, intelligence, the results of war-gaming experiences, the results of opera-
tions, fleet experience, exercise results, and advanced training as well as the perceptions
of the Navy’s strategic thinkers and debates on the subject in unofficial fora within the
Navy, such as Secretary of the Navy Lehman’s “Young Turk” lunches in the early 1980s,
U.S. Naval Institute symposia organized by Proceedings editor Fred Rainbow, Center for
Naval Analyses symposia, and the Navy Discussion Groups convened by Commander
James Stark in the middle and late 1980s. This initial and lengthy process eventually
produced a document signed by the Chief of Naval Operations in May 1984. As this
document began to go through further changes, refinements, and improvements, in
both classified and unclassified versions, the Maritime Strategy developed an additional
2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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role for the U.S. Navy to play—managing the Soviet perceptions of the Navy through
public release of information.
The U.S. Navy’s strategic thinking of the 1980s can be traced to the experience, develop-
ments, and perceptions that accumulated throughout the 1970s. Specifically, in this
context it was a direct outgrowth and extension of initiatives that Admiral Thomas B.
Hayward had begun as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (1977–78) and Chief of Naval
Operations (1978–82), and of the SEA PLAN 2000 study commissioned by then-
Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor and then–Under Secretary of the Navy James
Woolsey.3 The U.S. Navy’s strategic thinking of the 1980s was not a sudden revelation
thrust upon the naval services by the political leadership of the day but rather part of
an evolution of strategic thinking within the naval services, an evolution facilitated by
the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations’ policy guidance and objectives.
As the documents in this volume show, the Maritime Strategy was not an orchestrated
public relations campaign designed solely to justify a large naval force but rather a
series of initiatives of the Navy and Marine Corps, in the context of the day, to align
naval forces within the framework of a joint and cooperative national military strategy
that would make effective use of them. The purpose was to achieve national objectives
and align all aspects of the naval services, from procurement and force levels to train-
ing and operations, with policy and strategic guidance, in order to create realistic and
achievable expectations for the naval contribution to national defense.
Although the staff officers supporting naval leaders, as well as the naval leaders them-
selves, were making every attempt to cast the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s in broad
national terms as the maritime component of a national military strategy and as the
consolidation of the Navy’s generally accepted thinking on the employment of naval
forces, the fact that it was a product of the Department of the Navy made other services
suspicious. Outside the Navy, many assumed, without careful consideration of the sub-
stance of the strategy, that the arguments of the Maritime Strategy were visionary and
made at the expense of the other services. In part this was due to the fact that the other
services had not yet put into place similar or complementary approaches to their own
strategic thinking; also, at the same time that the Navy had momentarily moved into
the lead with such an approach, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman was making strong
public statements critical of the initiatives that eventually led to the passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1 October 1986.
This resulted in fierce public debates over congressional resource allocations to the
Navy and Marine Corps versus the Air Force and the Army. This also raised similar
debates about the utility of naval forces, the optimal operations for the defense of the
sea lines of communications, deterrence versus provocation, nuclear stability,
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 3
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horizontal escalation, and the roles of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific and Indian oceans.
Some criticized it as an old idea with no innovative ideas, while others characterized it
as too radical and as giving away too much information publicly.
The reputation of the Maritime Strategy during the past two decades has alternated. By
the mid-1990s, later strategists characterized all these earlier attempts to conceptualize
naval strategy as obsolete in the post–Cold War period, while at the same time, the U.S.
Marine Corps momentarily moved away from concentration on such closely inte-
grated, strategic, high-end warfighting cooperation with the Navy to develop more
independent or Marine Corps–led operational concepts focused on lower-intensity
regional contingencies. Within the Navy, however, the Maritime Strategy became a
standard against which later strategic capstone documents were judged. Subsequent
U.S. naval capstone statements have cited the Maritime Strategy, such as The Navy Pol-
icy Book (1992);4 Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (1994);5 and Sea Power
21 (2002–2003). The official background information for the U.S. Navy’s most recent
strategic statement, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (October 2007),
states that “the world has changed since 1986 when the last maritime strategy was
developed.”6
When the process of strategic development had been fully developed in the mid-1980s,
a number of people within the Navy saw the process that lay behind the Maritime
Strategy as a significant historical development in naval thinking. It appeared to mark a
renaissance in maritime strategic thinking within the U.S. naval officer corps and was a
clear and comprehensive statement that drew together for the first time many past and
contemporary strands of thinking. Among the new aspects that it presented were
detailed discussions of the roles of the U.S. Coast Guard, military sealift in support of
naval operations, and the employment of allied and friendly tactical aviation. The 1984
version first identified terrorism as an issue for naval forces to be concerned about. The
1988 version first identified drug trafficking as a naval threat and also mentioned for
the first time the U.S. Navy’s capability for humanitarian support operations. All of
these have continued to be part of American naval strategic thinking since that time.
The Navy Staff ’s desire to record the development of the Navy’s strategic development
in these years proceeded in two ways. The first was to measure, record, and learn from
public response and debate about the strategy. The second was to record the internal
process by which the strategic thinking process had developed and record it for future
development.
Captain Peter Swartz—the action officer for the Maritime Strategy in the Strategic
Concepts Branch (OP-603) between 1982 and 1984 and on the staff of Secretary of the
Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., in the Office of Program Appraisal in 1984–86—took up the
4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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first challenge and began to track the public debate on the subject to help ascertain its
effects and provide a means for the U.S. Navy to learn from them. This resulted in a
series of cumulative bibliographies that Swartz published in 1986,7 1987,8 1988,9 1989,10
and 2004.11 In addition, Swartz extended this task to a broader project in a PowerPoint
presentation in which he attempted to summarize naval strategic thinking through its
series of capstone documents between the 1970s and 2007, as a tool for educating cur-
rent and future staff officers in the process. This PowerPoint presentation evolved over
a number of years in several expanding iterations, and it has been the starting point for
this series of documentary volumes.
In addition, there was a desire to try to make a concurrent analytical historical record
of the events. To do this, Captain Larry Seaquist, then Head, Strategic Concepts Branch,
recommended to Vice Admiral James A. Lyons, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), that he commission Professor John
Hattendorf of the Naval War College to undertake this task. As a result, Vice Admiral
Lyons wrote the President of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral James E. Service,
asking that Hattendorf be assigned to this task.12 Seeing this as a particularly challeng-
ing assignment at a point when a number of senior and influential figures were each
claiming to be the sole “father of the Maritime Strategy,” Hattendorf requested and was
granted the authority to reach his own academic conclusions in regard to the develop-
ment of the strategy, based on the historical evidence. When Hattendorf completed his
history in 1988, President of the Naval War College Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth
requested authority from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost that
the Naval War College Press be granted permission to publish an article-length, unclas-
sified version.13 Admiral Trost personally approved the Naval War College’s request,14
and the article appeared in the Naval War College Review.15 The Naval War College Press
published the full history in 1989, in a series of classified papers. This classified docu-
ment was declassified and published in 2004 with additional supplementary materials.16
Additional historical insights into and details of the process used for the Maritime
Strategy were recorded in articles by Captains John Byron and Peter Swartz17 and by Dr.
David Alan Rosenberg.18 None of these efforts were conducted in isolation; there was
extensive collaboration among Hattendorf, Swartz, Byron, Rosenberg, Linton Brooks,
and others on these and related projects throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
To understand the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, it is essential to place it in the con-
text of its time and examine the manner in which that same changing context influ-
enced its evolution. Three different levels of thematic focus are essential to this
understanding: the changing world situation of the 1980s, national security develop-
ments within the United States during the 1980s, and developments within the U.S.
Navy during the 1980s.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 5
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The Changing World Situation of the 1980s
The world of the 1980s, as the Maritime Strategy characterized it, was an era of violent
peace.19 The global scene was dominated by the bipolar ideological, political, military,
and economic rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. At the outset of the 1980s,
the Cold War appeared to be deepening, with the Soviet navy showing significant
growth, increasing strength, and more tendencies toward belligerence at sea. The
nuclear balance remained stable, with no further nuclear proliferation during the
1980s. One modifying influence in the tension was the success of nine years of negotia-
tion during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
and its conclusion of the multilateral United Nations law of the sea convention of 1982,
establishing new legal regimes governing general as well as specific sea areas. In retro-
spect, it appears that after a long period of steadily increasing tension in the Cold War
at sea, this situation began to relax in the middle of the 1980s with the appointments of
Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
and Admiral Chernavin as Admiral Gorshkov’s replacement in 1985, and with the
beginning of the Soviet naval arms control offensive from 1986 onward. To contempo-
rary American naval eyes, however, the Soviet success in producing increasingly quiet
submarines; the Soviet navy’s increasing use of the former U.S. naval base at Cam Ranh
Bay, Vietnam; and the revelation of the major loss of secret and highly sensitive U.S.
naval information to the Soviets through the Walker spy leak in 1986 gave the U.S.
Navy reasons for pause. This was followed between 1989 and 1991 by major changes in
Soviet and Warsaw Pact leadership and policies, changes that resulted in dramatic
deterioration of the Soviet naval threat.
In Asia, the People’s Republic of China demonstrated high economic growth and was,
at that point, energy sufficient. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese government had
decided that the Soviet Union was no longer a threat. The People’s Liberation Army
Navy changed its posture from one of anti-Soviet coastal defense and announced
instead a naval doctrine of “Offshore Defense” with operations farther out to sea. By
1987, the Chinese had deployed their first nuclear-power ballistic-missile submarine
(SSBN). While this was going on, Taiwan was isolated but showed increasing economic
growth and political liberalization. In 1989, the Chinese government showed its hold
on the country during the Tiananmen Square incident. On the Korean Peninsula, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under Kim Il Sung continued to receive Soviet
support; it had organized the assassination of Republic of Korea officials in Burma. At
the same time, Muslim separatist insurgencies remained active in Mindanao and the
southern Philippines.
6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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In the Middle East, Israeli antiair-warfare capabilities had demonstrated their effective-
ness in the Bekaa Valley in 1982, and the Arab-Israeli situation remained at status quo
with the Palestinian intifada developing from 1987 onward. In Iran, following the fall
of the shah in 1979 and the U.S. hostage crisis of 1979–80, the Iranian theocracy
remained hostile to the West. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein continued in power with Soviet
support, while the Iran-Iraq War continued for most of the decade between 1980 and
1988, including a “tanker war” component. In Afghanistan, civil war raged from 1979
until 1989, during which U.S.-backed insurgents fought the communist government
and Soviet forces, which became increasingly bogged down.
In Africa, General Siad Barre continued to rule in Somalia and in 1989 an anti-U.S.
Islamic army faction came to power in Sudan. In Libya, the anti-Western Gadhafi
regime continued in power and was responsible for backing terrorist bombings, includ-
ing the bombing of a Pan American Airlines plane over Scotland in 1988. In 1986, the
United States conducted air strikes on Libya, but most of America’s NATO allies did
not support these operations and denied the U.S. base access and overflight permission.
In the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro’s Cuba remained antagonistic to the United
States. The United States invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983, to oust a
Cuban-backed government. In Haiti, “Baby Doc” Duvalier was ousted, and civil unrest
followed in 1986.
In other dimensions of the global scene, there was a slow rise in reported climatic and
natural humanitarian disasters across the world. Reports of piratical attacks on mer-
chant shipping were beginning to be heard from places like the Strait of Malacca, but
they appeared insignificant at this point.
National Security Developments within the United States during the 1980s
The 1980s were predominantly the years of Republican president Ronald Reagan. His
first term of office, from 1981 to 1985, was marked by initiatives against the Soviet
Union, while his second term, from 1985 to 1989, was marked by a gradual relaxation
of the anti-Soviet stance. His Republican Party successor from 1989 to 1993, President
George H. W. Bush, was principally concerned with managing the end of the Cold War
era and the transition to the follow-on period. During most of this period there was
divided control of the Congress, with the Democrats controlling the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Republicans controlling the Senate from 1981 to 1987.
Reagan’s presidency was marked by the resurgence of strong domestic popular support
for the U.S. armed forces, but with the end of the Cold War in sight by the late 1980s
there developed a strong popular desire for a “peace dividend,” to be found in cutting
the funding for national defense.
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In 1981, the Department of Defense’s expenditure represented 5.1 percent of the gross
domestic product; the department’s total overall allocation was $422 billion (as
expressed in constant Fiscal Year 2009 dollars). This rose in 1983 to 6 percent, with an
allocation of $495 billion, and was at 5.9 percent, the highest allocation of the decade,
$539 billion, in 1985. From that point, these figures gradually decreased to 5.6 percent
in 1988, $514 billion in the last year of Reagan’s presidency, and 5.1 percent, with $489
billion, in 1990.
The overall approach of the United States to its national security situation in the 1980s
was initially to continue its focus on one overarching global threat from the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. The administration’s initial goal was to oppose and even
roll back the Soviet Union through greatly increased U.S. defense spending that
involved significant military pay raises in 1980 and 1981. In this, the Department of
Defense placed its primary focus for planning and force sizing on the contingency of
having to deal with the Soviets in the European theater and supporting NATO. At the
same time, the Department of Defense had come to agree with the Navy’s opinion that
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Presidents
Ronald Reagan, 20 January 1981–20 January 1989
George H. W. Bush, 20 January 1989–20 January 1993
Secretaries of Defense
Caspar Weinberger, 21 January 1981–23 November 1987
Frank C. Carlucci III, 23 November 1987–20 January 1989
Richard B. Cheney, 21 March 1989–20 January 1993
Secretaries of the Navy
John F. Lehman, Jr., 5 February 1981–10 April 1987
James H. Webb, Jr., 1 May 1987–23 February 1988
William L. Ball III, 28 March 1988–15 May 1989
Henry L. Garrett III, 15 May 1989–26 June 1992
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General David C. Jones, USAF, 21 June 1978–18 June 1982
General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, 18 June 1982–30 September 1985
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, 1 October 1985–30 September 1989
General Colin Powell, USA, 1 October 1989–30 September 1993
Chiefs of Naval Operations
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, 1 July 1978–30 June 1982
Admiral James D. Watkins, 30 June 1982–30 June 1986
Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, 1 July 1986–29 June 1990
Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, 29 June 1990–23 August 1994
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Key Figures for National Security and Naval Policy, 1981–90
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such a war would be a global war, with a significant Asia-Pacific dimension. The
Defense Department’s planning scenario postulated that the war would start in South-
west Asia and spread, but the Navy felt that such a scenario was an ill-advised one on
which to concentrate exclusively. At the same time, the U.S. intelligence community
was unusually confident and united in its assessment of the Soviet naval threat, as
expressed in National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-15-82D of 15 November 1982.20
Some of the strategic problems and ideas that eventually emerged in the Maritime
Strategy were already being discussed at the highest levels of the government. As early
as 18 May 1982, President Reagan recorded in his personal diary,
Lunched with Joint Chfs of Staff and Cap W[einberger]. It was a good meeting with a sound discus-
sion of strategic problems—for example—the importance of the sea above Norway and what Iceland
means in the Navy strategy should there be conflict on the NATO front.21
As the United States conducted a variety of different small-crisis operations during the
decade—in Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Central America, Libya, and the Persian
Gulf—the confrontation between the United States and Iran continued. The United
States showed some preference for supporting Iraq in the parallel Iran-Iraq War. Dur-
ing the 1980s the Defense Department also made some small improvements in its
counterinsurgency capabilities. In other areas, in response to Soviet deployment of
mobile medium- and intermediate-range missiles, the United States deployed Pershing
II intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and BGM-109G Gryphon ground-
launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) to Europe in 1983–84, but this deployment was
reversed by the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty negotiations in 1985–87. In
the 1980s, the United States resisted proposals for conventional naval arms control but
led with proposals for the establishment of a voluntary international Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In terms of new defense technological develop-
ments, the Chief of Naval Operations, his staff (OPNAV), and naval research and devel-
opment played a major role in the Reagan administration’s ballistic-missile defense
policy and the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
As terrorism incidents began to rise and require responses from the United States, the State
Department fine-tuned its 1979 list of state sponsors of terrorism, which at that point
included Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria. In 1982, it dropped Iraq and added Cuba; in
1984 it added Iran; and in 1988, it listed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China began to nor-
malize in the years following the U.S. formal recognition of China in 1979 and that
same year the Taiwan Relations Act, which required the United States to maintain the
capacity to protect Taiwan. U.S. military assistance to Taiwan was henceforth limited
only to defensive arms. By the mid-1980s, Washington was providing assistance for
mainland Chinese military modernization.
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The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 created major develop-
ments that fundamentally changed Department of Defense command relationships.
Most important among them was the enhancement of the roles of the regional and
functional unified and specified joint combatant commanders in chief at the expense
of the service chiefs, including the Chief of Naval Operations. The act also enhanced
the advisory powers of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the
individual service chiefs and created a new four-star position for a vice chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, it mandated joint duty for all officers, including
naval officers, and mandated a requirement for the president to provide Congress with
an annual Presidential National Security Strategy Review.
Along with these changes came a series of major changes in the combatant and Navy
component commands. The first of these was the establishment of the U.S. Central
Command in 1983, with its naval component command, to deal with the geographical
areas that stretched from Egypt and Israel, over the Red Sea, the Arabian Peninsula, and
the Persian Gulf, to Pakistan. At the same time, Africa south of the Sahara remained the
responsibility of the U.S. European Command, with its naval component. These
changes were followed in 1985 with the reestablishment of a naval component for U.S.
Southern Command to deal with Latin America. In 1985, the U.S. Space Command
was also established, with its naval component, Naval Space Command. In 1987, the
U.S. Special Operations Command was established, with its naval component, Naval
Special Warfare Command. Also in 1987, the U.S. Transportation Command was estab-
lished, bringing under it the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Forces Com-
mand. Most of these changes were opposed by the Navy, which saw them as threats to
the necessary operational autonomy of naval commanders. All of these changes had a
direct impact on the Navy, which itself saw numerous internal developments.
Developments within the U.S. Navy during the 1980s
In the 1980s, the U.S. Navy was clearly the world’s strongest naval force, but it was chal-
lenged by a very strong Soviet navy. Throughout the decade, the U.S. Navy continued
extensive, varied global operations and exercises. At home, the Navy’s budget allocation
rose incrementally until the middle of the decade, after which it remained steady before
beginning to decline from 1988. In total funding allocation, the Navy Department
(including the Marine Corps) usually received incrementally more than the
departments of the Army or Air Force, but its allocation was closely matched by the Air
Force’s, which exceeded the Navy’s in 1984 and 1985.
In the period between 1981 and 1988, the U.S. Navy’s force structure goal was the “six-
hundred-ship navy,” which would comprise fifteen carrier battle groups (CVBGs), four
battleship surface action groups, one hundred nuclear-powered attack submarines
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(SSNs), ballistic-missile submarines, amphibious-force ships capable of carrying and
landing a Marine amphibious force (MAF) as well as a Marine amphibious brigade
(MAB), one hundred to 110 frigates, and thirty-one mine countermeasures ships, with
sufficient auxiliary support ships, such as repair tenders, fleet oilers, and supply ships,
for a force of this size. In addition, the plan called for fourteen active carrier air wings
(CVW) of aircraft and two reserve carrier air wings.
Both the Carter and Reagan administrations funded large new fast sealift and
prepositioning forces to support global Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps operations,
especially in Southwest Asia. Included in the new sealift force were two T-AH hospital
ships, designed for wartime duty but capable of peacetime and crisis response opera-
tions as well. The 1987 maiden transoceanic cruise of USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) was, in
fact, a humanitarian assistance deployment.
The nation’s basic naval deployment strategy was similar to that of the preceding three
decades—to have two permanent ready fleets in home waters, one on each coast, which
could surge forward if required, and two permanent forward fleets, one that was for-
ward deployed (in the Mediterranean) and the other forward based (in the western
Pacific). The Navy planned aggressive forward operations with its SSNs and deployed
its SSBNs within range of their wartime targets. During this period, the Navy—
together with the Coast Guard—also developed a renewed focus on defense of home











Source: www.history.navy.mil/library/online/budget.htm. Statistics for 1981 through 1984 are taken from the “Appropriation
Summary” in the February 1985 edition of U.S. Navy Dept., Historical Budget Data (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office for the Office of the Comptroller, 1985), pp. 4–5. Statistics from 1985 to 1990 are taken from the “Department of De-
fense—Budget Authority by Component” tables in the 1989, 1992 annual reports of the secretary of defense.
TABLE 2
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1 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
TYPE 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Battleships - - 1 2 2
Carriers 12 13 13 13 13
Cruisers 27 27 28 29 30
Destroyers 91 89 71 69 69
Frigates 78 86 95 103 110
Submarines 87 96 98 98 100
SSBNs 34 33 34 35 37
Command ships 4 4 4 4 4
Mine warfare 25 25 21 21 21
Patrol 1 4 6 6 6
Amphibious 61 61 59 57 58
Auxiliary 101 117 103 120 121
Surface warships 196 202 195 203 211
Total active 521* 555 533 557 571
TYPE 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Battleships 3 3 3 4 4
Carriers 14 14 14 14 13
Cruisers 32 36 38 40 43
Destroyers 69 69 69 68 57
Frigates 113 115 107 100 99
Submarines 101 102 100 99 93
SSBNs 39 37 37 36 33
Command ships 4 4 4 4 4
Mine warfare 21 22 22 23 22
Patrol 6 6 6 6 6
Amphibious 58 59 59 61 59
Auxiliary 123 127 114 137 137
Surface warships 217 223 217 212 203
Total active 583 594* 573 592 570
*The high (1987) and the low (1981) total figures for active warships.
All figures are shown as of the end of the fiscal year for each year: 30 September.
Source: Naval Historical Center, “Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1917–Present,” www.history.navy.mil/
branches/org9-4.htm#1979.
TABLE 3
U.S. Navy Active-Ship Force Levels, 1981–90
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waters. In addition, a forward hub of operations was developed in the Indian Ocean to
maintain permanent, combat-credible presence in that area of operations.
Fleet operations during the 1980s were greatly enhanced by the experience gained by
the Navy in operating the numerous transformational new ship, aircraft, and weapons
systems that had entered and were entering the fleet from the mid-1970s on: F-14 and
S-3 aircraft; Los Angeles– and Ohio-class submarines; Nimitz-class carriers;
Ticonderoga-class cruisers, Spruance-class destroyers, and Perry-class frigates; the
Tarawa-class general-purpose landing helicopter amphibious assault ships (LHAs), and
the air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC); and Aegis and Tomahawk missile systems (to
name only the most prominent). To fight all these new systems required revolutionary
new operational methods, especially the Composite Warfighting Concept. This con-
cept’s categorization of naval operations at sea by warfare task was also reflected in a
new naval “warfare appraisal” process back in Washington, similarly organized and
aimed at influencing the Navy’s program and budget decisions, as well as in the
organization of several versions of the Maritime Strategy.
Among the services, the Navy’s strength in manpower increased slightly across the
decade, to more than five hundred thousand total active-duty men and women, but
then began to decrease from 1989. The active manpower strength of the Marine Corps
remained relatively constant at under two hundred thousand during the decade, while
the Coast Guard remained steady at around forty thousand.
During most of the decade, the Navy and Marine Corps maintained close relations. They
carried out routine operations together, as well as crisis-response operations with














Source: “Allowances and Location of Naval Aircraft,” OPNAV Notice C3310, 31 March 1988, table 2. These reports were
discontinued with this report, and the information is unavailable for 1989 and 1990. All figures shown are for 31 March of each
year. See www.history.navy.mil/a-record/allow-lo/1981-88/3-1988.pdf.
TABLE 4
Inventory of Active Aircraft, 1981–88
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forward-deployed Marine Corps units in U.S. Navy ships. Both services focused on the
NATO flanks and the Soviet Far East in their operational planning. Their close relationship
was further demonstrated when both services opted to buy and fly F/A-18 C/D aircraft.
This allowed for an easy collaboration on the early versions of the Maritime Strategy
between 1982 and 1986, with Marine Corps Commandants General Robert Barrow and
General P. X. Kelley working closely with their counterpart Chiefs of Naval Operations,
Admiral Thomas Hayward and Admiral James Watkins. These early versions of the Mari-
time Strategy reflected the Marines’ development of over-the-horizon assault and
prepositioning concepts that culminated in the Amphibious Warfare Strategy of 1985
and General Kelley’s article in the Proceedings Maritime Strategy insert of January 1986.
Toward the end of the decade, the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps began to drift apart.
As the global scene began to change, the Marine Corps Commandant from 1987 to
1991, General Al Gray, refocused the Marine Corps on warfighting contingencies in the
third world to replace the earlier focus on anti-Soviet operations in NATO and north-
eastern Pacific campaigns. Emphasizing these changes of focus in 1988, the Marine
Corps replaced the term it used to describe its own forces, shifting from “amphibious
forces” to “expeditionary forces.” Its Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) became “spe-
cial operations capable,” but unlike the U.S. Navy’s SEALs, the Marine Corps was not
included in the new U.S. Special Operations Command. In 1989, the Fleet Marine
Force Manual 1, Warfighting, shifted its focus to maneuver warfare. Additional changes
showed the Marine Corps desire to increase its autonomy from—and equality with—
1 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
YEAR OFFICERS NURSES ENLISTED
OFFICER
CANDIDATES TOTAL
1981 64,580 2,713 466,388 5,541 536,509
1982 66,579 2,661 475,147 5,582 547,308
1983 68,764 2,744 489,495 5,361 563,620
1984 70,382 2,896 497,837 5,298 573,517
1985 71,079 2,951 503,072 5,443 579,594
1986 72,890 3,029 510,713 5,662 589,265
1987 74,064 3,078 523,071 5,608 602,743
1988 74,115 3,055 523,106 5,395 602,616
1989 74,374 2,989 526,018 5,410 605,802
1990 74,557 3,020 525,159 5,707 605,423
Source: “Personnel Strength of the U.S. Navy: 1775 to Present,” derived from the Bureau of Naval Personnel’s quarterly Navy
Military Personnel Statistics. See www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq65-1.htm.
TABLE 5
U.S. Navy Personnel Strength, 1981–90
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the Navy, with the appointment of the first Marine Corps general as a joint unified
commander, as well as the renaming and reorganization of the Marine Corps Develop-
ment and Education Command to be the Marine Corps Combat Development Com-
mand in 1987. Subsequently, a new Marine Corps University was established in 1989
and a new Marine Corps War College in 1990.
In the early 1980s, the U.S. Coast Guard was under the Department of Transportation
and did not participate in the Reagan administration’s big defense-budget and
military-manpower increases. Nevertheless, the historical link between the two services
had not been forgotten. In 1980, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Hayward
and Coast Guard Commandant John B. Hayes initiated the establishment of a Navy–
Coast Guard board for policy coordination. In 1984, a memorandum of agreement was
signed between the two services to establish Maritime Defense Zones (MARDEZs) for
port security, harbor defense, and coastal warfare. When activated in wartime, the
Coast Guard area commanders would report to the U.S. Navy’s fleet commanders as
MARDEZ commanders. The development of joint Navy–Coast Guard counterdrug
operations, with Coast Guard personnel deployed in U.S. Navy ships starting in 1982,
facilitated increasing cooperation and interrelationships between the two services. By
the end of the decade in 1989, Coast Guard flag officers were leading drug-interdiction
joint task forces under both the Atlantic and Pacific commanders in chief. The Navy
and Coast Guard also worked together dealing with the boatloads of refugees from
Cuba in May 1980; the recovery operations following the Soviet shooting down of
Korean Airlines flight KAL-007 in September 1983; and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in
Alaskan waters in March 1989.
The decade of the 1980s saw increased dialogue and cooperation between the Navy and
the Air Force, with memorandums of agreement on various subjects being signed
between the two services in 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1988. Many in the Air Force—espe-
cially in the Pacific—saw the Maritime Strategy as complementary to their own evolv-
ing concepts. Nevertheless, the Navy of the 1980s strongly preferred to plan for and
exercise coordinated, cooperative, and deconflicted (but separate) sea-based antiair and
strike campaigns rather than integrated tactical aviation (TACAIR) over-land and over-
sea operations under one powerful central operational theater air commander, who
would probably often be, in many important scenarios, a U.S. Air Force officer.
In 1986, in the most significant joint operation between the Vietnam War and the Gulf
wars, the Navy and the Air Force conducted simultaneous joint strike operations in
Libya. In that operation, the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force made geographi-
cally separate strikes under separate commands, but care was taken to deconflict each
service’s operations from interfering with one another. In 1987–88, during Operations
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EARNEST WILL and PRAYING MANTIS, Air Force tankers refueled naval tactical aircraft
operating over the Gulf and Air Force transport aircraft carried Marine Corps units to
forward positions. In 1985–89, Air Force B-52 aircraft based at Loring Air Force Base in
Maine and Anderson Air Force Base on Guam became fully capable of using the Har-
poon air-to-surface antiship missile. As joint commands began to proliferate, key sup-
porting components of the U.S. Navy came under Air Force general officers, with the
Naval Space Command under Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command and the
MSC under Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command.
In the 1980s, oceangoing sea transport for the armed forces had become an important
issue for the Navy. In 1981, the position of Commander, Military Sealift Command,
was restored to three-star rank and in 1984 Secretary of the Navy Lehman declared that
military sealift was a distinct naval function, along with sea control and power projec-
tion. As military development and control for military cargoes became in this period
the favored approach over the earlier reliance on subsidized commercial shipping, a
new Strategic Sealift Office (OP-42) was established in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations. While there was an increase in government and privately owned American-flag
ships suitable for military cargoes as plans moved ahead to create a fast sealift fleet with
thirty-seven vessels and to expand prepositioned fleets, the Navy also planned to con-
tinue to use allied shipping. A preposition force was established in the Indian Ocean in
1980, with seven ships on station at Diego Garcia and an afloat staff. In 1983, plans
were made for three Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) squadrons to support the
Marine Corps, with additional ships for support of the Army and Air Force. In the
early 1980s, the Navy took a number of additional steps to support these moves. These
included converting containerships to crane ships (T-ACSs), which were placed for
future use in the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force, and developing other
sealift-enhancement features to adapt containerships for military use.
In 1981, the Maritime Administration was moved from the Department of Commerce
to the Department of Transportation. The total number of ships in the National
Defense Reserve Fleet (renamed a Force in 1982) rose from 303 in 1980 to a high of 386
in 1984, and then began to fall, reaching 329 in 1990. At the same time, the ships within
that force designed for rapid sealift deployment rose steadily from twenty-four in 1980
to sixty-five in 1985 and ninety-six in 1990. Beginning in 1983, the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget encouraged government reliance on the commercial sector.22 This
development was paralleled by the continued transfer of the Navy’s Combat Logistics
Force ships to the Military Sealift Command’s civilian-manned naval fleet auxiliary
force, contracting out the operation of MSC special mission ships, and placing into ser-
vice eighteen Military Sealift Command Ocean Surveillance (T-AGOS) ships between
1984 and 1990. In October 1989, the new Bush administration issued National Security
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Directive 28 on sealift, giving broad policy guidance to support the American ocean-
shipping industry.23
A depression in merchant shipping continued until late in the 1980s with the U.S.-flag
commercial merchant marine comprising only 4 to 5 percent of world fleet tonnage,
steadily declining from 849 oceangoing vessels of over a thousand gross tons in 1980 to
748 in 1985 and 635 in 1990. At the same time, merchant shipping effectively under
U.S. control also declined precipitously, dropping from 466 vessels in 1982 to 326 in
1986 and to 228 in 1989, as a 1986 tax law acted to reduce American investment in
U.S.-owned foreign-flagged vessels. Paralleling this, the overall number of American
merchant mariners also continued to drop, from 19,600 in 1980 and 13,100 in 1985 to
11,100 in 1990. These trends caused concern within the Navy, as the activation of the
Ready Reserve Force was contingent on the availability of American civilian merchant
mariners.
Additionally, the American shipbuilding industry was also in decline. Although the
Navy was building ten to twenty-three ships each year during the 1980s, the construc-
tion of merchant shipping in the United States dropped sharply, from some twenty
ships in 1980 to none between 1988 and 1990.
The Maritime Strategy of the 1980s was produced by officers of the U.S. Navy in the
context of international events and through a careful appreciation of the capabilities of
the Soviet naval threat in that decade, along with American national security concerns
and developments within the U.S. Navy and its sister services and agencies. It was the
product of the complex interaction of many broad forces affecting the Navy, both
externally and internally. The Maritime Strategy established a general approach to the
most effective use of naval forces in the context of a range of specific maritime situa-
tions that American naval planners considered the most likely if a major war with the
Soviet Union were to occur in the 1980s. In their time, the maritime-strategy docu-
ments created for the Navy a consensus approach that filled a need for clarity and con-
solidation of thinking in a way that naval leaders found well aligned with thinking
within the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as with national defense policies.
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Maritime Strategy Presentation (for the
Secretary of the Navy, 4 November 1982)
This document comprises the original prepared text and Vu-Graph slides for the first
major briefing of the Maritime Strategy, on 4 November 1982.* Vice Admiral Arthur
Moreau, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) (OP-06),
gave the secret-level briefing to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral James Watkins, and Marine Corps Commandant General Robert H.
Barrow.
The idea to prepare such a briefing can be traced to a series of three memorandums sent
by Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William N. Small.† The first, in December
1981, was addressed to the director of Navy Program Planning and suggested that the
Navy needed to change its planning process so that a clear strategic plan drove the pro-
cess for ships and weapons acquisition instead of the kind of analysis that stressed the
worst-case scenario. Then, on 1 March 1982, Admiral Small sent a memorandum to the
director of the Office of Naval Warfare (OP-95), Rear Admiral William R. Smedberg IV,
and OP-06, then Vice Admiral Sylvester Foley, in which he pointed out that strategic
thinking seemed to be dormant in the Navy but that type of thinking might change cur-
rent assumptions about future needs and should be a shared responsibility between their
two offices. Reacting to this, Smedberg and Foley agreed that Foley’s office should take
the lead in preparing a briefing on maritime strategy and fleet employment options in
the event of a war. While these memos created consensus about the need for such a stra-
tegic vision, Admiral Small signed on 2 August 1982 another memo that directly resulted
in the preparation of this briefing. This memo, drafted by Rear Admiral John A. Baldwin
in Systems Analysis Division (OP-96), was sent to all four flag officers directly concerned
with developing the forthcoming annual program objective memorandum, or POM,












* This document was approved for declassification by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 16 July 2007.
† For a more detailed explanation of the background to this document, see John B. Hattendorf,
The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, R.I.:
Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 65–74.
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thoughts on the need for a strategic appraisal as the basis for defining the Navy’s goals
and objectives. As the draft memorandum went through the chain of command en route
to Small’s signature, Vice Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, the director of Navy Program
Planning (OP-090), commented on the route-slip, “We really need this to get the entire
OPNAV [i.e., Chief of Naval Operations] Staff moving in the same direction.”*
The memo was passed to the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), headed by Captain
Elizabeth Wylie. Within that office, she selected Lieutenant Commander Stanley Weeks
as the action officer. Taking it on initially as another routine chore, he soon found that it
was turning into a massive project to connect national strategy with defense program-
ming. As the complexity and scope of the project became plain, Commander W. Spencer
Johnson was assigned, so as to create a team effort. Johnson was the officer within OP-06
who coordinated the policy issues with the programs and budget process with the Joint
Staff and the Department of Defense, while Weeks had recently staffed Secretary of the
Navy Lehman’s Posture Statement to the House of Representatives Armed Services Com-
mittee on 8 February 1982. For Weeks and Johnson, Lehman’s concept of a six-hundred-
ship Navy based around fifteen carrier battle groups provided background, but it was not
the sole source for the briefing they developed. A number of other concepts were involved,
including the current war plans that the various fleet commanders in chief had devel-
oped, the basic directives on current national defense policy, and up-to-date intelligence
estimates of the Soviet threat. In developing this briefing, Johnson and Weeks received
inputs from a variety of people, including Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Com-
mander Kenneth McGruther, and later Commander Thomas Marfiak.
Before this briefing was given on 4 November 1982, early versions were briefed to the
OPNAV Program Development Review Committee and the Chief of Naval Operations’
Executive Panel. Meanwhile, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John
W. Vessey, Jr., called each joint commander in chief to come to Washington and brief him
on the concept of operations that lay behind the war plans for each respective theater.
Johnson and Weeks were able to obtain the briefings for the Atlantic and Pacific and thus
to understand the essence of the latest thinking of each operational commander in chief
for his area; they were able to work relevant ideas into their maritime strategy briefing.
At the annual conference of the fleet commanders in chief, which took place at the Naval
War College on 26–29 October 1982, the fleet commanders in chief collectively agreed
that the maritime strategy brief should be presented to the Secretary of the Navy, the
Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Warmly received
at the 4 November briefing, the document took on a new life of its own. As a result, a
project that had begun two months before to produce merely another document to sup-
port the budgetary program and planning process was suddenly catapulted into recogni-
tion as the U.S. Navy’s strategy. 
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* Quoted in ibid., p. 67.
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1&2 Good morning Mr Secretary, General Barrow, Admiral Watkins, gentlemen. The
purpose of this presentation is to provide a framework for subsequent discussion on
maritime strategy.
3 This vugraph outlines the major elements of today’s discussion. The first part will
provide the overall national guidance within which we must construct our maritime
strategy.
4 (NSDD-32) Our approved National Strategy is contained in two principal docu-
ments, NSDD-32 and the Defense Guidance.
NSDD-32 is the presidential directive which establishes our global objectives and prior-
ities and was issued by the president on 20 May of this year. The global strategy objec-
tives it contains are displayed here.
5 (NSDD-32) As you see, in NSDD-32 the likelihood of any war with the Soviets
being a global war is explicitly acknowledged, but due to our limited capabilities and
resource constraints, planning for prioritized, sequential operations is directed. It is
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MARITIME STRATEGY
OUTLINE
• NATIONAL STRATEGY REQUIREMENTS
• NATIONAL STRATEGY GUIDANCE
• CURRENT FORCE MARITIME STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL WAR
• CINCS WARPLANS/PREFERENCES
• GLOBAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY
• ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS
• NOTIONAL FORCE EMPLOYMENTS
• COMPLICATING FACTORS
NSDD-32 (20 MAY 82)
GLOBAL OBJECTIVES OF US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
• DETER MILITARY ATTACK BY SOVIETS AND ALLIES
• STRENGTHEN EXISTING ALLIANCES AND FORM NEW COALITION
• CONTAIN AND REVERSE SOVIET EXPANSION
• LIMIT SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES BY:
• STRENGTHENING US MILITARY
• PURSUING VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL, AGREEMENTS
• PREVENTING FLOW OF TECHNOLOGIES TO USSR
• ENSURING US ACCESS TO FOREIGN MARKETS
• ENSURING US ACCESS TO SPACE AND THE OCEANS
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implicit in the presidential directive that no theater is to be relinquished to the Soviets
by default.
6 (NSDD-32) The regional priorities for wartime planning are shown here.
In considering these priorities it is important to note that, first, these priorities for
planning have been established by presidential directive and are the same as those con-
tained in the DG. Secondly, the documents acknowledge that the political and military
situations at the time of war will bear heavily on strategic decisions that may alter these
priorities. Now let’s go to the defense guidance.
7 (DG P27–28) The defense guidance provides more detailed guidance from the
Secretary of Defense on our military priorities and objectives. It also provides both
peacetime and wartime strategic guidance. The peacetime strategy guidelines contained
in the DG are summarized in this vugraph. The emphasis on forward deployment of
our forces and surge deployment capabilities underscore the fact that US strategy is a
forward one.




“DUE TO THE GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIP
OF STRATEGIC THEATERS, THE LIKELIHOOD THAT ANY US SOVIET CONFLICT WOULD EXPAND BE-
YOND ONE THEATER TO OTHER THEATERS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AND PLANNED FOR. THIS DOES
NOT MEAN THAT WE MUST HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGE SOVIET FORCES SI-
MULTANEOUSLY ON ALL FRONTS. RATHER, THIS MEANS PROCURING BALANCED FORCES AND ES-
TABLISHING PRIORITIES FOR SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS AMONG THEATERS TO ENSURE THAT WE, IN





• NATO AND SUPPORTING LOCS
• ACCESS TO OIL IN SWA
• DEFENSE OF PACIFIC ALLIES AND LOCS FOR IO AND PACIFIC OCEAN
• DEFENSE OF FRIENDLY NATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA
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8 (DG P30) The DG provides wartime strategic guidance in three categories: (1)
conflict not involving Soviet forces; (2) conflict involving the USSR; and (3) global
conflict. In a conflict not involving Soviet forces we see emphasis placed on limiting the
scope of the conflict, a dependence on our allies to provide combat forces, and a clear
reluctance to introduce US ground combat forces. Navy, Marine and air forces, on the
other hand, play a significant role.
9 (DG P30–31) For a conflict involving the Soviet Union, shown here, two sub-
categories are defined: first aggression in areas of US advantage and, second, in areas of
Soviet advantage. In the latter case, emphasis is placed on counter offensive operations
and war-widening options. The likelihood that such a conflict would become global in
nature is acknowledged in the next to last objective.




• FORWARD DEPLOYMENT EMPHASIZED
• ABILITY TO RAPIDLY DEPLOY WHERE NECESSARY
• STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: SUFFICIENT FOR RETALIATION AFTER SOVIET FIRST STRIKE
• THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES:
• FORWARD DEPLOYED
• CAN PLAN FOR FIRST USE, RELEASE WILL BE NEITHER IMMEDIATE NOR AUTOMATIC





• LIMIT SCOPE OF CONFLICT, AVOID INVOLVEMENT OF SOVIET FORCES
• THREATENED REGIONAL ALLIES PROVIDE COMBAT FORCES
• US PROVIDES AIR, NAVAL, LOGISTIC, AND ADVISORY SUPPORT
• US GROUND COMBAT TROOPS DEPLOYED IF NECESSARY
• US COMBAT FORCE PARTICIPATION MAY INVOLVE
• DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE
• PROTECTION OF US LIVES OR CRITICAL RESOURCES
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10 (DG P32) The global conflict strategy guidelines contained in the DG are pro-
vided in order of the regional planning priorities. We see that naval forces have a key
role to play in our own hemisphere, a role made more difficult by the growing capabili-
ties of a strategically located Soviet proxy in Cuba, the unstable nature of Central
America, and the great distance to the South Atlantic SLOCs.
11 (DG P32) In the NATO-European theater, naval and air forces have, as first order
of business, the control of the North Atlantic SLOCs. A key role is assigned in securing
the flanks of the Northern and Southern region, affecting the weight of attack the Sovi-
ets may bring to bear on the Central Front.
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DEFENSE GUIDANCE
CONFLICT INVOLVING USSR
• SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AREAS OF US ADVANTAGE
• DEPLOY FORCES TO AREA TO SIGNAL COMMITMENT AND DETER
• CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS (WITH REGIONAL ALLIES) TO DEFEAT SOVIET AGGRESSION DECISIVELY
IF DETERRENCE FAILS
• PREPARE FOR GLOBAL US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION
• SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AREAS OF SOVIET ADVANTAGE
• DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES TO AREA RAPIDLY
• CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH ALLIES
• TAKE MILITARY ACTIONS TO THREATEN SOVIET VULNERABILITIES
• INITIATE MOBILIZATION MEASURES TO PREPARE FOR GLOBAL US-SOVIET WAR




• NEUTRALIZE SOVIET AND OTHER HOSTILE FORCES IN CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA.
• DEFEND PANAMA CANAL.




• US STRATEGY CONSISTENT WITH AGREED STRATEGY (MC 14/3) OF FORWARD DEFENSE
• NAVAL FORCES WILL GIVE FIRST PRIORITY TO CONTROL OF NORTH ATLANTIC SLOCS
• ATTACK AND DESTROY ENEMY NAVAL AIR FORCES
• DEFENDING MILITARY CONVOYS AND KEY ISLAND BASES
• IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN REGIONS, EMPLOY AIR, LAND AND NAVAL FORCES TO
SUPPORT NATO ALLIES
• OFFENSIVE MOVES AGAINST FLANKS TO DIVERT PACT FORCES FROM CENTRAL FRONT
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12 (DG P33) In the Southwest Asia region naval and air forces are tasked to establish
air and sea superiority, confront the Soviet attack, and defend Arabian Peninsula oil
resources.
13 (DG P31-32) In the Pacific, the SLOCs from the West Coast to the Persian Gulf
must be controlled. Offensive operations to tie down Soviet forces in a defensive role
would be undertaken, and counter-offensives against Vietnam, the Soviet coast and
North Korea staged.
14 (DG P34) In Africa, naval and air forces would again carry a major burden in car-
rying out our strategy.
[Presentation omits items 15 and 16.]




• ESTABLISH NAVAL AND AIR SUPERIORITY IN REGION
• SPECIAL OPS FORCES IMPEDE SOVIET ADVANCE UNTIL US GROUND FORCES INTRODUCED
• US FORCES RAPIDLY PROJECTED TO CONFRONT SOVIET ATTACK AND ASSIST




• DEFEND ALASKA, HAWAII AND CONUS LOCS
• NAVAL AND AIR FORCES CONTROL EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEA AND LOCS TO PERSIAN GULF
• CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO EXPLOIT SOVIET VULNERABILITIES





• EMPLOY AIR AND NAVAL FORCES TO NEUTRALIZE SOVIET OR HOSTILE FORCES IN
STRATEGIC LOCATIONS.
• PROTECT ACCESS TO AND DENY SOVIET USE OF RESOURCES, KEY FACILITIES, AND LOCS.
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17 (DG P43) Force planning guidance in the DG section is by service. You see here
Navy planning guidance goals. The force planning section of the DG recognizes that
our limited current force capabilities lag significantly the ambitious strategy goals we
have just reviewed. The DG Navy planning guidance goals, shown here, lay out the
requirements for our naval forces—these will also bound our global maritime strategy.
18 (DG P43) More specific DG planning guidance is shown in this vugraph.
19 From the foregoing, it is apparent that our force limitations require a prioritiza-
tion of our strategic objectives and a sequencing of our offensive operations—a fact
that the DG recognizes as necessary and the JCS continue to reiterate. This completes
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DEFENSE GUIDANCE
NAVY PLANNING GUIDANCE GOALS
FULL ACCESS TO SLOCS AND SUPPORTING CAMPAIGNS ON LAND:
• SEEK OUT AND DESTROY ENEMY NAVAL FORCES
• CONTROL VITAL SEA AREAS AND PROTECT VITAL SLOCS
• PROVIDE SEALIFT FOR POWER PROJECTION AND MOBILITY
• ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN LOCAL SUPERIORITY
• SEIZE AND DEFEND ADVANCED NAVAL BASES
• CONDUCT LAND OR AIR OPERATIONS AS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS OF NAVAL
CAMPAIGN
• PROVIDE REINFORCING FIREPOWER TO LAND FORCES
• SUPPRESS ENEMY SEA COMMERCE
DEFENSE GUIDANCE
NAVY FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE
• OBJECTIVE IS REGAINING ESSENTIAL MARGIN OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY
• FORCES SHOULD BE SIZED ON THE BASIS OF WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS
• PROCUREMENT PLANS BASED ON:
• 14 CVBG
• BB
• REQUISITE SSNS AND SURFACE COMBATANTS
• AMPHIBIOUS LIFT FOR AE OF MAF PLUS MAB
• ESSENTIAL SUPPORT SHIPS
• READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY TOP PRIORITY
• SWA FORCE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED
• UP TO 3 CVBG
• MPS/NTPS FOR 2 MAB BY END FY 84; 3 MAB BY FY 87
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:28:34 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
our treatment of NSDD-32 and the DG. We will now turn to a more specific consider-
ation of war plan requirements and current naval force employment.
The gap that our CINCs must bridge is between that “reasonable assurance” naval force
of 22 deployed carriers, derived from the CINCs’ requirements statements, and this
real-world force of 13 deployable carriers, only 11 of which (6 Atlantic, 5 Pacific) are
actually available in the first weeks of conflict. Our presentation assumes full readiness
for our deployable forces and the degree of sustainability necessary to ensure their
fighting capability for a protracted period.
This vugraph summarizes how we will assume that the Soviets posture their threat on a
global scale. (Read)
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• ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS
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This vugraph summarizes the likely contribution of allied naval forces in a global con-
flict. Despite the real assistance these allied forces provide in covering their local or
regional waters they may contribute only modestly to the U.S. Navy’s forward offensive
counter to the global Soviet blue-water threat. (Read) Nevertheless, we must ensure
that our allies’ capabilities are strengthened insofar as possible and their forces fully
integrated into our plans and operations.
The CINCs are responsible for developing their general war plans, based on the taskings
and force allocations in the JSCP. Although all three principal CINCs are presently
tasked to provide war plans without augmentation, until very recently each CINC’s
general warplan has been based on conflict originating in his theater, with augmenta-
tion by swing forces from other theaters.
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SOVIET NAVAL FORCE POSTURE
PACIFIC: CONTROL SEA OF JAPAN/SEA OF OKHOTSK. OPERATE IN NW PACIFIC (PROTECT SSBN
OPAREAS/HOMELAND. ATTACK THREATENING ALLIED FORCES). SOVIET FORCES IN VIETNAM POSI-
TION TO INTERDICT SLOCS TO IO. NORTH KOREAN FORCES THREATEN REGIONAL SLOCS.
IO: POSITION TO ATTACK US NAVAL FORCES/SLOCS.
MED: CONCENTRATE IN EAST MED. AUGMENT BY BLACK SEA FLEET FORCES. SOVIET FORCES OPER-
ATING FROM LIBYAN BASES.
NORTHERN FLEET: CONTROL BARENTS/GREENLAND/NORTHERN NORWEGIAN SEA. PROTECT SSBN
OP AREAS/HOMELAND; SSN’s MOVE DOWN TO AND BEYOND GIN GAP, RESOURCES PERMITTING.
BALTIC FLEET: OPERATE IN BALTIC TO SUPPORT LAND CAMPAIGN, THEN MAY ATTEMPT TO JOIN
NORTHERN FLEET FORCES.
ALLIED NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS
• OVERALL: ALLIED NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS ASSIST IN COVERING LOCAL AND REGIONAL
DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.
• PACIFIC: JAPANESE (NEAR HOME WATERS) ASW, ESCORT, MCM; ASSIST MINING OF
SOJ EXITS. ANZUS ALLIES ASW, ESCORT, TACAIR CONTRIBUTION IN SE ASIA, SOUTH
PACIFIC.
• INDIAN OCEAN: LIMITED ASW/ESCORT AUGMENTATION FROM ANY IN-PLACE FRENCH, UK,
AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND FORCES.
• ATLANTIC/BALTIC: ASW, ESCORT, AND MCM IN EASTLANT/ENGLISH CHANNEL/
NORWEGIAN SEA. FRG/DENMARK MINING OF BALTIC EXITS, SS OPS IN BALTIC.
• MEDITERRANEAN: POTENTIAL FRENCH CV SUPPORT AND SS OPS IN WESTMED. SPANISH,
ITALIAN, GREEK, TURKISH SURFACE, SUBSURFACE, AND MCM CONTRIBUTION IN OWN
REGIONS OF MED. TURKISH MINING OF BLACK SEA EXITS.
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Adding up (on the diagonal in the orange) the CINCs’ existing general war plans, with
these augmentation forces, we find a total of 10 carrier battle groups in Europe, 3 in
SWA, and 9 in the Pacific to fight a global war. We don’t have this total of 22 carrier bat-
tle groups, and in fact have only 11 of the 13 shown in the JSCP available in the first
weeks of conflict. Thus, our current force maritime strategy for a near-simultaneous
global war cannot be simply the sum of existing CINCs’ general warplans.
The Joint Chiefs have recently emphasized the need to plan for a war which would rap-
idly become global. CINCLANT and CINCPAC have now been tasked to supplement
their current general war OPLANs with OPLANs for the employment of unaugmented
forces. However, naval forces required for operations in the IO will have to come from
LANT and PAC assets.
First we will review each CINC’s strategy and perspectives in his theater.
This vugraph summarizes the force deployments in the current CINCLANT general
warplan. (Pause) CINCLANT emphasizes early establishment of sea control in the
Atlantic and the key role that the defense of Iceland and Norway assumes in this strat-
egy. Note the importance of early deployment to Iceland of Marine ground forces and
additional Air Force fighter squadrons and AWACS. Keeping the majority of Soviet
forces confined north of the GIN Gap is essential to limit our own force requirements.
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CONCLUSION
MARITIME STRATEGY FOR NEAR-SIMULTANEOUS GLOBAL
WAR IS NOT THE SUM OF CINCS’ CURRENT PLANS.
FORCE ALLOCATIONS FOR GLOBAL CONFLICT
(FY 83 JSCP)














0 * 9 CVBG
*** 3 MAF
*INCLUDES 3 CVBG “SWING” FROM CINCPAC OR CINCLANT. 9 CG AND 44 DD/FF/DDG/FFG TYPES FROM PACOM
MAY ALSO “SWING”
**INCLUDES 31 PACOM AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
***INCLUDES 27 LANTCOM AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
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The force employment concept for CINCLANT’s CVBGs is highlighted here. (Pause)
CINCLANT’s convoy strategy depends initially on independent sailing on the southern
route, followed by convoy escort from Madeira north. This southern route strategy is
necessary because of an escort shortage of 65 to 103 ships. Admiral Trost* recently
highlighted this shortage in forwarding the escort requirements study. Defense of the
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CINCLANT GENERAL WARPLAN DEPLOYMENTS
• INTRATHEATER DEPLOYMENTS
• CVBGS:
• 3 TO GIN GAP
• 4TH CVBG TO N. ATLANTIC FOR SLOC PROTECTION
• 5TH AND 6TH CVBG JOIN WHEN AVAILABLE
• ICELAND
• 1 MAB
• 2 USAF F-4 TFS (NEED USAF F-15s, ADDITIONAL AWACS)
• 1 ARMY BRIGADE
• SAG TO CARIBBEAN TO DETER CUBA
• ASSAULT ELEMENT OF II MAF TO EUROPE
• OTHER ASSIGNED FORCES FOR SHIPPING/SLOC PROTECTION
• INTRATHEATER (“SWING”) DEPLOYMENTS
• MAF FROM PACOM
• 1 CV, 6 CG, 29 DD/FF, 31 AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS FROM PACOM TO LANTCOM
• 2 CV, 3 CG, 15 DD/FF TRANSIT THE LANTCOM AREA ENROUTE MED.
CINCLANT FORWARD DEFENSE
• DEFENSE OF ICELAND/NORWAY CRITICAL TO LANTCOM SEA CONTROL
• CONFINE MAJORITY OF SOVIET FORCES NORTH OF GIN
• MUST CONTROL G-I-N GAP
• IF SCENE OF BATTLE SHIFTS TO ATLANTIC, MANY MORE FORCES WILL BE REQUIRED TO DEFEAT SOVIETS
CINCLANT CVBG EMPLOYMENT
• IN BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF GIN GAP, POSITION FOUR CVBGS TO INTERDICT SOVIET FORCES
TRANSITING S. NORWEGIAN SEA
• ESTABLISH CLEAR AIR SUPERIORITY IN NORWEGIAN SEA/NORTH ATLANTIC WITH:
• EARLY ARRIVAL OF 2 CVBGS SOUTH OF GIN GAP
• DELAYED ARRIVAL OF 3RD CVBG (AFTER CUBAN/CARIBBEAN/SOLANT TASKING)
• 4TH CVBG (DEPENDENT ON MED/IO/PACOM TASKING).
CONVOY STRATEGY
• AZORES ESSENTIAL
• ELIMINATE SOVIET AIR AND SUB THREAT SOUTH OF 40 DEGREES NORTH
• ALLOWS INITIAL SHIPPING TO SAIL INDEPENDENTLY TO MADEIRA, THEN CONVOYS NORTH
• WHEN PACOM AUGMENTATION (6 CGS, 29 DD/FF/DDG/FFG) RECEIVED, CONVOYS FROM PUERTO RICO TO
MADEIRA, THEN NORTH
* Vice Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost was then serving as director of Navy Program Planning (OP-090).
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Azores, as a vital base to support our sea and air LOCs, and holding the Soviet air and
sub threat north of 40 degrees are prerequisites to this LOC defense strategy. Here you
see CINCLANT’s concerns about prompt neutralization of Cuba. (Pause)
CINCLANT’s strategic priorities for support of his Atlantic maritime strategy are
summarized here.
In the Mediterranean and southern region of NATO, these are CINCUSNAVEUR’s
tasks. (Pause) Here is CINCUSNAVEUR’s concept of maritime operations to carry out
those tasks. Note the importance of early Marine and Air Force TACAIR and AWACS
deployments, as well as potential allied land-based TACAIR support, to help attrite the
Soviet air threat. This concept emphasizes early positioning of CVBGs in the central
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 3 1
CINCLANT CONVOY STRATEGY
CUBA
• PREVENT CUBAN ATTACK OF VITAL SHIPPING
• HALF OF INITIAL SHIPPING TO NATO FROM GULF PORTS
• NEUTRALIZE CUBAN THREAT EARLY
• PERMITS TRANSIT OF SHIPPING, RELEASES FORCES
• WORST CASE IS CUBA DECLARES NEUTRALITY, WAITS UNTIL US FORCES REDEPLOYED, THEN ATTACKS
• CINCLANT FORCES AVAILABLE:
• NAVAL FORCES DIVERTED FROM OTHER TASKS
• 2 USAF B-52 SQUADRONS
CINCLANT’S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES
1. SUPPORT FOR ICELAND AND NORWAY
2. SUPPORT FOR MID-ATLANTIC LOCS (AZORES)
3. PROTECTION IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION
4. PROTECTION OF SOUTH ATLANTIC
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Med, then moving east for offensive operations as the Soviet threat is attrited. Note the
threat posed by Soviet forces operating from Libyan bases—a threat that only the Sixth
Fleet is prepared to counter since Libya lies south of NATO planning boundaries.
(Pause) The ability of our Mediterranean forces to fulfill the strategy requirements in
the southern region are shown here. Note that CINCUSNAVEUR desires 4 CVBGs or
additional land based TACAIR augmentation to operate with two or three CVBGs in
the eastern Mediterranean.
3 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
MARITIME TASKS IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN
• DESTROY SOVIET NAVAL FORCES
• TACAIR AND AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT TO ALLIES
• CONTROL GIBRALTAR, TURKISH STRAITS, SUEZ
• SECURE SLOCS TO REINFORCE/RESUPPLY SOUTHERN REGION
• OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO REGAIN INITIATIVE
CINCUSNAVEUR CONCEPT OF MARITIME OPERATIONS
• POSITION CVBGS IN CENTMED
• USMC/USAF TACAIR TO TURKEY/GREECE/ITALY
• LOCATE AND TRAIL SOVIET SSNS
• TURKISH CLOSURE OF STRAITS
• COUNTERATTACK IMMEDIATE SOVMEDFLT THREAT
• AWACS/US AND ALLIED LAND-BASED TACAIR/SAM BARRIERS ATTRITE AIR THREAT
FROM CRIMEA
• NEUTRALIZE SOVIET FORCES IN LIBYA IF REQUIRED
• DESTROY RESIDUAL SOVMEDFLT THREAT
• SECURE MED LOCS
• OFFENSIVE AIR/AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TO SUPPORT LAND CAMPAIGN
CINCUSNAVEUR COMMENTS ON ABILITY
TO EXECUTE STRATEGY
• 2 CVBGS CANNOT SUSTAIN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN HIGH THREAT ENVIRONMENT OF
EASTMED WITHOUT EITHER:
• EARLY CVBG AUGMENTATION
• EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF USAF LAND-BASED TACAIR/AWACS TO GREECE, TURKEY, AND SOUTHERN ITALY
• OTHERWISE, 4 CVBGS NEEDED TO OPERATE IN EASTMED WITH “HIGH CONFIDENCE”
• ALSO NEED ADDITIONAL SSN AND MPA
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Here is a summary of CINCPAC’s current General War Concept of Operations. (Pause)
CINCPAC stresses the importance of defense of the Aleutians. Soviet seizure of one of
the Aleutian airfields could bring Hawaii and the US West Coast within easy Soviet air
attack range. The early dispatch of Marine ground and land based air forces for the
defense of these key islands must preclude this eventuality. Recent and future combined
arms exercises in the northern Pacific will underscore the importance of defending this
strategic area. Elsewhere, CINCPAC must destroy or confine Soviet naval forces in the
northwest Pacific, assist our allies in Korea and Japan, control vast reaches of SLOCs,
and operate in support of any SWA action. In CINCPAC’s recent presentation of his
strategic concepts to the JCS, he concluded that “swing”, by redeploying over half his
carriers, cruisers, destroyers and all but six of his amphibious ships, would jeopardize
even the capability to defend the US. Likewise, CINCPAC also concludes that the
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 3 3
CINCPAC GENERAL WARPLAN
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
• DEPLOY PACOM FORCES TO ALEUTIANS, JAPAN, ROK
• DESTROY SOVIET NAVAL FORCES
• ASSIST IN DEFENSE OF JAPAN AND ROK
• CONDUCT OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO MAINTAIN SECURITY OF HAWAII, ALEUTIANS,
GUAM, LOCS
• CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST USSR
• DEPLOY MARINE, ARMY AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
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deployment of major forces to the SWA region would prevent any forward defense in
the NW Pacific.
In fact, CINCPAC prefers a different strategy approach, and has developed an alterna-
tive strategy which would carry out the four strategic priorities shown here. Basically,
the SWA SLOC protection mission would be deferred in favor of engaging Soviet Far
East forces well forward. The objective would be to keep Japan and Korea as active
allies, maximize our own use of Korean and Japanese forces and bases and, at a mini-
mum, deny the use of these bases to the Soviets. Early offensive strikes on the Soviets
would support these key allies, strike at areas of exposed Soviet weakness and keep the
Soviets preoccupied with homeland defense. CINCPAC’s sequence of operations,
shown here, highlights the initial importance of the Aleutians, additional USAF
TACAIR to northern Japan followed at some point by offensive mining, and strikes on
Soviet client bases. In the initial operations phase, the IO CVBG would attack the
Soviet Indian Ocean squadron as it redeployed out of the IO. A force of 3 CVBGs
would generate in the vicinity of Guam and begin to sweep key SLOCs and position for
subsequent strike operations. Korean and Japanese forces make major contributions in
self-defense in this phase, while our own offensive naval operations confine and attrite
Soviet Far East forces. In the subsequent offensive operations phase, the forces would
help stabilize the situation in Korea. Then they would move forward to further increase
the pressure on the Soviets, adding to their perception of our resolve to bring the con-
sequences of aggression home to them until the war is terminated. This strategy
3 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
CURRENT OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
CINCPAC CONCLUSIONS
• SWING “. . . IGNORES THE INCREASED SOVIET THREAT IN THE PACIFIC AND EXACERBATES THE
INADEQUACY OF FORCES CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO PACOM.”
• “DEFENSE OF NE ASIA ALLIES AND THE PACOM LOCS SHOULD BE GIVEN HIGHER PRIORITY
THAN ENSURING ACCESS TO SWA OIL IN A GLOBAL WAR SCENARIO.”
• DIFFERENT APPROACH PREFERRED.
• NO “SWING” ASSUMED
• PRIORITY TO NE ASIA ALLIES
CINCPAC PREFERRED STRATEGY
• DEFEND US
• FORWARD DEFENSE IN NE ASIA & NW PACIFIC
• INDIAN OCEAN OPS DEFERRED (EXCEPT TRANSIT STRIKES)
• EARLY STRIKES ON SOVIET FAR EAST TO SUPPORT OVERALL DEFENSE
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assumes that the PRC as a minimum will serve as a force-in-being and will therefore tie
down significant Soviet forces.
This CINCPAC alternative strategy would suggest a change in the current presidential
and SECDEF regional prioritization of access to SWA oil over the defense of Pacific
allies. Also, CINCPAC would require the full use of his 5 initially available carriers as
well as some additional USAF force tactical fighter and B-52 squadrons.
Up to this point, you’ve seen the national strategy requirements and the regional
taskings and perspectives of the CINCs. Now we will review an overall maritime strat-
egy for the employment of current forces in a near-simultaneous global war. We have
tried to tie together the strategic requirements and the key aspects of the CINCs’ cur-
rent strategy preferences into a logical and balanced strategic concept employing joint
and combined forces.
The essence of our national strategy is global forward deterrence. Sequential employ-
ment of our global maritime force is necessary. But we do not have the luxury of ceding
any major region to the Soviets by default—even SWA. The forward aspect means that
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 3 5
CINCPAC PREFERRED STRATEGY
• INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS/STRIKES
• USMC GROUND/TACAIR TO ALEUTIANS
• TACAIR TO N. JAPAN
• MINE JAPANESE STRAITS
• UW/AIR STRIKES ON SOVIETS IN VIETNAM/PDRY/ETHIOPIA
• INITIAL OPERATIONS
• IO: CVBG ATTACK SOVIET IO SQUADRON, REDEPLOY TO NW PACIFIC
• SOUTH CHINA SEA: TRANSIT STRIKE BY REDEPLOYING CVBG
• JAPAN/KOREA: MAJOR CONTRIBUTION IN SELF-DEFENSE
• SOVIET FAR EAST: ATTRITE NAVAL THREAT, SUB BARRIER OPS, STRIKE VULNERABILITIES
• SUBSEQUENT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
• KOREA: STABILIZE DEFENSE, MAXIMIZE DAMAGE TO N. KOREAN FORCES
• JAPAN: CVBGS ADVANCE UNDER COVER OF INCREASED AIR DEFENSE SHADOW OF JAPAN




• ESSENCE OF NATIONAL STRATEGY GLOBAL FORWARD DETERRENCE
• GLOBAL: CEDE NO REGION TO SOVIETS BY DEFAULT
• FORWARD: KEEP OPEN SLOCS TO EURASIA, FULL COOPERATION WITH US FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES AND ALLIES
• DETERRENCE: TO DETER IS TO THREATEN. REQUIRES CONTINUING PRESSURE ON SOVIET CORE VALUES (HOMELAND,
BASES, CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC FORCES).
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we must keep the SLOC’s open to Eurasia, provide reinforcement/resupply shipping,
and support fully our other services and allies. The third element—deterrence—must
be viewed not only in its peacetime or strategic nuclear context, but also in terms of
our threatening pressure on the Soviets which reinforces or restores deterrence in crisis
or wartime. Continuing pressure on Soviet core values such as their homeland, bases,
conventional and strategic forces is essential to our military and political strategy
objectives. We want to ensure the maritime strategy contributes to our objective of war
termination on favorable terms. First, we must keep sufficient offensive pressure on the
Soviets to convince them of no gain in continuing their aggression. Second, we mini-
mize the attraction of the escalation option to the Soviets by having in being strategic
nuclear forces to provide a secure reserve, and sustained capabilities in our conven-
tional forces. Third, we use our inherently flexible and mobile battle group and
amphibious forces to carry the fight to the enemy, to gain or regain territory and strike
Soviet vulnerabilities. The result desired is to gain some negotiating advantages of our
own and preclude the Soviets just “sitting on” their initial territorial gains.
We will now discuss a notional force employment reflecting current forces centered on
11 initially available, fully ready, carrier battle groups. Over the POM period, the addi-
tional carrier battle group and other programmed force enhancements and force mul-
tipliers would augment obvious needs but probably would not change the essence of the
CINCs’ strategy or basic force employments. This force employment is based on a
striking symmetry between key elements of the LANT and PAC strategy. Both CINCs




• OBJECTIVE OF WARFIGHTING IS WAR TERMINATION ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO US
• WAR TERMINATION REQUIRES SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON SOVIETS TO CONVINCE THEM OF NO GAIN IN CONTINUING
AGGRESSION
• FAVORABLE TERMS TO US MEANS:
• SOVIETS SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN FURTHER ESCALATING CONFLICT
• REQUIRES SECURE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR RESERVE
• REQUIRES SUSTAINED CAPABILITIES OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
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place fundamental importance on a forward defense pivoted on keystone northern
islands that control access to the U.S. and lie above the vital transoceanic sealanes. If these
islands are lost, the roof collapses on our links with NATO and the key Pacific allies. Early
forward U.S. and allied land based TACAIR helps attrite the air threat while the subma-
rine and surface threat is confined and attrited by early forward SSN barriers and
offensive mining by the US and its allies. Note how early offensive mining of choke
points would play a vital role in holding back the enemy’s numerical weight to enhance






CINCLANT AND CINCPAC STRATEGY SYMMETRY
• KEEP SOVIET THREAT AWAY FROM CONUS AND SLOCS BY EARLY FORWARD DEFENSE AND
ATTRITION:
• DEFEND ISLAND “KEYSTONES” (ICELAND, ADAK)
• EARLY FORWARD SSN BARRIERS (NORTH OF GIN; NW PACIFIC)
• OFFENSIVE MINING OF CHOKE POINTS (BALTIC/BLACK SEAS; TSUSHIMA, TSUGARU, SOYA)
• OFFENSIVE PRESSURE ON SOVIETS ESSENTIAL TO DEFEND VITAL FLANK ALLIES (NORWAY, JAPAN/
KOREA).
• PRESERVE BASES FOR US USE
• AT MINIMUM, DENY BASES TO SOVIETS
• BLUNT INITIAL ATTACK THEN USE FULLY GENERATED FORCES (CVBGS, USMC) TO “SUPPORT
LAND WAR”.
• 4 CVBGS DESIRED IN FORWARD POSITIONS (GIN GAP; NW PACIFIC).
• “BOTTOM LINE” IS 3 CVBGS IN FORWARD POSITIONS
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our own forces’ ability to quickly move the offense forward. As shown here, our allies
can play a key role, and their capabilities factor heavily in our choke-point mining
plans. SSNs with mining capability would be the primary means to mine Soviet ports
like Petropavlovsk and heavily defended coastal areas, while TACAIR, P-3s, and B-52s
would be used to lay mine barriers in lower threat areas and oceanic choke points. The
early offensive pressure on the Soviets is essential to defend the vital flank allies and
deny their bases to the enemy. Then once the initial attack is blunted, we would hope to
use our Navy/Marine Corps team to bring decisive offensive pressure on the enemy from
forward positions, leading to war termination on favorable terms.



















MINEFIELDS FOR CONFINEMENT OF SOVIET FLEETS
CURRENT ALLIED MINE INVENTORIES
ASTRIDE RELEVANT STRAITS
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With this symmetry of the existing LANT and PAC CINCs’ strategies in mind, let’s look
at a notional current force employment in the Atlantic and Pacific to support an overall
strategy. The length of the prehostilities phase is critical, and will allow insertion of
land-based TACAIR in such crucial areas as Iceland, the Aleutians, Japan, SWA, as well
as Europe and Turkey. If we have even a week of prehostilities movement, it makes the
second phase of blunting the initial attack much easier. But, an extended prehostilities
phase might become a double-edged sword for us if the Soviets should contradict our
assumptions about holding back the bulk of their submarine forces and, instead, surge
these south into our sealanes.
Our strategy keeps forward pressure on the Soviets to blunt the initial attack and then
to conduct offensive operations. (Pause). First we support our own and allied forces to
stabilize the land battle. (Pause). Then our Navy/Marine Corps team carries the fight to
the enemy to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and to gain or regain territorial areas essen-
tial to our war termination leverage.
The precise timing of the commitment of our carrier battle groups to the land battle in
both these phases is a critical but highly scenario-dependent decision. We must





• EARLY USMC GROUND/USAF (F-15) TACAIR TO ICELAND/ADAK
• SSNS TO FORWARD BARRIERS
• CVBGS (3 TOTAL) TO FORWARD POSITIONS SOUTH OF GIN/EAST OF JAPAN
• OFFENSIVE MINING PREPARATIONS
• INITIAL SEALIFT TO EUR/MED SAIL INDEPENDENTLY
FORCE EMPLOYMENT
ATLANTIC/PACIFIC
• BLUNT INITIAL ATTACK/SUPPORT LAND BATTLE
• BARRIER SSNS PRESSURE SOVIETS/ATTRITE SUB THREAT
• USAF, USMC, AND ALLIED LAND-BASED TACAIR/SURVEILLANCE ASSETS ATTRITE SOVIET AIR THREAT.
• CVBGS MANEUVER IN FORWARD POSITIONS TO ATTACK UNATTRITED AIR AND SUBMARINE THREATS,
MAINTAIN SEA CONTROL
• CVBGS THEN PRESS FURTHER FORWARD AS REQUIRED TO:
• HELP BLUNT LAND ATTACK
• KEEP PRESSURE ON SOVIET FORCES/HOMELAND
• CARRY FIGHT TO ENEMY
• MAINTAIN/INCREASE FORWARD OFFENSIVE PRESSURE ON SOVIET VULNERABILITIES
• NAVY/MARINE CORPS OFFENSIVE MOVEMENTS TO:
• REGAIN TERRITORY FROM SOVIETS (NORWAY, JUTLAND, KOREA?)
• GAIN TERRITORY (S. KURILES, N. KOREA?)
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preserve our flexibility to intervene in a decisive manner, and employ our battle groups
to make the strategic difference.
Turning from the Atlantic and Pacific to the Mediterranean and SWA, we are dealing
with situations in which our maritime forces are primarily supporting non-maritime
CINCs. The key issue in both regions is somewhat similar: how early do we need to
control the SLOC’s in more limited areas? This overall strategy would concentrate
initially on denying the Soviets sea control in the eastern Mediterranean and Indian
Ocean. But we do not interpret sequential operations to mean uncontested withdrawal
from the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean regions.
Maintaining our initially deployed battle groups in the central Mediterranean and the
Indian Ocean has two benefits: First, we complicate the Soviet ability to rapidly shift
and concentrate their backfire threat in either region. Second, in Southwest Asia such
in-place forces are likely to have a decisive effect on the Soviet decision to continue their
initial aggression. Our national interest is not in Iran, per se, but in maintaining access
to the oil of the Arabian Peninsula. We might do well, then, to avoid getting our strat-
egy thinking bogged down in debates over regional priorities and accept the fact that
the SWA region will be contested to the extent possible, with the Navy/Marine Corps
forces available to the region at the outset of conflict playing the key initial role mili-
tarily and signalling our political resolve to counter Soviet aggression in the region.
In the worst scenarios, our one deployed carrier battle group, MIDEASTFORCE, and
7th MAB/NTPF may initially have to carry out the SWA regional mission without aug-
mentation. Despite the great risk, they may have to destroy Soviet naval forces in the
4 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
BLUNT INITIAL ATTACK/SUPPORT LAND BATTLE
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Indian Ocean and could have to cover the insertion of the NTPF MAB at least into
Oman.
With more prehostilities time, we would have the option of surging a second carrier
into the IO, to cover the insertion of limited land based TACAIR into at least Oman
and surging additional SSNs and MPA support.
In summary, a global war scenario may require us to execute a limited strategy in SWA
with in-place maritime forces. This strategy recognizes the need to engage Soviet forces
early on with US forces in place at that time, and would keep offensive pressure on the
Soviets and position our forces to eventually regain access to Persian Gulf oil.
Our force employment strategy in the Med recognizes the priority given to protecting
the trans-Atlantic SLOC’s to the Med with our 3 CVBG forward pressure strategy in
the North Atlantic, the realities of only 6 Atlantic CVBGs available, and the need to
neutralize any threat posed from Libya. We would augment the deployed Med CVBG
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 4 1
FORCE EMPLOYMENT
SOUTHWEST ASIA
• FORCES IN-PLACE: 1 CVBG/MEF/NTPF
• POSSIBLE AUGMENTATION FORCES:
• 2ND CVBG
• LAND-BASED TACAIR TO OMAN
• ADDITIONAL SSN/MPA SUPPORT
• MUST DESTROY SOVIET IO FORCES




• POSITION 2 CVBGS IN CENTMED
• USMC/USAF TACAIR/AWACS TO ITALY/GREECE/TURKEY
• LOCATE AND TRAIL SOVIET SSNS
• BLUNT THE ATTACK/SUPPORT LAND BATTLE
• TURKS MINE STRAITS
• USAF, USMC, AND ALLIED LAND-BASED TACAIR/SURVEILLANCE HELP ATTRITE SOVIET AIR THREAT
• CVBGS IN CENTMED AREA ATTACK UNATTRITED SUB/AIR THREATS, MAINTAIN SEA CONTROL
• 2 CVBGS, WHEN JOINED BY THIRD CVBG, MIGHT RISK MOVE FORWARD IN EAST CENTRAL MED FOR OFFENSIVE OPS TO:
• HELP BLUNT LAND ATTACK
• KEEP PRESSURE ON SOVIET SOUTHERN FLANK/FORCES
• CARRY FIGHT TO ENEMY
• NAVY/MARINE CORPS THRUSTS TO GAIN OR REGAIN TERRITORY (THRACE, ADRIATIC)
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with a second CVBG as soon as possible, as we are committed to chop two Med CVBGs
to SACEUR at NATO SIMPLE ALERT. The third battle group for the Med might well
be required to delay enroute to conduct transit strike on Cuba.
If we then elect to move forward into the eastern Med with the 3 available CVBGs to
control the SLOCs, support the land battle, and bring pressure closer to the Soviet
homeland we would do so at higher risk.
I will now conclude this review of our forward offensive maritime strategy with a con-
sideration of two factors that complicate our force employment requirements.
First, Cuba poses a threat to both the continental United States and to over half of our
initial reinforcement/resupply shipments to Europe. There are no naval forces specifi-
cally allocated in the JSCP to neutralize Cuba, yet it must be neutralized early to ensure
scheduled transit of reinforcement shipping. CINCLANT’s force employment prefer-
ence would be to use USAF B-52 squadrons and land-based attack aircraft to strike a
crippling blow on Cuban air and naval bases at the outset of the war. One deploying
carrier battle group could also participate in a coordinated initial strike with the Air
Force. If required, the last of the carrier battle groups deploying to the Med or North
Atlantic could participate in other coordinated follow-on strikes.
Thus, the need for early neutralization of the Cuban threat, and the need to minimize
the diversion of our CVBGs from their forward offensive roles suggests an innovative
4 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
COMPLICATING FACTORS
CUBA
• THREAT TO CONUS AND HALF OF INITIAL RE/RE SHIPPING TO EUROPE
• CINCLANT: MUST NEUTRALIZE CUBA EARLY
• NO NAVAL FORCES ALLOCATED SPECIFICALLY FOR CUBA (JSCP)
• 2 B-52 SQUADRONS ALLOCATED
COMPLICATING FACTORS
CUBA
• OFFENSIVE FORCE EMPLOYMENT:
• EARLY USE OF USAF B-52 SQUADRONS, LAND-BASED ATTACK A/C TO ELIMINATE THREAT TO SHIPPING WITH MINIMUM
CVBG DIVERSION.
• CVBG PARTICIPATE IN COORDINATED INITIAL STRIKE (DEPENDENT ON SCENARIO/INITIAL LOCATION)
• LAST CVBGS DEPLOYING TO NORLANT/MED PARTICIPATE IN BRIEF COORDINATED FOLLOW-ON STRIKE IF REQUIRED
• OBSERVATIONS:
• NEED INNOVATIVE JOINT PLANNING FOR CUBA IN GLOBAL WAR CONTEXT.
• LAND-BASED TACAIR/SURVEILLANCE.
• AIR FORCE TACAIR COVER FOR PHMS, OTHER SURFACE ASSETS (SLOC DEFENSE).
• INCREASED EXERCISES WITH USAF.
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look south in our joint planning, emphasizing land-based TACAIR and surveillance
cooperation with the Air Force. Air Force air cover for our PHM and other surface
assets can contribute greatly to continual protection of the SLOCs in this Caribbean
area where we may not have battle group forces to allocate.
The second complicating factor is Soviet forces operating from Vietnamese bases. Our
three battle group forward offensive pressure on Soviet forces in the NW Pacific will
prevent the Soviets from augmenting their forces in Vietnam. This would help us in
dealing with a finite threat from Soviet forces. This Soviet South China Sea threat to the
vital umbilical SLOCs from the Indian Ocean must be eliminated at the outset of con-
flict. The strategy would coordinate our surveillance and strikes with USAF B-52 assis-
tance from Philippine and Guam bases, using an additional CVBG enroute to the
Indian Ocean for an early strike if possible.
The strategy and force employment presented illustrates clearly that the U.S. Navy is
making a major strategic difference in our peacetime deterrent posture and will make a
major strategic impact in the conduct of wartime operations. In order to ensure the
latter, we must learn how the Soviets think, tactically and strategically, and use superior
tactics and strategy to maximize the warfighting capability of our smaller naval forces.
We must ensure that our current forces are ready to fight, across the board, now—and
that the necessary sustainability items are there to keep them in battle for extended
periods. We must pursue short term objectives that enhance our warfighting capabili-
ties—force multipliers—to bridge the gap between current and required force levels as
best we can. We must work in complete concert with the other services and our allies,
ensuring that their contributions to maritime operations are not overlooked or mis-
used. The achievement of the foregoing, along with the force structure growth and
modernization we need, will further ensure that our Navy and Marine forces will con-
tinue to make the strategic difference.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 4 3
COMPLICATING FACTORS
VIETNAM
• THREAT OF SOVIET FORCES/FACILITIES
• KEEP SOVIET THREAT FINITE BY FORWARD OFFENSIVE PRESSURE IN NW PACIFIC
• DESTROY SOVIET SOUTH CHINA SEA FORCES AT THE OUTSET
• OFFENSIVE FORCE EMPLOYMENT:
• EARLY COORDINATED USAF/USN SURVEILLANCE/STRIKE
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The Maritime Strategy, 1984
The 1984 Maritime Strategy was the first that was made into a formal publication and
circulated throughout the Navy. From its initial development in 1982 until 4 May 1984,
when the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, issued this publication,
it had only been an evolving and unsigned staff briefing, as the key figures had all agreed
at the conclusion of a briefing on 4 November 1982.* In Admiral Watkins’s letter of dis-
tribution, he noted that “it [the Maritime Strategy publication] outlines the Navy’s role
in our national military strategy, especially in the event of a global conventional war
with the Soviet Union.” In addition, he declared, “It has formed the basis for the develop-
ment of [the] Navy POM-86 [Program Objectives Memorandum 1986], testimony in sup-
port of Navy budgets and programs, and joint and allied cooperative planning efforts.”†
The development of the publication began in 1983 with the appointment of Captain
Roger Barnett as head of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) and, within that
office, Commander Peter Swartz as action officer for the Maritime Strategy, to replace
both Lieutenant Commander Stanley Weeks and Commander W. Spencer Johnson, who
went on to new assignments. These changes coincided with the beginning of a new phase
of congressional testimony to support the Navy’s budget and programs in the POM-86
process. At this juncture, Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, the outgoing Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) (OP-06), took great and direct interest
in the plans for the next step to the strategy. In particular, he wanted to advance the con-
ceptual underpinning of the strategy and to move from an emphasis on carrier battle
groups so as to include other types of naval forces, allied navies and air forces, and joint
U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force strategy. In addition, the new version was to be more
closely connected with the intelligence community’s understanding of Soviet naval strat-












* For a more detailed explanation of the background to this document, see John B. Hattendorf,
The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, R.I.:
Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 74–81.
† Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-84, serial 00/4S300236, 4
May 1984, paras. 2 and 3. This publication was approved for declassification by the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 7 February 2007.
‡ See Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs through the 1990s, National
Intelligence Estimate 11-15-82/D, in Evolution, by Hattendorf, pp. 101–84.
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Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College
had been thinking about in terms of northern Norway and the Mediterranean in rela-
tionship to naval support of NATO, the strategic relationship of naval operations to the
European Central Front, the role of Pacific Fleet battle forces, and the importance of the
sea lines of communication in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas.
As the action officer for the Maritime Strategy, Swartz’s principal task was to meet Vice
Admiral Moreau’s requirements as well as to turn the Weeks-Johnson briefing into a
publication. In this, he wanted to represent the collective thought of the U.S. Navy’s high
command, to flesh out the initial concepts with additional information on the national
strategic, joint, and allied aspects of the strategy. Meanwhile, he sought to preserve and
build upon the essence of Lieutenant Commander Weeks and Commander Johnson’s
pathbreaking effort. As he approached this task, he was influenced by the concepts con-
tained in Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie’s 1967 book Military Strategy: A General Theory of
Power Control and particularly by Wylie’s view that military control cannot be isolated
from other factors.*
After looking through the materials available to him, Swartz concluded that Admiral
Robert Long’s Pacific Command campaign plan—one of the plans that the joint com-
manders in chief had recently briefed to General Vessey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
and which had been consulted and used by Lieutenant Commander Weeks—provided a
model that he could apply in global terms. This choice reemphasized the line of thought
that had arisen, in its turn, from concepts that Admiral Thomas Hayward had developed
in his “Project Sea Strike” as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and that Admiral Long,
as Vice Chief of Naval Operations overseeing the work on SEA PLAN 2000, had also
applied. Both Barnett and Swartz were familiar with these documents from earlier
Washington assignments. In addition, Barnett had written his doctoral dissertation on
Soviet military thought and had studied the issue of Soviet strategic reserves; Swartz had
conducted predoctoral research on U.S. Navy–NATO navy relationships and plans.†
Swartz’s expansion of the Maritime Strategy into a publication with an intentionally
eye-catching bright yellow cover was developed through the summer and autumn of
1983 as a result of pointed feedback from a succession of briefings and “murder-board
sessions” at the working level of strategically minded commanders and captains. Among
key people who provided input to Swartz at this time were Commander James R. Stark,
who had worked on SEA PLAN 2000 in 1977–78, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas
Wilkerson and Major Tony Wood at Marine Corps Headquarters.
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* See J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, introduction by John B.
Hattendorf and postscript by J. C. Wylie, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1989).
† Roger W. Barnett, “Soviet Military Thought: Exploring Soviet Intentions” (PhD diss., University
of Southern California, 1977). See also Barnett, “Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet Navy,”
in The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? ed. Kenneth M. Currie and Gregory Varhall (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), and “U.S. Maritime Strategy: Sound and Safe,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43, no. 7 (September 1987), pp. 30–39.
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Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott, Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-
60), gave the first major briefing of this new version to Admiral Watkins and six former
Chiefs of Naval Operations and other key figures on board USCGC Chase (WHEC 718),
during the America’s Cup race off Newport, Rhode Island, on 13 September 1983. In
October, it was briefed to the OPNAV Program Development Review Committee and the
CNO Executive Board. On 19 January 1984, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and
Admiral Watkins presented the briefing to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.
Then, on 14 March, Secretaries Weinberger and Lehman presented the briefing to the
Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Between 13 Septem-
ber 1983 and 4 May 1984, when the final version was signed, the draft publication had
evolved through seventy-five detailed briefings, some to allied chiefs of navy, representatives
of other American armed services, and war college students.
Barnett and Swartz felt that the 1984 publication achieved a number of things. First,
they had made connections with key staff members who worked war plan issues on the
various commanders in chief ’s staffs and were confident that the 1984 strategy was not
contrary to their thinking and would not be opposed for those reasons. Second, this ver-
sion of the strategy was the first to mention and to lay out in any detail the role of naval
forces in the direct defense of the American coasts and ports, in what would later come to
be called homeland defense, and cited the assets of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Naval
Reserve as the primary tools for these operations. This theme was picked up and contin-
ued through all the following versions of the Maritime Strategy. Third, this version was
the first capstone document specifically to identify terrorism as a threat that naval forces
could help to counter. From this point onward, terrorism remained listed as a threat,
although it was not given the highest priority as long as the Soviet Union held that posi-
tion. Fourth, they had organized the strategy by warfare tasks, which related to the Com-
posite Warfare Commander concept that governed the way in which naval officers
tended to think about operations and to the categories by which the Warfare Appraisal
portion of the Navy’s program-planning process was organized. Fifth, they chose a dis-
tinctive map projection to illustrate the strategic ideas. Instead of using separate theater
maps, they chose a single map that placed the Soviet Union in the center of the projec-
tion, thereby stressing the global nature of the strategy while simultaneously showing the
key flanking oceanic areas in the Norwegian Sea and in the Northwest Pacific. At the
same time, constant repetition of this particular map projection throughout each briefing
provided a single clear picture that showed how the Navy made a strategic difference in a
future war. Finally—building on the concept of “complicating factors” introduced by
Lieutenant Commander Weeks and Commander Johnson—they had institutionalized an
“uncertainties” section within the strategy, emphasizing the contingent nature of many
of the strategy’s assumptions, and stressing the importance of critical thinking in imple-
menting the strategy. 
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 4 7
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:28:48 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
This is the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy. It is the Navy’s current determination as to
the best overall conventional maritime strategy for global war today. It is the Navy’s
preferred strategy, considering national and coalition guidance, the threat, force levels,
and trade-offs among conflicting aims. It is a baseline strategy, around which our other
strategic options are centered.
Before discussing the role of the Navy in a conventional global war, it must be empha-
sized that the Navy serves the U.S. government across the entire range of conflict possibili-
ties: from peacetime presence through strategic nuclear war. While the strategy outlined
here focuses on global conventional war, the Navy’s role in it cannot be understood com-
pletely without some mention of other kinds of conflict. Therefore, it will initially focus
briefly on the Navy’s two other major roles: peacetime presence and crisis response.
The Navy’s peacetime presence is constant and worldwide. While naval units naturally
spend much time operating in the Western Atlantic and Eastern Pacific, a major pres-
ence is also maintained in the Western Pacific. Permanent deployments, in force, are
made to the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, and the Indian
Ocean. The Northeast Atlantic and North Pacific are also not neglected, since those are
vital areas from which naval forces must be prepared to fight.
At any point in time, over 110 thousand Navy men and women are at sea, in many
parts of the world, plus three to four thousand civilian mariners providing afloat logis-
tics support.
Naval forces underline American commitments and interests around the globe every day.
Their forward presence is a physical demonstration of our will; encouraging allies and
friends; deterring and reducing the influence of enemies; influencing neutrals; and
4 8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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asserting and reinforcing principles of international law and freedom of the seas on a
continuous basis.
Throughout the year naval forces participate in a demanding series of peacetime exer-
cises. Dozens are held each year; often with allies and other services. This chart shows
only some of the most important ones last year, the largest being FLEETEX 83-1 in the
North Pacific and the sequence UNITED EFFORT/OCEAN SAFARI in the Atlantic.
These exercises contribute to alliance cohesion, enabling U.S. naval units to operate
routinely with sister services and allied forces, and to test and update joint and com-
bined procedures.
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One measure of the Navy’s peacetime presence role is the number of diplomatic port
visits. Note that the dots on this chart only represent countries visited—over 65. To
show the individual ports themselves would be impossible on such a small chart.
These routine port visits are conducted not only to ensure adequate crew rest and
relaxation; but also to promote better relations between the United States and the
allied, friendly, and neutral countries visited; and to demonstrate American military
strength, professionalism and support.
Crisis response is the next major U.S. Navy role. Since World War II, the U.S. Navy ha[s]
been used for this purpose more often than any other service: over 200 times, in more
than 80 percent of the crises in which the United States has been involved.
Carrier battle groups and amphibious forces have been the primary instruments of
naval crisis response, but most other types of naval forces can also be so used. Naval
5 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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forces are sometimes used in crises in conjunction with other U.S. services, but less so
with allied forces, and then usually outside formal alliance frameworks.
U.S. Navy crisis response can range from varying deployment patterns to express spe-
cific concern and support, through clear demonstrations of warfighting capabilities, to
the actual use of force in support of national objectives. Naval forces can be used across
the full spectrum of responses to crises, from countering acts of state-supported terror-
ism, to engaging in single-theater wars.
During the last year alone, U.S. naval forces were used at least six times, as part of the
U.S. national response to crises: off Central America, in Grenada, off Libya, in Lebanon,
off Korea in response to the assassination of the Korean Government officials in Burma,
and off Northern Japan to help locate the Korean airliner downed by the Soviets.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 5 1
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Naval forces are able to conduct such extensive forward peacetime and crisis opera-
tions, while preparing for the possibility of global war, because of their great mobility
and flexibility. This chart shows the movements of major U.S. naval forces during just a
3-month period this past winter.
Under the FLEXOPS deployment concept, naval commanders have completely reor-
dered their methods of peacetime scheduling. This allows for more realistic
multicarrier and amphibious operations, greater flexibility for theater commanders,
and far more useful training; while at the same time reducing the time out of homeport
for Navy and Marine Corps personnel. This new concept of operations made it possible
for naval units to undertake the major peacekeeping operation in Lebanon and the
regional security operation in Grenada without disrupting or reducing peacetime
deployments elsewhere in the world.
Peacetime Deployments and Crisis Response, while lower in intensity than the Navy’s
global warfighting role, nevertheless affect the strategy for carrying out that role. The
Navy continually tests and evaluates the Maritime Strategy through exercises, war
games, and from “lessons learned” from crisis and single-theater war operations, such
as those that took place in the Middle East and the Falklands. More importantly, the
Navy’s global deterrent and warfighting strategy influences its peacetime and crisis
activities.
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Feedback from these operations, as well as the strategy itself, highlights the strengths
and weaknesses of the current naval force structure and, in turn, influences research
and development and procurement plans. Conversely, actual procurement—the forces
available—acts to bound the strategy, as shall be seen.
The primary concern here is the U.S. Navy’s baseline strategy for fighting a global conven-
tional war with the Soviets. At the conclusion, some of the implications of escalation to
nuclear war, both theater and strategic, will be examined.
This is an overview of what is to follow. The first portion underscores the relationship
between the Maritime Strategy and national strategy. The Maritime Strategy is integral
to our national strategy, for if the United States must go to war, it must go to sea. The
Maritime Strategy, however, is not an independent strategy, although it can be described
independently.
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The Maritime Strategy flows from and contributes to the national strategy, and is sensi-
tive to Soviet strategy. It is not determined, but it is definitely bounded, by force capa-
bility. Consideration of these factors, therefore, is necessary as a prelude to discussing
the strategy itself. Before concluding, the uncertainties inherent in this strategy will be
considered. The uncertainties are very difficult to predict. They may well prevent the
strategy from being implemented as preferred.
Those who say that the United States has no national strategy are simply wrong. The
national strategy is constructed upon this foundation: deterrence first, but if this fails,
then defense as far forward as possible, worldwide, in conjunction with our allies.
The sources of our national strategy are diverse. This is a list of the most important of
them as they relate to the maritime strategy.
The NSDD’s are presidential decisions on national strategy. The DG is annual Secretary
of Defense guidance on strategy and programs. The JSPD and JSCP are annual JCS
documents which recommend strategy to the National Command Authority, and pro-
vide guidance to the unified and specified commanders, respectively.
The Navy contributes to the development of these documents, and naval forces are
among those responsible for their execution.
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NSDD-32, a national security decision directive signed by the President, is the basic
document setting forth the national strategy. Essential points have been extracted here.
It is a clear, direct document, with which naval strategic thought is largely in harmony.
In it, the importance of global, conventional, balanced, and forward deployed forces is
highlighted.
Within the Department of Defense, the Secretary promulgates guidance annually. Its
primary purpose is to guide the annual Program Objectives Memorandum.
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NSDD-32 (20 MAY 82)
“US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY”
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The current Defense Guidance is very positive in its guidance on maritime posture.
It contains, however, a global war planning scenario that has the war commencing with
a Soviet attack in Southwest Asia, and then spreading to Europe and Korea sixteen days
later.
What troubles the Navy is that this scenario can be used to influence planning and
programming to an unwarranted degree. Actually fighting a global war against the
Soviets the way the scenario depicts would be very unwise.
This year’s Defense Guidance has updated the listing of earlier regional priorities for
general Department of Defense planning. The Secretary of Defense has now placed
defense of our Pacific allies and lines of communication on an equal footing with access
to oil in Southwest Asia. He has also clarified the position of friendly Caribbean and
Central American states as part of North America, our top defense priority.
DG 86-90 provides the Navy with clear force planning guidance warfighting goals,
emphasizing destruction of the enemy fleet, control of vital sea areas (highlighting the
Norwegian Sea and Northwest Pacific), power projection ashore, and sealift.
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It commits the Department to a goal of Maritime Superiority.
Another source for the national military strategy is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSCP), which constitutes Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) near-term planning guidance to the
unified and specified commanders (CINCS). The current JSCP, signed in the spring of
1984, derives from NSDD-32 and the current DG. It apportions Fiscal Year (FY) 85
forces for use in war planning.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 5 7
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JSCP FY 85 charges the CINCs with war planning for three distinct global scenarios.
These include, as in the DG, a global war originating in Southwest Asia; but also global
wars originating in Europe and in the Pacific. JSCP CINC force apportionments for
each scenario differ.
Besides these strictly national documents, we also have alliances, treaties, and formal
agreements that together form the skeletal frame of global coalition warfare, another of
the bases for our national military strategy. It is a fundamental tenet that by defending
our allies, we defend ourselves.
In addition to the states shown here with which we have formal defense treaty relation-
ships, there are others with whom we have common military interests and which affect
the maritime strategy. These will be discussed later. The maritime strategy takes the
requirements of coalition warfare fully into account.
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All of the guidance the Navy has received can be distilled into a few basic goals. It is to
implement these that the Maritime Strategy has been developed.
Next, Soviet strategy must be considered. This is a necessity, since strategy is not a game
of solitaire.
This chart shows Soviet worldwide force levels. Note especially the size and composi-
tion of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, the position of Soviet SSBN’s, and the world-
wide disposition of the Soviet Navy. Approximately 15 percent of the Soviet Navy is
normally deployed away from home waters.
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These naval forces are supplemented by more than 1700 ocean-going Soviet merchant
ships, the most militarily adaptable merchantmen in the world, also deployed globally.
They are supplemented in the Baltic by the Polish and East German fleets and in the
Black Sea by the Romanian and Bulgarian Navies.
The highlights of the agreed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval strat-
egy, presented here, illustrate the best current agreed estimate by the U.S. intelligence
community, including the Director of Naval Intelligence. The Soviets believe that war
between the coalitions will be global in scope. There is an emphasis upon strategic
strike, including defense of their SSBN force and of the maritime approaches to the
USSR, as primary tasks. Support for ground operations and interdiction of the mid-
ocean sea lanes are seen as secondary tasks.
Therefore, according to the NIE, only a relatively few forces—primarily diesel subma-
rines—would probably be allocated to open ocean SLOC interdiction roles in the early
days of a global war.
It should be noted that Soviet maritime strategy, like our own, is executed as part of an
overall unified military strategy, and cannot be properly understood outside that
context.
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Initial estimated Soviet operating areas are composed of sea denial zones out to 2000
kilometers, which contain within them sea control zones. The sea denial zones engulf
most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and several of our allies, extending
far out into “blue water”. They would, if achieved, sever the vital sea lines of
communications.
In the sea control areas, the Soviet threat would be multi-platform; in the sea denial
zones, largely air and subsurface; beyond the sea denial zones, largely subsurface.
While the essentials of Soviet naval strategy are not seen as changing appreciably over
the next 15 to 20 years, their ever increasing capabilities mean that, by the next century,
the zones would possibly extend out to 3000 kilometers.
That the Soviet Navy has some capabilities in excess of their zone defense needs is clear,
but this represents the best current estimate of their intentions. The implications of
what could happen if they adopt a different strategy will be discussed later. In any
event, the Soviets intend, without doubt, to challenge our forward strategy.
The Soviets have optimized their force capabilities for operations within their desired sea
control and sea denial zones, and are a formidable foe. Yet they are not invulnerable,
and have weaknesses that can be exploited during war.
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Our current force posture is a significant portion of the basis for the Maritime Strategy.
The U.S. Navy is, of course, the centerpiece, but all U.S. military services, of necessity,
contribute to the strategy, and the allies play an important role as well.
The Maritime Strategy—like CINC war planning—addresses current forces, that is,
those available at the end of Fiscal Year 84. This avoids uncertainties as to the
attainability of forces now planned or programmed for out-years, while not—as will be
discussed later—appreciably affecting the shape of the anticipated future strategy.
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The major FY 84 Navy and Marine Corps general purpose forces are assigned to fleet
commanders and are normally deployed as shown. In accordance with national strat-
egy, a significant portion—about a third—is routinely forward deployed. The force lev-
els include units in overhaul, but not in the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP).
It is initially assumed here that all hulls and airframes could be usefully employed in
warfighting. Readiness, sustainability, availability, and attrition decrements will be
addressed later. The Tomahawk weapons system, a significant change to our strike and
anti-surface warfare posture, continues to begin to phase in during this period in its
anti-ship (TASM) and nuclear land attack (TLAM-N) forms. Conventional land attack
weapons (TLAM-C), however, do not enter the fleet until after the period discussed
here.
The previous chart depicted the worldwide mobility of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
forces. The more theater-oriented U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force also play important
roles in the development of the Maritime Strategy. Shown here are some aspects of
their worldwide postures, as they relate to that strategy. In addition to the Army
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posture, it shows Air Force tactical fighter squadrons and AWACS aircraft, and those
B-52 squadrons with a current secondary mine-laying and anti-surface missile
capability.
The U.S. Army is not only a main beneficiary of the Navy’s achieving maritime superi-
ority in vital ocean areas, but also has essential roles to perform in securing island key-
stones and littoral areas. These roles are important to the prosecution of the Maritime
Strategy.
The U.S. Air Force can also be a significant asset in the strategy, especially its poten-
tial anti-air warfare (AAW) capability in forward areas. In drawing up the current
Navy–Air Force Memorandum of Agreement on maritime operations, the Navy identi-
fied AAW as the most important area in which the Air Force can make contributions at
sea. The Air Force is also concerned with enhancing its anti-surface warfare capability.
There are other benefits to be derived, however, as shown here. They are being pursued
[as] well.
Dependence on and utilization of the forces of sister services must, however, be tem-
pered with the realization that they are not optimized for maritime support operations.
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Their geographical emphases often differ, as do their warfare priorities. And they—like
the Navy—have serious force level deficiencies in critical warfare and support areas.
The U.S. global alliance force structure must also be counted when the naval forces avail-
able to fight are tallied up. Full commitment of all allies to the war effort is assumed
here, including the French, Japanese, and others.
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This chart and table show the current peacetime disposition of those allied naval forces
that could be expected to play a significant role in a global war. Note the predominance
of the smaller blue-water surface combatants and mine counter-measures vessels. Note
also that the bulk of our allies’ forces are in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean the-
aters. Although we have no formal allies in the Indian Ocean area save Australia, some
British and French naval units are continuously assigned there.
Allied merchant marine assets will be required. In certain areas (like Norway, Turkey,
and Japan), allied coastal defense forces would also be helpful. Certain allies, notably
the British and Dutch, possess limited amphibious assault forces.
Certain forward land-based allied air superiority and air defense forces could help signif-
icantly in reducing the air threat to our maritime efforts. NATO air forces could assist
on the European flanks, as could the Japanese and Koreans in East Asia and the French
squadron at Djibouti in the Indian Ocean.
Allied airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft—RAF Shackletons and Nimrods, NATO
AWACS, and Japanese E2’s—could provide us with additional search and targeting
capabilities. Allied ground radar systems—the NATO, UK, and Basic (Japanese) Air
Defense Ground Environments (ADGE)—could do the same.
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Likewise, the British and French have significant aerial refueling capabilities which
could assist U.S. naval air operations if made available.
As with the other U.S. services, our consideration of allied forces is not without qualifi-
cation. They must adhere to their own national duties, and even the more advanced of
them have limitations. In the Falklands, for example, the Royal Navy exhibited far lower
fleet airborne early warning, air defense in depth, and damage control capabilities than
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will be required in global warfare with the Soviets. Today, the British maintain signifi-
cant naval and air forces in the Falklands, forces that degrade the ability of the Royal
Navy and Royal Air Force to support naval operations in the Eastern Atlantic.
Also, as was shown, the naval forces of the allies are concentrated largely in the North
Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, putting a greater relative responsibility on U.S. naval
forces in the Pacific.
To summarize the three topics discussed to this point, they comprise an architecture for
building a maritime strategy. National policy gives it direction, but Soviet strategy and
the size and capability of U.S. and allied forces provide the boundaries. The product is a
full forward pressure strategy.
The strategy itself will now be developed, after which the important uncertainties—
many already noted—will be addressed. They result in more reservations about the
strategy than would be wished.
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The Maritime Strategy is designed to help achieve the national objective of war termi-
nation on favorable terms, in the event deterrence fails. Our national strategy to
accomplish that—like all strategies in response to aggression—can take four forms:
(1) We can meet force with like force at the point of attack; (2) We can escalate the
intensity of the conflict; (3) We can alter the geographic scope of the conflict; and/or (4)
We can control the duration of the fighting.
Holding at the point of attack does not by itself generate pressure to end the war. Esca-
lation is an effective deterrent option, but if used is fraught with enormous risk. It is
the last two dimensions that give flexibility and maneuver options to the national mili-
tary strategy, and at the heart of these two dimensions is the Navy–Marine Corps team.
Our primary objective early on is to limit expansion of any conflict. If it cannot be lim-
ited, however, or catastrophic loss impends, then careful attention to scope and duration
will become necessary. These are the two forms of response in which a Maritime Strat-
egy makes the strategic difference.
Making the strategic difference by altering the geographical breadth of the conflict
means that—with maritime superiority—we can deny the Soviets any advantage
through expansion, and permits us, if we choose, to take the conflict to an area or areas
where they do not want to fight.
The Maritime Strategy is a mobile, forward, flanking strategy of options. While the bat-
tle is joined in Central Europe, the Maritime Strategy enables the Western alliance to
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secure the sea lines of communications, defeat attacks on the European flanks and in
the Far East, and to carry the fight to the enemy there. This will hurt Soviet ability to
reinforce the center, while ensuring the buildup of U.S. and allied countervailing power
there. Moreover, in the Far East, the possibility of Chinese involvement in the war is
fostered by the existence there of strong and credible U.S. maritime forces.
The Maritime Strategy breaks out into three phases. There are deliberately no time
frames attached to them, since they represent the direction in which the Navy prefers to
go, not a timetable.
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How the Transition to War is addressed is significantly influenced by the various
sources of the national military strategy discussed earlier. Competing—and often con-
flicting—interpretations are contained in the DG, the JSCP, the U.S. Reply to the NATO
Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ), and the preferred concept of operations of
each unified commander. Some have explicit scenarios, and all imply them in their
apportionment of forces for planning to subordinate commanders in the field.
Unified Commander (CINC) preferred concepts diverge, for example, on the relative
importance of the various theaters in a global war; on the amount of time assumed as
available for pre-hostilities measures; and on the number of current force CVBG’s,
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MAFS, and sealift assets that each CINC feels is his minimum requirement in the devel-
opment of the global campaign.
For example, there are only 13 deployable battle groups available to the CINCs—11 in
the first few months—yet their current expressed bottom line requirements add up to 15.
The Maritime Strategy must be consonant with the JSCP and current CINC war plan-
ning, but because of overlapping requirements must transcend an uncritical compilation
of these preferred concepts of operations. The 15-CVBG/600-ship Navy is the minimum
requirement, but it will not be available until the end of the decade. The Maritime
Strategy must therefore look elsewhere in the near term for augmenting forces to
achieve war termination on favorable terms.
What the Maritime Strategy does is to meld the frequently divergent approaches in the
DG, the JSCP, the DPQ, and CINC concepts, and present a central preferred baseline
strategic course of action, starting with the Transition Phase. It is assumed initially, for
example, that there would be at least two weeks of transition to global war. That there
are serious implications if a greater or lesser period is assumed, will be addressed later.
Phase I, the Transition Phase, includes rising tensions, and could include one or more
crises, and/or a regional war involving U.S. or Soviet forces. Here are the general princi-
ples that guide the strategy in this phase. Clearly we would prefer this phase to be the
final phase, by controlling a crisis or keeping a “small war” from spreading.
The principles will be tempered by the obviously conflicting demands of each, and
tradeoffs are inevitable. Since early warning and sufficient reaction time are vital, timely
political decisionmaking will be crucial.
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It should be noted that even “small wars” can involve the Navy in operations in high-
threat areas, given the large and sophisticated forces of many third-world states.
In this phase we would expect the Soviets to sortie into their sea control and sea denial
areas. They could also reinforce their Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and/or South
China Sea forces, especially with submarines, and intermingle in those areas with U.S.
and allied naval forces. We would probably detect all this movement fairly early on, and
have about two weeks warning before their initial worldwide attacks came.
Their aviation strike forces would redeploy to their dispersal bases, and the Black and
Baltic Sea fleets and the four other Warsaw Pact navies would prepare to support joint
operations ashore. The Soviet merchant fleet would chop to naval control, to provide
intelligence and lift. The Soviets, in short, would posture for global war, world-wide.
U.S. naval forces would redeploy as well, forward. This chart illustrates some timeframes
involved in considering moving naval afloat forces into position, and is helpful in dis-
cussing what follows.
Note also that whereas total U.S. and allied naval and air orders of battle were listed
earlier, some 18 to 24 percent of the units mentioned would probably be unavailable in
the early months of the war due to conversions, overhauls, and shakedowns.
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Throughout the Transition to War there would be global forward movement of U.S.
naval forces, a complex operation. SSN’s would move into far forward positions, includ-
ing the Arctic, deep in the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas. Battle groups would
begin to form into multi-carrier battle forces, since a single carrier battle group would
almost never be operated in a major forward theater by itself in wartime. Forward
deployed forces would increase readiness, demonstrating that no major region would be
ceded to the Soviets.
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Battleship and other surface action groups, the patrol hydrofoil squadron, and special
warfare groups would move out. VP would redeploy forward, worldwide, and intensify
surveillance.
Regarding mining plans, the CINCs would have to make hard trade-offs, assigning
mining missions to scarce multi-role platforms, and commencing mine loadout.
Forward deployed amphibious task groups would increase readiness, and lead portions
of a Marine Amphibious Brigade would fly to Norway to join their prepositioned
equipment. Other Marine Air-Ground Task Forces would begin loadout. Sealift of
multi-service reinforcements would commence.
During the Transition Phase, activation of reserves is anticipated. Twelve modern Coast
Guard high-endurance cutters would be made available to the CINCs for SLOC protec-
tion duties, and other Coast Guard units would prepare for coastal defense duties.
Marine Reserves would also be activated, under CINCLANT. This table shows only the
major Coast Guard and Naval Reserve ships and aircraft, and does not depict the totality
of the important contribution that Coast Guard and Reserve personnel would make.
Our key allies would increase their readiness and, in accordance with plans, deploy
some of their forces. The NATO Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic and the Channel
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would increase readiness, and the Naval On-call Force, Mediterranean would be consti-
tuted. The Royal Navy would send SSN’s forward and a British ASW task group, cen-
tered around at least one carrier, would put to sea in EASTLANT. French carrier task
groups and submarines could be expected to put to sea in the Western Mediterranean.
The West German Navy would move to conduct forward operations in the Baltic, and
the Turkish Navy, especially its submarines, would do the same in the Black Sea. The
Italian Navy would deploy in the North Central Med, and a Spanish ASW carrier task
group would also get under way in the Atlantic.
British and Dutch Marines would reinforce Norway. The Japanese and other allies
would sortie also. On a worldwide basis, combined ASW tracking by maritime patrol
aircraft (MPA) would intensify, and readiness would be increased. NATO and other
allies would begin to marshal sealift assets, to support U.S. and other reinforcement
movements.
U.S. and allied armies and air forces would be active as well in moving to support the
Maritime Strategy.
While the U.S. Army’s central focus would be on reinforcement by airlift and sealift of
the European Central Region, it is envisioned that active or reserve Army infantry
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brigades would reinforce the Aleutians and Iceland, and an Army military police battal-
ion would reinforce the Azores. Army air defense missile batteries would reinforce Ice-
land and the Azores. Retaining control of these islands is vital to the success of the
Maritime Strategy. There are allied army deployments important to the Maritime Strat-
egy as well, including movement of the British Mobile Force and the Canadian Air-Sea
Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group to Norway.
U.S. Air Force TACAIR would also focus on the Central Region, but it is anticipated that
some reinforcements would go as well to the NATO flanks, Iceland, the Azores, Japan
and Korea. Some U.S. Air Force fighters would probably deploy to Southwest Asia;
Canadian and British TACAIR would reinforce Norway; and U.S. and Allied AEW air-
craft (AWACS, NATO AWACS, Nimrods, Shackletons, and E-2’s) would take up sta-
tions. The U.S. AWACS in Saudi Arabia would probably redeploy to Europe.
With enemy and allied forces moving into place globally, at some point a major Soviet
attack could occur and actual large-scale warfare between the Soviet Union and the
U.S. would commence. If so, it would probably spread among a number of theaters, espe-
cially at sea.
Strategically, one side or the other would find it to its advantage to expand the war geo-
graphically—either to concentrate its forces or to prevent its enemy from doing so. It is
hard to visualize U.S. naval units from Yokosuka and Soviet ships from Vladivostok, for
example, proceeding to the Indian Ocean or beyond without incident, while fighting
was occurring elsewhere.
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This is Phase II, in which the Navy would seek to seize the initiative, as far forward as
possible. It is preparatory to carrying the fight to the enemy.
The war at sea cannot be discussed without some consideration of the land/air battle.
This chart shows the likely Soviet initial land/air attack posture once the situation
clearly transitioned to global war. The primary Soviet thrust would be in Central
Europe. Smaller attacks would also occur to attempt to seize Northern Norway and the
Turkish Straits. A limited offensive is also possible in Eastern Turkey, to try to draw off
forces defending the straits.
In the Far East, the Soviets would pressure the Japanese to deny the U.S. the use of
naval and air facilities. Failing in this, if the U.S.-Japanese alliance holds (as the Mari-
time Strategy assumes), they would attack Japan, initially by air. North Korea might
take the opportunity to attack the South. The Soviets would seek not to provoke the
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Chinese into entering the war against them but would not let their guard down in Asia.
Even if the Chinese came in, however, the Soviets’ focus would nevertheless remain on
Europe.
The Soviets are unlikely to initiate hostilities in Southwest Asia as a precursor to global
war, and any hostilities which might occur there during a global war would likely
involve mainly unreinforced and less capable forces.
At sea, should the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact and other allies attack, our initial
course of action would be to counter that attack, attrite enemy forces, and seize the ini-
tiative. Vital sea lines of communication would be defended as far forward as possible.
Mine warfare (MIW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and anti-air warfare (AAW)
would assume primary importance, at this stage, in destroying enemy forces, and
ensuring the protection of our own forces and of U.S. and allied reinforcement and
resupply shipping, in anticipation of Phase III.
Note that while this strategy describes each warfare task separately, they would actually
be implemented more or less simultaneously. Also, while operations in one geographic
theater may continue in Phase II for a considerable period, those in another may well
move to Phase III very quickly. These considerations confirm that the geographical
focus of the Maritime Strategy must always be global, avoiding treatment of any single
theater exclusively.
Fundamental to our eventual success is destruction of the Soviet submarine fleet, as far
forward as possible. As shown here, a coordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
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initiative is a complex undertaking, involving a wide variety of platforms, weapons sys-
tems, and tactics.
Forward and barrier ASW operations would have as their goal the destruction of Soviet
submarines operating in the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas as well as those
seeking to break out to attack reinforcement and resupply shipping farther out. SSNs
would conduct ASW operations far into the Soviet sea control zone, against the range
of available targets, requiring operations under the Arctic ice cover. Allied task groups
would perform area ASW operations. U.S. and allied mine and submarine barriers
would be initiated at key choke points. Selective mining of Soviet port area approaches
would also be implemented.
Forward-positioned maritime patrol aircraft, in conjunction with SOSUS, and aug-
mented by mobile passive acoustic systems, would operate, especially in barrier opera-
tions, to the extent they could without suffering unacceptable attrition, and without
interfering with SSN operations. Sonobuoy availability is an important uncertainty
here.
Failure to provide adequate forward ASW protection early on in the war would open up
reinforcement and resupply shipping to direct attacks, such as happened in World War
II to Japan in the Pacific and to the U.S. in the Atlantic (depicted here, at the height of
the U-boat campaign against U.S. shipping).
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During that time frame over 450 merchant ships were lost in the Atlantic to a German
force that at the time averaged just 50 operational boats, with only 14 on patrol in the
Western Atlantic.
The requirement for concomitant close-in ASW protection will be addressed later.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 8 1
MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK BY U-BOATS
JANUARY–JULY 1942




Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:30:08 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
In the initial anti-air warfare (AAW) campaign, carrier battle force thrusts would seize
the initiative, engaging Soviet air attacks as far forward as possible in outer air battles, to
cause maximum attrition. Available land-based TACAIR would complement these
efforts in the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Northwest Pacific. The MAB
in Norway, for example, would probably include two F-4 squadrons. Joint CVBG/
USMC/USAF operations would also be possible in the Indian Ocean to meet any threat
there. Land-based TACAIR could also address any Cuban air threat, if necessary.
It should be noted that our 1984 AAW capabilities are enhanced by the presence of the
two initial Aegis cruisers in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.
The French carriers would probably operate in the Western Mediterranean, possibly
securing Western Mediterranean SLOCs and providing backing for the U.S. carriers
moving east, while retaining their primary national theater nuclear reserve role.
The initial intermingling of Soviet and U.S. and allied forces in the Mediterranean and
Indian Oceans would ensure early and intense anti-surface warfare (ASUW) engage-
ments in those areas. Effective rules of engagement (ROE) and innovative tactics should
be utilized to complicate Soviet targeting and seize the initiative. In the Indian Ocean,
the Middle East Force would probably chop to the battle group commander, but other
surface action groups may be constituted elsewhere.
West German naval and naval air forces would make immediate contact with Soviet
and Warsaw Pact forces moving across the Baltic. Surface action group and/or PHM
battles may occur in the Caribbean, and similar surface clashes are possible elsewhere.
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Soviet AGI’s as well as combatants would be sought out and destroyed, and merchant-
men sunk as targets of opportunity.
U.S. and allied surface, subsurface, and air assets would be engaged, including ASM-
equipped allied TACAIR. U.S. Navy submarines, mines, and Harpoon-equipped P-3’s,
although primarily engaged in ASW, could contribute—especially TASM-equipped
SSN’s. TASM will also be available on a few surface combatants. If Harpoon-equipped
B-52’s are made available, they could contribute as well, if required.
Even though the campaign would still be in Phase II and the massed power of the car-
rier battle forces and amphibious forces would not yet be in a position to strike the
Soviets far forward, certain initial projection operations could nevertheless occur. This
chart shows various options that could be mounted from the maritime theaters in this
phase.
Should it be necessary, air strikes and offensive mining may be conducted against Cuba,
Libya, Vietnam and Korea, possibly by CVBF’s enroute to higher threat areas. Strikes
will be necessary to support forces repelling Soviet attacks in Norway, Thrace, and
Japan.
USAF and allied support would be particularly useful here, and in the Pacific against
Soviet dispersal bases and allies. Soviet targets in Asia are more accessible to direct U.S.
attack than those in Europe at this stage.
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SPECWAR surveillance, intelligence and raiding options, for instance against C3 sites,
would be valuable supplements. U.S. and allied Marine operations in Norway and—
possibly—amphibious insertions elsewhere are also options.
Success in Phase II would allow the Navy to carry the fight to the enemy.
In this third phase the tempo of strike, amphibious, and unconventional warfare opera-
tions would be accelerated, while anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and forward
anti-surface warfare would be continued. Again, some geographic theaters may see
movement into Phase III operations more quickly than others.
The goals are quite straight-forward. Sustainability and attrition are the critical vari-
ables, of course, and will be addressed later.
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Heavy strikes on the flanks culminating in attacks on Soviet territory would be conducted
as battle forces massed and moved farther forward with reduced risk and higher confi-
dence of success. In accordance with DG 86-90 policy, in Europe the Navy would now
be projecting power ashore in support of the land battle; and in East Asia denying to
the Soviets a secure flank.
Of the 13 deployable FY-84 CVBG’s, two would be in overhaul and 11 at sea. Therefore,
three or four would probably be available for Norwegian Sea battle force operations; a
similar number for the Northwest Pacific; two or three (plus the French) for the Medi-
terranean; and zero to one for the Arabian Sea. Thus full global pressure would be
applied.
This assumes, however, no attrition, and all units capable of contributing to the war
effort. Delayed and sequential operations would be necessary if we have lost battle
groups, or if enemy threats from Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, or Korea have complicated the
equation. Sequential operations are also likely if early destruction of the Soviet
INDRON and its support facilities leads to redeployment of most U.S. naval forces
from the Indian Ocean to the Northwest Pacific.
The combined assets available in our amphibious ships and follow-on Military Sealift
Command shipping provide a capability to conduct Marine Amphibious Brigade–sized
assault operations in two forward ocean areas simultaneously. Assault operations requir-
ing an entire Marine Amphibious Force, however, would require the concentration of
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 8 5




Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:30:24 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
amphibious ships in one forward ocean area or the other. This justifies the high priority
accorded defense of the Panama Canal and its approaches in DG FY 86–90.
Additionally, Marine Amphibious Brigade operations utilizing the Near-Term
Prepositioned Force and newly deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships could be con-
ducted in appropriate theaters. Some allies, especially the British, have small amphibi-
ous assault capabilities to supplement ours.
The two battleship surface action groups could be employed to good advantage in a
naval gunfire support role. Surface combatants, construction battalions, and special
operations and mine warfare forces have important roles to play here as well. Amphibi-
ous operations would have the purpose of gaining leverage for war termination, secur-
ing strategic choke points, or recovering territory lost to Soviet attack.
In all three phases, the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) would be utilized to support
the total war effort. Sealift from CONUS to deployed U.S. forces is, of course, central to
American and allied success. Over 95 percent of the American reinforcement and resup-
ply dry cargo and 99% of the petroleum must go by sea. Also, the oil and other eco-
nomic shipping SLOCs are important for long-term prosecution of the war, especially
by the allies. These SLOCs must be defended.
The primary defense would be made well north of the major transoceanic SLOCs, as has
been shown, but a certain close-in threat would always be present, especially pre-
deployed submarines and those that slip through U.S. and allied forward and barrier
operations. Without close-in support, even a small number of submarines operating in
the SLOCs can pose a serious threat, as World War II showed.
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The routing of the major military reinforcement and resupply SLOCs depicted here
also seeks to minimize the risk of Soviet land-based air attack. Should the forward
AAW and ASW battles go favorably, the SLOCs could be shifted northward.
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Reinforcement and resupply sealift for all services and our allies would be provided by
the U.S. Military Sealift Command nucleus fleet, the Ready Reserve Fleet, other ships of
the U.S. National Defense Reserve Fleet, merchant ships requisitioned by the Depart-
ment of Transportation, and allied vessels.
Also, rapidly deployable, prepositioned equipment aboard the Near-Term Prepositioning
Force (NTPF) and Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) remains an important ingre-
dient in our forward strategy. Thirteen NTPF ships are concentrated at Diego Garcia
with one at Guam, two at Subic Bay, and one in the Mediterranean. The first set of four
MPS ships will be prepositioned in EASTLANT. If no major threat materializes in
Southwest Asia, as seems likely, then Marine-dedicated NTPF and MPS ships would be
used to support the introduction of Marine Forces in Europe, the Atlantic, and/or the
Pacific. The remaining depot ships would sustain Army, Air Force, and Navy units.
Support functions for these prepositioning ships have been assigned in large measure
to Naval Reserve forces.
Economic shipping would also need to flow. Not only oil, but also strategic minerals and
industrial products would have to pass by sea to support the western alliances.
In peacetime, the United States imports over 12 percent of its gross national product;
the figures for allied nations are considerably higher. To illustrate, the table shows U.S.
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peacetime dependency on strategic mineral imports. Estimates of U.S. and allied war-
time dependency vary, but what is clear is that some level of imports would be necessary,
becoming increasingly more vital as a war progressed. These imports would have to
come across a number of SLOCs with—if peacetime patterns hold—more imports
coming in from East Asia than from either Europe, the Mideast, or Latin America.
To successfully defend this shipping is to give the U.S. and its allies the upper hand in
determining how long a war would last.
Currently envisioned responsibilities for close-in protection and control of military ship-
ping along these SLOCs are as shown. Naval protection of shipping (NPS) against sub-
marine, air, and surface attack could include a variety of options: not only convoys
(which are escort-intensive), but also protected lanes, independent sailings for fast
steamers, etc. U.S. forces required are primarily destroyers and frigates (active and
reserve), Coast Guard high endurance cutters, and maritime patrol aircraft.
U.S. responsibilities would be focused upon the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, the
Western and Central Atlantic, the Central Pacific, and the Northern Indian Ocean. The
allies would have similar responsibilities in adjacent areas. They do not, however, have
sufficient escort forces. Encouraging the allies to fulfill—and expand upon—their cur-
rent escort commitments and force levels is a major on-going USN task.
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Naval control of shipping (NCS) is a worldwide allied effort, with Naval Reserve person-
nel playing the major U.S. Navy role.
Besides the threat of open-ocean attack, a major threat to these SLOCs would be mines
at the terminals. The primary mine countermeasures campaign will be as far forward as
possible, targeting delivery platforms to prevent mines from being sown at all. For those
that get through and must be swept, envisioned U.S. and allied mine countermeasures
responsibilities are depicted here. It is anticipated that the allies would bear the lion’s
share of the task.
There are clearly not enough U.S. or allied assets to clear all our areas of responsibility
simultaneously. Also, many additional critical choke points and ports would be uncov-
ered as well. Any threats to those areas would have to [be] countered by redeployment
of scarce assets from elsewhere.
Other threats to the SLOC terminals—small submarines and surface craft, special war-
fare teams, saboteurs, etc.—must also be dealt with. The allies would secure their own
inshore waters. For the United States, coastal defense responsibilities would fall to units
of the U.S. Naval Reserve and U.S. Coast Guard, operating in Maritime Defense Zones
under the Fleet Commanders.
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Mobile, flexible naval combat operations cannot be sustained at great distances, or at
high rates of engagement, without mobile and shore-based forward logistics support,
backed up by sealift and bases in CONUS.
U.S. and allied mobile logistics support force ships would be formed into Underway
Replenishment Groups (URGS), supported in turn by military sealift “Consol” tankers.
Tenders would be deployed forward. U.S. and allied surface combatants would be
required as escorts.
Current forward bases would be reinforced with Advanced Base Functional Compo-
nents (ABFC’s) to provide battle group logistics support; sustain P-3 operations; and
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provide hospital, repair, and construction support. New major bases would probably
have to be established in Western Europe. Host nation support would be used, world-
wide, to the maximum extent possible, especially to provide cargo handling and port
services. U.S. Navy and Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions would also be
required. Advanced forward bases, especially for P-3’s and Marines, would require
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (SEABEE) Support.
The Navy and Naval Reserve provide the primary carrier onboard delivery (COD) and
intra-theater airlift support to our forward combat forces.
Primary inter-theater air logistics support would be provided by the Military Airlift
Command along these notional routes, supplemented by U.S. and allied civilian air-
craft. This will be especially critical for VP support, mine countermeasures helicopter
and SPECWARGRU deployments, and critical spare parts and personnel movements.
Thus the U.S. and allied cargo airlift asset shortfall could degrade the Maritime
Strategy.
The desired culmination of this strategy is war termination on favorable terms. This
requires putting sufficient conventional pressure on the Soviets to convince them that
they would have no gain in continuing aggression and in fact should retreat, while giv-
ing them no incentives to escalate to nuclear war. For the Navy, this means neutraliza-
tion or destruction of the Soviet Navy and of ground and air forces on the Eurasian
flanks; sea control; and intervention in the land battle.
What happens at sea is important primarily as it can contribute to the land battle ashore
or to a favorable settlement of the conflict. For example, Pacific operations should prove
critical to keeping Japan in the war, defending Korea, and ensuring that China
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maintains an at least aggressively neutral, and possibly even a combatant, posture. This
ties down considerable Soviet forces which could otherwise move West.
The outcome of the land war is problematical; superior seapower must be correctly
employed in order to make the strategic difference. While a loss in Central Europe could
be catastrophic for the U.S., loss of control of the sea would be fatal.
The strategic difference that the Navy makes is, as has been shown, multi-faceted.
The Navy provides the visible and essential linkage between ourselves and our forward
allies and forces, and bolsters the position of neutrals. The Navy, by foreclosing options
and multiplying uncertainties for the Soviets, forces them to focus on only a narrow
range of strategic choices. The Navy precludes Soviet flanking operations, surrogate
support, and SLOC interdiction, and protects against attacks on our shores.
The Navy likewise forces the Soviets to commit resources to the defense of otherwise
secure flanks, against the entire range of naval offensive capabilities; and the Navy
meets any Soviet attacks on the flanks as well. This all hinders redeployments of Soviet
forces to the center.
Moreover, the Navy is also the service that provides the nation with the ability to con-
tinue the war for as long as the National Command Authority desires, as well as lever-
age at war’s end.
It must, however, be reiterated that this strategy demands more than the U.S. Navy
forces now at hand for high confidence of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
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recommended “Planning Forces” in JSPD 86-93. The difference between the Navy
“Planning Force” and the Navy “Current Force” is a discrete measure of our strategy-force
mismatch. The CINC “Minimum Risk Force” and the “Program Force” are points of
comparison.
This table emphasizes that carrying out the strategy with current forces will be risky,
and that pursuit of additional forces or army, air force, and allied force multipliers must
be tenacious.
Also, while achievement of the “Program Force” will certainly fill quite obvious needs, it
will not appreciably change the essence of the Maritime Strategy.
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Given the Strategy–“Navy Current Force” Mismatch, what can be done about it? Scaling
down the strategy appears unacceptable if defeat of the Soviet Union remains the goal.
Increasing capability will take time, and the Navy will, in fact, reach its minimum goal
of a 600-ship, 15 CVBG Navy by the end of this decade.
Sequential operations is the approach taken in NSDD-32, the DG, the JSCP, and—to a
certain extent—the Maritime Strategy. Such operations would enable most U.S. naval
forces to be moved out of the Indian Ocean to assist in the Northeast Asia campaign,
then possibly back in again. They would also ensue if Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, or North
Korea were to enter the war. Other inter-theater sequential operations, however, require
lengthy swings and are risky; they could, in some cases, cede critical initiatives to the
Soviets and cause allies to waver or fall. It is strongly preferred not to sequence North
Atlantic, North Pacific, and Mediterranean operations.
The primary approach taken by the Navy in the Maritime Strategy has been not only to
sequence some operations, but also to maximize use of the assets of other services and
allies, while pushing hard for increased future capability.
It now remains to take a hard look at the uncertainties inherent in the strategy as it has
been outlined.
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This is a list of the most important uncertainties—all those tough-to-come-to-grips-
with items set aside earlier. Some the Navy can control somewhat, and is striving to do
so. Most it cannot. They are not listed in any particular order of priority.
To the extent that these uncertainties work in the Navy’s favor, it will be able to execute
the strategy with greater confidence. To the extent that they go against the Navy, naval
commanders will have to revert to more defensive, more sequential actions. The Navy
tries, in its planning and in its procurement, to hedge against a range of possibilities in
each area of uncertainty. Resource and time constraints, however, prevent the Navy
from being able to meet all contingencies with an equal degree of confidence.
At the top of the list of uncertainties is escalation to nuclear war, including nuclear war at
sea. This is a great uncertainty for the Navy, one it clearly would like not to have to deal
with.
Since nuclear war at sea would be disadvantageous to the United States, it would proba-
bly not initiate one. And if the Soviets were to attack the United States at sea, it is U.S.
policy that nuclear war would not necessarily remain limited to the sea.
Any nuclear exchange at sea, however, would probably result from land battle decisions.
E.g.: If the Soviets are doing well ashore, they will probably not want to escalate there,
and therefore will not do so at sea either.
Also, the Flexible Response strategy of NATO is likely to put U.S. naval forces in a
bind. If the U.S. and its allies were to initiate land-based theater nuclear strikes, in
accordance with NATO strategy, then U.S. and allied naval forces at sea would almost
certainly suffer in any retaliatory Soviet nuclear attack.
Consequently, the Navy must have the defensive measures, offensive systems, and tac-
tics to hedge against such an attack. Naval commanders must be alerted early should
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there be serious consideration of any nuclear release ashore. Once this were to occur, it
is difficult to project exactly what course the war might take.
The possibility of still further escalation exists. The ultimate deterrent to such escala-
tion lies with the U.S. strategic forces, particularly the invulnerable SSBN force (31 in
the Atlantic and four in the Pacific).
The Soviets are not believed to consider that the destruction of potential strategic
assets, such as SSBN’s, during conventional war would by itself trigger an escalation to
the use of nuclear weapons. Decisions, however, to use U.S. naval forces to attack Soviet
strategic nuclear forces or the Soviet homeland carry—or may be seen by the National
Command Authority to carry—some measure of risk of escalation. Thus they would be
subject to tight control by the National Command Authority.
This would also apply to any conventional use of B-52’s, since this might also be con-
sidered as open to Soviet misinterpretation.
The Maritime Strategy assumes about two weeks of warning time and a period of tran-
sition to full global war.
The war plans, however, assume more compressed timeframes. There would probably
be sufficient warning time, but uncertainties as to timing of political decisions lead the
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JCS and CINCs to plan otherwise, i.e. on the basis of mobilization, force movement,
and combat beginning simultaneously (M=C=D).
There are other areas of concern here as well, especially regarding sensor utilization
and vulnerability, and the adequacy and consistency of our peacetime rules of engage-
ment (ROE) in the transition to war.
It has been assumed so far that current peacetime guidance will hold during the war. As
mentioned earlier, there are tradeoffs, implicit in the response to crises and the transi-
tion to war, that the National Command Authority must make. Additionally, changes to
the guidance may be made.
Some issues susceptible to policy changes are listed here. Will the nation, for example,
in fact execute a reserve call-up, and in time for it to support the strategy? And how
quickly will civilian lift assets be requisitioned?
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Would the Soviets act as the NIE predicts? They have some capabilities that exceed those
necessary just to carry out the intentions attributed to them in NIE 11-15. The NIE
describes how the Soviets think they would initially operate if the war goes in accor-
dance with their expectations. If this does not occur, the NIE judgements could be
nullified.
Should they operate in a manner different than that anticipated, it would provide new
challenges, although it would also yield new opportunities to exploit.
Would the Soviet European satellites stay in the Soviet camp? More importantly for the
Maritime Strategy, would certain key pro-Soviet states participate in the Warsaw Pact
campaign?
Any of the states shown here at the bottom has the capability to seriously degrade the
strategy—especially if they also allow the Soviets to work from them—while forcing
the reallocation of scarce U.S. and allied assets urgently needed elsewhere, i.e. sequen-
tial operations. Threats to U.S. and allied naval forces and to reinforcement, resupply,
and economic shipping are possible.
An imaginative mix of forceful joint and allied diplomatic and military incentives
applied early on will be necessary. To be successful ultimately in the global war, mari-
time forces must avoid being deflected from their primary operational theaters.
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Operations against these states should be mounted with maximum allied and other ser-
vice participation, using economy of force so as to have the least impact on the war else-
where. The U.S. Air Force, for example, would have a key role in operations against
Cuba, while French and Italian forces would be useful against Libya.
The uncertainty as to Army and Air Force contributions is of crucial importance to the
viability of the Maritime Strategy. Without these contributions, sequential—and there-
fore late—operations, or abandonment of commitments, are unavoidable. And yet
there are real shortfalls in Army and Air Force capabilities, some of which have already
been noted.
For example: the recent planned replacement of Marine reinforcements by the Army in
the critical islands results in a degradation of previously planned air defense capabilities.
AWACS and air superiority TACAIR squadrons have a number of threats to deal with, not
only those threatening our naval forces. The Military Airlift Command has nowhere near
enough lift assets to satisfy CINC requirements, especially early in the war. The NCA may
well not release B-52’s for mining and ASUW roles. Although that will not greatly
degrade overall ASUW capabilities, they are badly needed for Mine Warfare.
It is clear that the other services may not be able to meet all their maritime requirements.
To the extent they cannot, the risk to our forces and the likelihood of more sequential
operations increases.
The United States’ own alliances require consideration, and the intent and capability of
those not aligned must be assessed. The stance assumed by France and Japan, for exam-
ple, will be pivotal. Any allies that choose not to join in the war effort will weaken total
capabilities to carry out the strategy. In addition, antagonisms among some allies could
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degrade their ability to completely commit themselves to a common cause. Allied force
capability deficiencies have already been addressed.
Returning to the discussion of escalation, both France and Britain have naval strategic
and naval theater nuclear forces, and reserve the right to escalate unilaterally. This, of
course, presents both the U.S. and the Soviets with substantial uncertainty.
Regarding the neutrals, the Maritime Strategy counts on China and the European neu-
trals to exercise—at a minimum—an armed neutrality, and to oppose vigorously any
violation of their territory. The defense of North Norway, for example, becomes much
more problematic if the Soviets are allowed to transit Sweden unopposed; and South-
west Asia may increase in importance if Iran collapses and the Soviets move in.
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The uncertainties as to allies cut two ways, however. There are a number of nominally
non-aligned states with which the United States enjoys close military relations and com-
mon interests, and which therefore may prove of great help in a global war with the
Warsaw Pact.
None of them possesses a blue-water fleet capable of contributing significantly to the
maritime campaign. Many, however, could afford U.S. Navy units valuable access to
facilities and strategically placed choke points. Some—especially Israel—possess land-
based air arms which could prove helpful in maritime anti-air warfare.
It was noted earlier that sufficient readiness and sustainability, and no attrition, were
assumed in discussing the strategy. This is, of course, unrealistic. Yet readiness,
sustainability, and attrition factors accurate enough to be useful are largely scenario-
dependent.
What is certain, is that the Navy does not have enough sustainability assets. Assessments
of the size of the deficiency, however, depend upon assumptions about the intensity of
combat—not necessarily the Navy’s choice—and the effectiveness of U.S. Navy weap-
ons, as well as upon the admittedly insufficient stocks on hand.
The Navy needs to continue increasing these stocks, but naval commanders would, in
time of war, prioritize, pool, share, substitute and otherwise manage their limited assets to
achieve results.
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As an illustration of the extent of the sustainability problem regarding stocks on hand,
this graphic compares Navy ordnance assets to the Navy programming objective. As is
evident, POM-86 investment will provide dramatic improvement in sustainability, but
the present position is still seriously deficient. Note also that the apparent improve-
ments seen here will be delayed in reaching the fleet because of the two year procure-
ment lag time.
Likewise, serious deficiencies in the aviation consolidated allowance list (AVCAL) and
in aviation weapons handling equipment are also addressed in POM-86. For now, how-
ever, there is only enough AVCAL for ten out of thirteen deployable carriers, without
spreading the deficiency across the board.
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The final uncertainty concerns people. Will the Navy have enough of them? Will they be
trained well enough? Will they have exercised in the right locations, in the right force
packages, and under the right conditions? Responsibility in this area is split among the
Navy, the unified and specified commanders, the Defense Department, and the
Congress.
To conclude, this is a recapitulation of the major points of the Maritime Strategy.
That strategy is consistent with national and coalition policy and provides the flexibil-
ity of response that has always been expected of the U.S. Navy. Full forward pressure is
required of the Navy. It is risky, but it is doable.
The Navy must, however, have the forces, the sustainability assets, and the assistance of
allies and the other U.S. services.
In that event, the Navy will make the strategic difference.
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The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, 1985
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General P. X. Kelley, and the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, jointly promulgated “The Amphibious Warfare
Strategy”*on 26 June 1985.† In their joint letter, the two service chiefs announced that
the purpose of this document was
to outline the role of amphibious forces in support of the Maritime Strategy as set forth in the ref-
erence [i.e., “The Maritime Strategy, 1984,” see chapter 2], and by extension, the contribution
[that] naval forces can make to the execution of the national military strategy. The Amphibious
Warfare Strategy addresses the uses of naval amphibious forces across the spectrum of conflict
while focusing on a global conventional war with the Soviet Union.‡
Turning to the future development of the ideas in the document, General Kelley and
Admiral Watkins noted:
It is envisioned that this document will continue to be developed by an iterative process in con-
junction with the . . . Maritime Strategy. The objectives in so doing are twofold: (1) To develop an
Amphibious Warfare Strategy that is both a subset of and fully complementary to the Maritime
Strategy and; (2) To provide a basis for future program development, a baseline reference for use
in support of testimony concerning budgetary matters and a primary source for ongoing joint and
allied cooperative planning efforts.§
In addition, they intended that this document would be revised on the same schedule as
that for the Maritime Strategy, soliciting comments and suggestions for the next revision.**
The principal staff drafters of the strategy were Captain Larry Seaquist, USN, as head of
the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and Colonel Phil Harrington, USMC, a special
assistant to the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Operations, Lieutenant
General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC. Under Seaquist’s leadership, the officers in the Stra-














* OPNAV 60 P-2-85/NAVMC-2790. This document was declassified by the Commanding General,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 24 July 2007, and the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy N3/N5, on 17 July 2007.
† Joint Letter of Distribution: CNO 3340 Ser 00/5S300245 and CMC 3340 of 26 June 1985.
‡ Ibid., para. 2.
§ Ibid., para. 3.
** Ibid., para. 4.
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complementary strategies to the Maritime Strategy. These included thoughts about
developing an Army-Navy strategy, an Air Force–Navy strategy, a special operations
strategy, and a logistics strategy. But among them, only the amphibious strategy reached
fruition as a formal document involving substantive strategic planning.*
An important impetus for undertaking the project for a Navy–Marine Corps amphibious
strategy in the context of the Maritime Strategy can be traced back to the work of Strate-
gic Studies Group III, working at the Naval War College, in August 1983 to June 1984.
Seaquist had been a member of that group, along with Marine colonel Edward Badolato.
When that group briefed the initial results of their studies on third-world crisis manage-
ment to the naval commanders in chief ’s conference at Annapolis, Maryland, in the
spring of 1984, Admiral Watkins had commented as an aside to the Group that, with the
Maritime Strategy, he had nearly everything that he needed to testify to Congress to
explain everything that the Navy needed and how much it needed. But what he lacked
was a similar explanation for the relationship of the Marine Corps to the Navy and the
reasons why the Navy invested in an amphibious capability. Watkins mused about the
need for this but gave no direct order to have the work done. Nevertheless, when Seaquist
and Badolato were assigned to participate in the Global War Game in the summer of
1984, they took it upon themselves to think further about Watkins’s challenge.†
Seaquist and Badolato led a large support group that operated in parallel with the main
Global War Game. Located adjacent to, but separate from, the main players in the game,
this group had a variety of functions. Among them was to look at alternative employ-
ment of amphibious operations. At any one time, the group had some twenty or more
Marine and amphibious warfare specialists from the staffs of the various naval com-
manders in chief, OPNAV, and Marine Corps Headquarters.
This group explored alternative campaigns involving amphibious operations in three
separate geographical areas: the eastern Mediterranean; the North Atlantic flank, with a
focus on Scandinavia and the Baltic approaches; and the northwest Pacific flank, with a
focus on the southern Kurile Islands and Sakhalin Island.
The northwest Pacific issue provided the initial impetus, based on the assumption that in
the case of a World War III, Japan might have a primary interest in recovering the south-
ern Kuriles, which it had lost at the end of World War II. With this in mind, those work-
ing in this unit gamed out the thought that the United States could possibly coordinate
with the Japanese, forestall a Soviet attack on Hokkaido by preempting the Soviet
attempt to make a preemptive attack on Japan, and reach over Japanese operations to
take and hold Sakhalin Island with the southern Kuriles. The group’s gaming suggested
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* This and the following paragraphs are based on Captain Larry Seaquist, USN (Ret.), e-mail to
Swartz and Hattendorf, 12 August 2007, with attachment by Seaquist, “Notes on the Origins &
Impact of Phibstrat.”
† For a summary of this war game, see Robert H. Gile, Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988,
Newport Paper 20 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 17–34.
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:31:15 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
that if these amphibious operations were executed decisively, they could secure the Sea of
Okhotsk for American naval operations against the Soviet submarine bastion that was
believed to be located in that area.
While the unit’s examination of potential amphibious operations in the eastern Mediter-
ranean did not reveal any issues that could result in a war-winning move, its examina-
tion of possible amphibious operations in the North Atlantic did. The unit’s members
focused on a scenario in which Warsaw Pact forces initiated an attack through the Cen-
tral Front, and they examined what amphibious operation that allied forces could use to
deflect or to spoil a subsequent Soviet move to turn northward and to envelop and neu-
tralize allied positions in Scandinavia, including the naval forces at sea carrying out por-
tions of the Maritime Strategy. The members of the unit who participated in gaming
these ideas generally concluded that the Marines could be inserted skillfully and quickly
at the base of the Jutland Peninsula. This, they saw, identified a major decision for allied
commanders to face in the early stages of World War III. It would be a high-risk opera-
tion in which a major part of the Marine Corps might be lost but that, if successful, had
the potential to change Soviet perceptions of the dynamics of the Central Front, a basic
principle and main intent behind the Maritime Strategy.
Upon completion of his participation in this work in Newport, Colonel Badolato moved
on to become Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy (1985–89), while Captain Seaquist
stayed in the maritime strategy business and moved to Washington, D.C., to take up his
new assignment as Head, Strategic Concepts Branch.* In this job, his main focus was to
complete the next iteration of the Maritime Strategy, but before that document was
released in November 1985 he and colleagues in the Marine Corps were able to build the
cooperative effort required to complete the Amphibious Warfare Strategy and have it
signed in June 1985, five months ahead of the new version of the Maritime Strategy.
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy of 1985 later helped to form the basis of two early
1990s documents, “. . . From the Sea”† and “Forward . . . from the Sea,”‡ providing a
starting point for later discussions between the Marine Corps and the Navy for the coop-
eration that resulted in those two important documents.§ 
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* Captain Seaquist relieved Commander James R. Stark, who in turn had briefly relieved Captain
Roger W. Barnett
† Printed as chapter 3 in John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Docu-
ments, Newport Paper 27 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2006), pp. 87–99.
‡ Printed in ibid., chap. 5, pp. 149–58.
§ For a broad overview of amphibious operations, see Carter A. Malkasian, Charting the Pathway
to OMTFS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present, CRM
D0006297.A2/Final July 2002 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2002). On the inter-
face between the Marine Corps and Navy on amphibious force ships, with key documents, see
Matthew T. Robinson, Integrated Amphibious Operations Update Study (DoN Lift +2): A Short
History of the Amphibious Lift Requirement, CRM D0005882.A3/Final July 2002 (Alexandria, Va.:
Center for Naval Analyses, 2002).
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This is the Amphibious Warfare Strategy. It is the Navy and Marine Corps’ determina-
tion of the best overall conventional Amphibious Warfare Strategy for global war today.
It is the naval services’ preferred strategy, given current national and coalition guid-
ance, the threat, force levels and trade-offs among conflicting aims. This strategy is
intended to flow from and be fully complementary to the Maritime Strategy—the base-
line strategy around which the other strategic options for naval forces are centered.
This strategy concentrates on amphibious forces: the Navy–Marine Corps Team. Its
central focus is on operations that involve the use of amphibious shipping with battle
group support; however, the strategy contains options for the uni-service employment
of Marine forces. The strategy is further focused on naval warfare today and addresses
only current forces and capabilities, although some recognition of evolving capabilities
is made.
Finally, it should be recognized at the outset that amphibious forces are a national stra-
tegic asset—as such they should be considered to be a valuable, mobile national force
and employed accordingly. That is to say, that the optimum employment of amphibi-
ous forces may not be achieved through their commitment to sustained operations
ashore.
This is an overview of what is to follow. The first portion underscores the relationship
between the Amphibious Strategy and the Maritime Strategy, with emphasis on the
precept that the Amphibious Warfare Strategy is an integral part of the Maritime Strat-
egy. Accordingly, the Amphibious Warfare Strategy is not to be considered as an inde-
pendent strategy, although it can be described independently.
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy flows from and contributes to the Maritime Strat-
egy. It is not determined, but it is definitely bounded, by force capability. Consideration
of these factors, therefore, is necessary as a prelude to discussing the strategy itself.
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:
The current military strategy acknowledges that the United States is already engaged in
peacetime competition with the Soviet Union and that a war with the Soviets would probably
be global and may be lengthy. Emphasis is directed toward limiting a United States–Soviet
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confrontation to conventional means while strengthening and integrating appropriate
nuclear and chemical deterrents. The strategy provides reasonable assurance that, should
deterrence fail, the Soviets will not increase their territorial domination without incurring
extreme risks and unacceptable costs to them. In a global war, the Soviets and their allies
will be isolated from the rest of the world, their vulnerabilities exploited and the full spec-
trum of U.S. military capabilities mobilized, built-up and applied until U.S. objectives are
attained. Because our forces are insufficient to achieve all military objectives simultaneously,
the strategy has an inherent degree of risk and will require difficult choices involving
sequential operations. Many of those choices cannot be made in advance because they are
dependent on the political and military situation at the time. While this strategy, by both
timing and force levels, supports many existing national and coalition plans, its develop-
ment is not driven by requirements to support specific plans.
The foundation for the Maritime Strategy is the national military strategy, which is
based upon policy directives from the NCA, the Defense Guidance and appropriate JCS
planning documents. This is as it should be: It is our intent to employ all naval forces
in such a way as to fully execute the national military strategy.
In large measure, the present composition of naval forces is designed to be consistent
with the foundation of the Maritime Strategy as set forth herein. That is to say:
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NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OVERVIEW*
• NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES:
THE OVERALL NATIONAL DEFENSE OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT WAR, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR WAR. INCLUDED
WITHIN THIS OVERALL OBJECTIVE ARE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES:
• DETER MILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS VITAL INTERESTS
• PREVENT POLITICAL COERCION OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS ALLIES AND ITS FRIENDS BY ANY ENEMY
• IF DETERRENCE FAILS, FIGHT AT THE LEVEL OF INTENSITY AND FOR THE DURATION NECESSARY TO ATTAIN U.S. POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES
* Source: FY 87–90 Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD).
MARITIME STRATEGY: GOALS
• DETERRENCE
• IF DETERRENCE FAILS:
• FORWARD DEFENSE
• GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL COALITION WARFARE
• DESTROY ENEMY MARITIME FORCES
• PROTECT US/ALLIED SEA LINES
• SUPPORT US/ALLIED LAND BATTLES
• SECURE FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION
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deterrence first, but if this fails, then defense as far forward as possible, worldwide, in
conjunction with our allies.
These are the Navy’s present force planning warfighting goals. They emphasize destruc-
tion of the enemy fleet, control of vital sea areas (highlighting the Norwegian Sea and
Northwest Pacific), power projection ashore and sealift.
These Navy force planning goals are designed to serve as objectives of the Maritime Cam-
paign in the event of a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. The Amphibious
Warfare Strategy is in consonance with these objectives. Indeed, many of them cannot be
accomplished without the proper application of the power extant in amphibious forces.
These objectives commit the United States to a goal of maritime superiority.
Key to an understanding of our own Maritime Strategy is an analysis of Soviet naval
power. In examining the force structure, deployment posture, strategic precepts and
strengths/weaknesses of the Soviet Navy, U.S. naval efforts at the global and theater lev-
els can be placed in context and the opportunities for the effective employment of
amphibious forces then become more apparent.
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DG 86-90 NAVY FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE GOALS*
• SEEK OUT AND DESTROY ENEMY NAVAL FORCES
• EVEN IN HIGH THREAT AREAS
• CONTROL VITAL SEA AREAS AND PROTECT VITAL SLOCS
• DENY VITAL AREAS TO ENEMY
• ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN LOCAL SUPERIORITY IN AN AREA OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
• SEIZE AND DEFEND ADVANCED NAVAL BASES
• CONDUCT LAND AND AIR OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS OF NAVAL CAMPAIGN
• BLUNT ENEMY GROUND ATTACK BY DIRECT ACTION
• PROVIDE REINFORCING FIREPOWER TO FORCES ASHORE
• PROVIDE SEALIFT FOR POWER PROJECTION/FORWARD/ALLIED FORCE RESUPPLY
• SUPPRESS ENEMY SEA COMMERCE
• ASSURE THE ESSENTIAL MARGIN OF ALLIED MARITIME SUPERIORITY
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This chart shows Soviet worldwide force levels. Note especially the size and composition
of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, the position of Soviet SSBN’s and the worldwide dis-
position of the Soviet Navy. Approximately 15 percent of the Soviet Navy is normally
deployed away from home waters.
These naval forces are supplemented by more than 1700 ocean-going Soviet merchant
ships, the most militarily adaptable merchantmen in the world, which are also
deployed globally. They are supplemented in the Baltic by the Polish and East German
fleets and in the Black Sea by the Romanian and Bulgarian Navies.
The highlights of the agreed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval strat-
egy, presented here, illustrate the best current agreed upon estimate by the U.S. intelli-
gence community, including the Director of Naval Intelligence. The Soviets believe that
war between the coalitions will be global in scope. There is an emphasis upon strategic
strike, including defense of their SSBN force and of the maritime approaches to the
USSR, as primary tasks. Support for ground operations and interdiction of the mid-
ocean sea lanes are seen as secondary tasks.
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SOVIET NAVY: ACTIVE GLOBAL PEACETIME POSTURE (FY 85)
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Therefore, according to the NIE, a small but significant number of forces would proba-
bly be allocated to open ocean SLOC interdiction roles in the early days of a global war.
It should be noted that Soviet maritime strategy, like our own, is executed as part of an
overall unified military strategy and cannot be properly understood outside that context.
Initial estimated Soviet operating areas are composed of sea denial zones out to 2000
kilometers, which contain within them sea control zones. The sea denial zones engulf
1 1 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
SOVIET INITIAL WARTIME AREAS OF OPERATION
SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY
NIE 11-15-82D MARCH 1983
NIE 11-15-84 FEBRUARY 1985
• WAR WITH WEST GLOBAL AND ESCALATORY
• CRISIS ANYWHERE
• LEADS TO CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE
• SPREAD TO FAR EAST LIKELY
• NUCLEAR WAR LIKELY
• PRIMARY SOVIET TASKS
• STRATEGIC STRIKE
• SEA CONTROL IN PERIPHERAL WATERS
• GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PROTECT SSBN’s
• STRATEGIC DEFENSE
• SEA DENIAL OUT TO 2000 KM
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• SECONDARY TASKS
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most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and several of our allies, extending
far out into “blue water.” These zones, if occupied, would sever the vital sea lines of
communications.
In the sea control areas, the Soviet threat would be multi-platform; in the sea denial
zones, largely air and subsurface; and beyond the sea denial zones, largely subsurface.
While the essentials of Soviet naval strategy are not seen as changing appreciably over
the next 15 or 20 years, their ever-increasing capabilities mean that, by the next cen-
tury, the zones would possibly extend out to 3000 kilometers.
That the Soviet Navy possesses capabilities in excess of their zone defense needs is clear,
but this represents the best current estimate of their intentions. In any event, the Sovi-
ets intend, without doubt, to challenge our forward strategy.
The Soviets have optimized their force capabilities for operations within their desired
sea control and sea denial zones and are a formidable foe. Yet they are not invulnerable
and have weaknesses that can be exploited during wartime.
A detailed analysis of Soviet goals and capabilities, when combined with the objectives
of our National Military Strategy, provides a firm foundation for the construction of
the Maritime Strategy.
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• PHASE I: DETERRENCE/TRANSITION TO WAR
• PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
• PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY
SOVIET NAVY
• STRENGTHS TO BE ATTRITED/AVOIDED/NEUTRALIZED
• DEFENSE IN DEPTH WITHIN 2000 KM OF HOMELAND
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The Maritime Strategy breaks out into three phases. There are deliberately no time
frames attached to them, since they represent the direction in which the Navy–Marine
Corps Team prefers to go, not a timetable.
Phase I, the Transition Phase, includes rising tensions and could include one or more
crises and/or a regional war involving U.S. or Soviet forces. These are the general prin-
ciples that guide the strategy in this phase. Clearly we would prefer this phase to be the
final phase, by controlling a crisis or keeping a “small war” from spreading.
The principal objective during this phase is political: persuading the Soviet leadership
that escalation to general war is not in their best interest. In order to contribute to cre-
ating this perception in the minds of the Soviet leadership, the strategy envisions that
naval forces should rapidly displace to forward operating areas. The presence of naval
forces capable of threatening the Soviet flanks accrues the added benefits of reassuring
our key allies and providing a clear signal of U.S. resolve.





• ATTRITION OF THE ENEMY
• FORWARD PROTECTION OF THE SLOCS




• PRIMARY: MIW ASW AAW ASUW
• SECONDARY: STRIKE AMPHIBIOUS SPECWAR
MARITIME STRATEGY
PHASE I
• WIN CRISIS/SMALL WAR
• DETER ESCALATION





• MAXIMIZE WARNING TIME
• CEDE NO VITAL AREA BY DEFAULT
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These objectives may be characterized by conflicting demands and trade-offs will be
inevitable. Since early warning and sufficient reaction time are vital, timely political
decisionmaking is crucial.
This is Phase II, in which the Navy would seek to seize the initiative as far forward as
possible. Our actions during this phase must be complementary to and preparatory for
our subsequent moves in Phase III.
At sea, should the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact and other allies attack, our initial
course of action would be to counter that attack, attrite enemy forces and seize the ini-
tiative. Vital sea lines of communication would be defended as far forward as possible.
Anti-surface warfare (ASUW), mine warfare (MIW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
and anti-air warfare (AAW) would assume primary importance at this stage in destroy-
ing enemy forces and ensuring the protection of our own forces and of U.S. and allied
reinforcement and resupply shipping, in anticipation of Phase III. Strike, amphibious
and special warfare options would be executed, as required, to support our Phase II
goals. For example, amphibious forces could seize an advanced naval base that could
then be used by naval aircraft to prosecute the ASW campaign, execute the initial strike
options, if required, or to replenish ships tasked with seakeeping missions.
Note that while this strategy describes each warfare task separately, they would actually
be implemented more or less simultaneously. Also, while operations in one geographic
theater may continue in Phase II for a considerable period, those in another may well
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MARITIME STRATEGY
PHASE III:
CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY
GOALS:
• PRESS HOME THE INITIATIVE
• DESTROY SOVIET FORCES
• RETAIN/REGAIN TERRITORY
• KEEP SLOCS OPEN





• ACCELERATE STRIKE OPS
• ACCELERATE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
• ACCELERATE SPECWAR OPS
• COMMENCE FORWARD ASUW
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move to Phase III very quickly. These considerations confirm that the geographical
focus of the Maritime Strategy must always be global, avoiding treatment of any single
theater exclusively.
Success in Phase II would allow the Navy to carry the fight to the enemy.
In this third phase the tempo of strike, amphibious and unconventional warfare opera-
tions would be accelerated, while anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare and forward
anti-surface warfare would be continued. Again, some geographic theaters may see
movement into Phase III operations more quickly than others.
Having conducted a brief overview of the Maritime Strategy, we will now turn to a gen-
eral overview of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy itself.
These are the basic goals of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy. The scope of these goals
precludes their simultaneous pursuit. Appreciation of the broad range of actions
required to attain these goals confirms the sequential character our naval operations
will have to adopt. It is to pursue these goals in maritime theaters and to fully support
the Maritime Strategy that this strategy has been developed.
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• DETER WAR/ESCALATION
• IF DETERRENCE FAILS
• DESTROY ENEMY MARITIME FORCES
• AID IN STRIKING/SEIZING SOVIET/WP TERRITORY
• AID IN PUTTING SOVIETS ON DEFENSE
• NEUTRALIZE REMAINING TROUBLE SPOTS
• PROTECT U.S./ALLIED SEA LANES
• BOLSTER ALLIES AND FRIENDLY STATES
• INFLUENCE NEUTRALS
• WIDEN SOVIET STRATEGIC PROBLEM
• CONTRIBUTE TO ATTAINMENT OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY
• SUPPORT U.S./ALLIED LAND BATTLES
• ASSIST IN RESTORATION OR DEFENSE OF ALLIED TERRITORY
• SECURE FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION
• GAIN LEVERAGE TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES
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This strategy will attempt to exploit the advantages inherent in amphibious forces by
positioning forward to create pressure at either a single point of decision or along mul-
tiple axes. In so doing, we intend to seize and hold positions well within the Soviet sea
control/denial areas. Success in forward positioning at points of our choosing will, in
the early stages, allow us to disrupt the correlation of forces and ultimately gain needed
leverage for use in war termination.
These Marine Corps force planning goals have been extracted from the FY 86–90
Defense Guidance and are designed to serve as objectives of the amphibious campaign
in the event of global conventional war with the Soviet Union. The nature of the stated
goals speak to the unique contribution that amphibious forces can make in support of
the Maritime Strategy.
Having taken a brief look at both the goals of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy and the
warfighting objectives assigned to amphibious forces, the following section will focus
on those contributions that amphibious forces can make in a peacetime or crisis envi-
ronment by full exploitation of their current posture.
Before discussing the role of amphibious forces in a conventional global war, it must be
emphasized that those forces serve the U.S. government across the entire spectrum of
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 1 1 7
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE
• MARITIME STRATEGY OVERVIEW
• AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OVERVIEW
• CURRENT FORCE POSTURE
• GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY
• SUMMARY
MARINE CORPS FORCE PLANNING GOALS
• CONDUCT FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS
• SEIZE AND DEFEND ADVANCED NAVAL BASES
• CONTRIBUTE TO SLOC DEFENSE
• ASSIST IN EXTENSION OF CONTROL OVER SEA AREAS OF OPERATIONS
• REINFORCE ALLIES BY PROJECTION OF POWER AGAINST THE LITTORALS
• SEIZE AND CONTROL STRATEGIC OCEANIC CHOKEPOINTS
• SEIZE AND ESTABLISH LODGEMENTS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF FOLLOW-ON FORCES
• IMMEDIATELY RESPOND TO AND CARRY OUT PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
• CONDUCT OPERATIONS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE LAND CAMPAIGN
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conflict possibilities: from peacetime presence through strategic nuclear war. While the
strategy outlined herein focuses on global conventional war, the role of amphibious
forces in it cannot be understood completely without some mention of other kinds of
conflict. Therefore, it will initially focus on two other major roles for amphibious
forces: peacetime presence and crisis response.
The peacetime presence of amphibious forces is constant and worldwide. This presence
underlines U.S. commitments and interests around the globe on a daily basis. This for-
ward presence is a physical demonstration of our national will, encourages allies and
friends, deters and reduces the influence of potential foes, influences neutrals and rein-
forces the principles of international law and freedom of the seas so vital to our
national interests.
The Maritime and Amphibious Warfare Strategies, like CINC war planning, address
current forces, that is, those available at the end of Fiscal 85. This avoids uncertainties
as to the attainability of forces now planned or programmed for the out-years, while
not appreciably affecting the shape of the anticipated future strategies. It should be
noted that while this chart depicts only naval forces, all U.S. military forces of necessity
will contribute to the strategy and the allies play an important role as well. The major
FY 85 Navy and Marine Corps general purpose forces are assigned to fleet commanders
and are normally deployed as shown. In accordance with the Maritime Strategy, a sig-
nificant portion of these forces, approximately one third, are routinely forward
deployed.
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One measure of the peacetime presence role that amphibious forces play is the number
of port visits routinely conducted each year. Note that the dots on this chart only rep-
resent countries visited, over 45 of them. Many of these countries received visits at
more than one port-of-call.
These routine port visits promote better relations between the United States and the
allied, friendly and neutral countries visited and demonstrate American military
strength, professionalism and potential support in time of crisis.
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Throughout the year amphibious forces participate in a demanding series of peacetime
exercises. Dozens are held each year, often with allies and other services. This chart
shows some of the most important peacetime exercises held on a continuing basis, the
largest being RIMPAC in the North Pacific and SOLID SHIELD in the Atlantic.
These exercises contribute to alliance cohesion, enable U.S. naval units to operate rou-
tinely with sister services and allied forces, and to test and update joint and combined
operational procedures.
Central to our ability to execute the strategy is the requirement to conduct large scale
amphibious exercises, as well as joint/combined exercises, in every clime and place we
may be expected to fight in war. Development of an exercise program within the con-
text of the strategy will allow us to: (1) Test/refine the strategy, (2) identify future
requirements, which in turn will, (3) influence the direction of Research and Develop-
ment efforts and (4) serve as a visible signal of U.S. resolve to support friends and
oppose foes.
Crisis response is the next major role of amphibious forces. Crisis responses by amphib-
ious forces can range from varying deployment patterns to express specific concern and
support, through clear demonstrations of warfighting capabilities, to the actual use of
force in support of national objectives. Amphibious forces can be used across the entire
spectrum of responses to crises, from a show of force, through the countering of acts of
state-supported terrorism, to engaging in single theater wars. In addition, MPS MABs
offer a significantly increased capability to rapidly respond to a crisis situation with a
credible force when employed as a preconflict deterrent or to reinforce ongoing
amphibious operations after the outbreak of hostilities. Most recent examples of a
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maritime response to crises can be seen in the use of amphibious forces in both Leba-
non* and Grenada.†
With the foregoing as a backdrop, we will now turn to a discussion of the strategy itself.
In the event deterrence fails, both the Maritime and its component Amphibious War-
fare Strategy are designed to help achieve the national objective of war termination on
favorable terms. Our national strategy to accomplish that, like all strategies in response
to aggression, can take four forms: (1) We can meet force with like force at the point of
attack; (2) We can escalate the intensity of the conflict; (3) We can alter the geographic
scope of the conflict; and/or (4) We can control the duration of the fighting.
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* For details of this operation, see Benis L. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982–1984 (Washington,
D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1987) [Editor].
† For details of this operation, see Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution
of Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October–2 November 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Of-
fice, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997) [Editor].
USES OF NAVAL POWER
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:31:21 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Holding at the point of attack does not by itself generate pressure to end the war. Esca-
lation is an effective deterrent option, but if used is fraught with risk. It is the last two
dimensions that give flexibility and maneuver options to the strategies and at the heart
of these two dimensions is the Navy–Marine Corps Team.
Our primary objective early on is to limit expansion of any conflict. If it cannot be lim-
ited, however, or catastrophic loss impends, then careful attention to scope and dura-
tion will become necessary. These are the two forms of response in which the
Amphibious Warfare Strategy can complement the Maritime Strategy in making the
strategic difference.
Maritime superiority will allow us to alter the geographical breadth of the conflict and
deny the Soviets any advantage through expansion. This strategic difference will also
permit us, if we choose, to take the conflict to an area or areas where the Soviets do not
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THE NAVY–MARINE CORPS TEAM: MAKING THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE
RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION
• MEET FORCE WITH LIKE FORCE HEAD-ON
• ESCALATE INTENSITY OF THE CONFLICT
ALTER GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT
CONTROL DURATION OF THE CONFLICT
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want to fight. Further, the application of naval power is not intended to be accom-
plished in isolation. To take full advantage of the synergism that that accrues from
coordinated, mutually-supporting combat actions, the employment of naval forces, to
include power projection forces, must be done in full concert with all U.S. and allied
forces.
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy Component, like the Maritime Strategy, is a mobile,
forward, flanking strategy of options. While the battle is joined in Central Europe, our
strategy enables the Western alliance to secure the sea lines of communications, defeat
attacks on the European flanks and in the Far East, and to carry the fight to the enemy
there. This will influence the Soviets’ decision to reinforce the center, while ensuring
the buildup of U.S. and allied countervailing power at the strategic point(s) of decision.
Moreover, the roles and influence of the Chinese in the war will be, in part, influenced
by the strong and credible actions of U.S. maritime forces.
Presently, the Maritime Strategy frames the conflict within three phases. The phases
shown here are not constrained by specific timelines, nor should they be. Indeed, it is
anticipated that a global, conventional war with the Soviet Union may be of protracted
duration. This assumption, in turn, exposes additional Soviet vulnerabilities to be
exploited by allied forces in the later stages of the conflict. As will be shown, the judi-
cious application of naval power at key points of Soviet vulnerability can contribute to
pressing home the strategic advantages accrued and, along with other coalition forces,
bring about war termination on terms favorable to this Nation and its allies.
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Inasmuch as the Amphibious Warfare Strategy is a component of the Maritime Strat-
egy, it will be articulated in the same manner: the war and the strategy will be subdi-
vided into phases characterized by the level and type of conflict.
The combat power of an amphibious task force, with attendant Carrier Air, Mine
Countermeasure and Naval Surface Fire Support, when employed in concert with allied
forces, provides for flexible response across a wide range of options. If properly
applied, amphibious operations can make a vital contribution to both the conduct of
maritime and land operations, and in so doing, contribute to the successful execution
of the Maritime Strategy.
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is a global strategy which emphasizes full forward
pressure in all phases of a global conventional war. It employs the flexibility of response
which has always characterized naval forces. Our response options must include both
sequential and simultaneous operations conducted in one or more theaters.
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is designed to support the national objectives of
deterrence or war termination on favorable terms. We will attempt to accomplish this
by offering strategic options which may alter the scope and duration of the war. Fur-
thermore, the employment of amphibious forces should be exercised within the con-
text of the overarching strategic requirements that may emerge as the conflict expands.
That is to say, that amphibious forces must be available to contribute to the attainment
of the ultimate objective of war termination on favorable terms. Additionally, amphibi-
ous forces must be postured in such a way to respond to changing national aims which
may call for the maximum application of naval power at various junctures across the
breadth of the conflict. It is critical that these individual decision points take into
account that the employment of amphibious forces at a given place and time may fore-
close the option of their employment at another place and time.
In the global war scenario upon which this strategy is based the most efficient use of
amphibious forces is for the projection of power along the Soviet flanks or Rimland. While
our focus will be on amphibious operations along the flanks, our strategy must provide
options that strike against the Soviet Heartland or, at a minimum, allow for incursions into
the strategic centers of Warsaw Pact and Soviet surrogate states, if required.
1 2 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
PRINCIPLES
• FOCUS OF STRATEGY IS ON APPLICATION OF FORCE AGAINST THE FLANKS (RIMLAND)
• THE STRATEGY MUST SUPPORT MULTI-THEATER OPERATIONS
• AMPHIBIOUS FORCES MAY BE CALLED UPON TO SWING FROM ONE THEATER TO ANOTHER
• MARINE FORCES MAY DEPLOY AS MABs, BUT WILL FIGHT AS MAFs WHEREVER AND WHENEVER
REQUIRED
• THE STRATEGIC MOBILITY OF MPS MABs WILL BE FULLY EXPLOITED
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In order to maximize the strategic advantage provided by the unique flexibility of maritime
forces and to support the goal of exerting full forward pressure, amphibious warfare
options must address multi-theater operations, both simultaneously and sequentially.
To accomplish the foregoing, the “swing” of amphibious shipping, Marine forces and
other supporting naval forces cannot be arbitrarily ruled out. However, the risk inher-
ent in the intertheater swing of naval forces, with the attendant loss of options in other
theaters, should not be taken without an assessment of the strategic advantages to
accrue from such a decision.
Close examination of the potential threat suggests that whenever and wherever possible
a minimum of a MAF-sized force will be required to conduct forcible entry operations.
However, an assessment of our present lift capability indicates that little more than a
MAB’s worth of lift is extant in each ocean. We cannot tie ourselves to only sequential
operations and, therefore, must be prepared to conduct MAB-size amphibious opera-
tions simultaneously with or without MPS reinforcement, in remote or single theaters
when a strategic advantage may accrue by doing so. In this employment sequence, the
amphibious MAB may well serve as the lead element of the ultimate amphibious force.
Within the context of general war, the strategy must provide a range of options for the
deployment/employment of the MPS Squadrons and their associated MABs which
cover the spectrum from pre-hostility insertions to reinforcement of amphibious
MAGTFs or the massing of multi-MAB forces, under a single MAF Headquarters, for
the conduct of independent operations.
Phase I is a transition phase characterized by rising tensions, regional crises, regional
wars involving either the U.S. or Soviets and positioning our forces for a possible gen-
eral war. Our objectives during this period are three: first to terminate the conflict by
winning the small war or managing a crisis and thereby prevent escalation, secondly, to
prepare for general war through increases in readiness and deploying forces as far




• DETER SOVIETS/CLIENTS FROM ESCALATING THE CONFLICT
• PREPARE FOR GENERAL WAR
• BOLSTER ALLIES AND FRIENDLY STATES
• TASKS:
• OCCUPATION OF STRATEGIC CHOKEPOINTS
• DENIAL OF KEY ISLANDS AND BASES TO ENEMY FORCES
• INTEGRATION WITH ALLIED NAVAL, GROUND AND AIR FORCES AT KEY GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS
• STABILIZATION THROUGH PRESENCE, OF AREAS KEY TO THE CONTROL OF GLOBAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION
• ENHANCEMENT OF KEY ALLIED DEFENSIVE POSTURES
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forward as possible and third, in so doing bolster the confidence of our allies and other
friendly states. Competition between these objectives is inevitable: early national-level
decisionmaking is crucial to the attainment of adequate force levels and to avoid
maldeployment of naval forces prior to the conclusion of this phase.
Throughout the Transition to War there would be global forward movement of U.S.
naval forces, SSNs would move into far forward positions, including the Arctic, deep in
the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas. Battle groups would begin to form into
multi-carrier battle forces. Forward deployed forces would increase readiness, demon-
strating that no major region would be ceded to the Soviets.
Forward deployed amphibious task groups would increase readiness and lead portions
of a Marine Amphibious Brigade would fly to Norway to join their prepositioned
equipment.* Other Marine Air-Ground Task Forces would begin loadout. Sealift of
multi-service reinforcements would commence.
Amphibious forces may not be engaged in combat during Phase I. Nonetheless, there are
actions that must be taken early in order to produce the capability to fight immediately, if
required or be prepared for engagement with enemy forces early in the following phases.
1 2 6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
PHASE I
TRANSITION TO WAR: MOVEMENT OF POWER PROJECTION FORCES
* When completed in FY 89, the Norway Prepositioning Program will include major items of equip-
ment and 30 days of sustainability for a MAB specifically tailored to accommodate the mission, ter-
rain, environment and perceived threat. In the interim, essential equipment and supplies not yet
prepositioned will deploy with this MAB.
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Prepositioning forces, both land and maritime, can have a major impact during Phase I,
both in deterrence/conflict limitation and in positioning/preparation for general war.
As early as possible, a MAB configured for the Norway prepo mission would be
airlanded to Norway prepared for subsequent employment.* The two MABs currently
associated with the MPS Squadrons can be airlifted into regions such as: (1) the Jutland
Peninsula to aid in the defense of Denmark, (2) Greek or Turkish Thrace to add stabil-
ity to the area and to deter the opening of a second front by the Soviets, (3) to strategic
straits and choke points, e.g., the Dardanelles, Hormuz, (4) to strategic forward bases
or islands, (5) to forward locations such as the United Kingdom or Japan to prepare for
subsequent operations, (6) reinforce ongoing amphibious operations or (7) establish a
stabilizing presence in peripheral crisis areas. Additionally, the massing of the two MPS
MABs in a single theater, under a MAF Headquarters, if the tactical situation dictates,
is a capability that should be considered.
Amphibious forces will increase readiness, commence embarkation and move forward
during Phase I. Atlantic Fleet amphibious shipping will embark the Marine Forces
available to II MAF while Pacific Fleet amphibious ships are embarking the maximum
number of Marines from I and III MAF. The 4th Division–Wing Team may be acti-
vated, as well as Selected Reservists from various Navy amphibious warfare units who
may be called up and embarked with deploying Amphibious Task Forces. Additionally,
those commercial/USNS ships earmarked for use as Assault Follow-on Echelon
(AFOE) shipping will sail for ports of embarkation, load out and sail in trace of their
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 1 2 7
PHASE I
TRANSITION TO WAR
* FOC in FY 89.
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respective assault echelons. Finally, forward deployed and overseas homeported
amphibious units will move to join those amphibious forces sailing to forward
positions.
A significant range of strategic options emerge which are directly attributable to the
flexibility inherent in amphibious forces. II MAF forces may be initially employed to
stabilize crisis situations developing in locations such as: the Caribbean Basin or the
Mediterranean littoral, sail to critical forward positions in the island chains of the G-I-
N Gap, to ports in Great Britain, to ports on the continent or, indeed, swing their forces
into the Pacific Ocean. Likewise, I and/or III MAF forces may sail directly to Japan, into
the Indian Ocean, or swing their forces into the LANTCOM Area of Operations.
Finally, forward deployed forces may rendezvous with ATF’s underway from CONUS
ports, egress from potential Mare Clausum, e.g., Med Sea, Sea of Japan or sail inde-
pendently to positions in the vicinity of friendly ports to aid in reinforcing our deter-
rent posture or avoid/create a perception of the potential for escalation.
In the final analysis, the strategic moves decided upon must commence early in Phase I.
Since our principal objectives in this phase are to deter war and if that fails to be in
optimum position to commence hostilities, amphibious forces must be in position to
engage at the point(s) of decision around the globe. At a minimum, the following force
disposition should be expected: (1) an airlanded MAB will be in position in Norway,*
(2) an amphibious MAB positioned forward in each ocean or in transit to form a MAF
1 2 8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
PHASE I
TRANSITION TO WAR
* FOC in FY 89.
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in a single theater, (3) sustaining AFOEs steaming in trace or positioned in close prox-
imity to their assault echelons, (4) MPS Squadrons moving to potential offload/
employment locations and (5) the balance of active forces commencing closure of the
major theaters of operation.
The key to success during Phase I of the Amphibious Strategy is readiness: readiness of
ships and Marine units to embark and move forward on short notice, of selected naval
reserves to support early movement of MPS MABs and of the command structure to
make the early decisions which permit amphibious forces to assume their critically
important forward positions.




• CONTRIBUTE TO ATTAINMENT OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY
• DEFEND ALLIED TERRITORY
• TASKS:
• SEIZURE, OCCUPATION, AND DEFENSE OF ADVANCED NAVAL BASES
• OCCUPATION, NEUTRALIZATION OR STABILIZATION OF TERRAIN VITAL TO THE SECURING OF A NAVAL FLANK
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Phase II begins for amphibious forces when the Phase I objective, to be in position to
engage worldwide, has been achieved, and the Soviets have initiated an attack on U.S.
and/or allied forces. The arrival in theater(s) of amphibious MABs, MPS Forces, MAF
Headquarters Elements, AFOE shipping, residual Marine units and reserves will permit
the organization of Composite MAFs forward.
Amphibious forces, if far enough forward to seize the initiative, will be positioned to
accomplish their Phase II objectives. Prepositioned forces can assist in the attainment
of maritime superiority by securing naval flanks and/or occupying and defending
advanced naval bases. Selected aviation assets of the employed MAGTF(s) can assist in
the attainment of maritime objectives by supporting Strike and TASMO operations.
The MAB positioned in Norway,* along with allied forces, will be fully engaged in
defense of allied territory. Additionally, these Marine forces can directly contribute to
the attainment of maritime superiority in the Norwegian/Barents Seas area by denying
the use of airspace to Soviet surveillance aircraft engaged in fixing/targeting U.S. sur-
face fleets.
Uncommitted but ready amphibious forces will succeed in complicating the Soviets’
strategic equation. Depending on the levels of sea control established in proximity to
selected littorals, amphibious forces, up to MAF-size, will be capable of assault opera-
tions at key points of decision; thereby causing the Soviet forces to withhold reserve
forces which could otherwise be better employed by contributing to the conduct of
their theater offensive.
During the initial stages of Phase II, the forward posture of amphibious forces consti-
tute a direct threat to the Soviets by increasing the level of uncertainty and severely
complicating the Soviet decisionmaking process. Depending on the deployment
sequence chosen, the Soviets will be required to react to the possible simultaneous
deployment of amphibious forces on their Northern, Southern and Eastern Flanks.
Such deployments represent the potential for the conduct of amphibious operations
which may lead to the introduction of U.S./allied follow-on forces.




• WIDEN THE SOVIET STRATEGIC PROBLEM
• AID IN PUTTING THE SOVIETS ON THE DEFENSE
• TASKS:
• CONTRIBUTE TO AIR DEFENSE OF WATERS ADJACENT TO OCCUPIED LITTORALS
• CONDUCT ASSAULT OPERATIONS TO SEIZE KEY TERRAIN FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF U.S./ALLIED FOLLOW-ON FORCES
* FOC in FY 89.
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Strategic options available to amphibious forces as Phase II unfolds range from limited
objective amphibious raids, up to MAB-sized in scale, to near MAF-sized amphibious
assaults to secure territory adequate for the introduction of other service or allied follow-
on forces or reinforcement of engaged ground forces. This capability may become criti-
cal if we are unable to effect the bilateral agreements necessary to sustain our naval
forces or, for whatever reason, an existing agreement is abrogated.
Depending on our ultimate force disposition during this Phase, the aforementioned
options could be executed against the Soviet Rimland in such diverse locations as
North Norway, the Southern Kuriles, both the North and South coasts of the Mediter-
ranean Sea, the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean littoral or Southeast Asian havens for Soviet
combatants.
Coordination with other U.S. services, with NATO and with the armed forces of other
allied or associated nations is critical as we begin to conduct amphibious operations.
Amphibious warfare forces will have to exercise this coordination on a continuous
basis regardless of whether or not they are engaged in joint/combined operations.
As the Soviet offensive is gradually contained, allied forces will have the opportunity to
launch decisive counterattacks to seize the strategic initiative and to begin the progressive
rollback of Soviet/WP forces. Beginning during Phase III and continuing until the end of
the war, amphibious warfare is a primary task for maritime forces. Amphibious warfare
accelerates and builds on the success achieved previously to prosecute the campaigns
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 1 3 1
PHASE II
SEIZE THE INITIATIVE: INITIAL PROJECTION OPTIONS
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initiated during Phase II. The objectives for amphibious forces are broad and permit con-
sideration of an ever-widening series of options. Objectives are to regain lost territory, to
ensure that critical SLOCs remain open or to seize and occupy Soviet territory in a series of
war termination actions. During this phase, sufficient attrition of Soviet forces may have
occurred to permit assaults, or the threat thereof, directly into the homeland.
It is from the early stages of Phase III through the termination of hostilities that the
value of amphibious forces as a strategic reserve becomes clear. While these forces were
most probably insufficient to decisively affect the early outcome of a European war,
their potential for shifting the strategic center of gravity against a battered and
exhausted Soviet force is enormous. The level of uncertainty created by such a mobile
force and the threat of its employment in assaults on the vulnerable Soviet pressure
points combine to make amphibious forces a valuable tool in gaining leverage for war
termination on favorable terms. Accordingly, the selection of employment options dur-
ing phases I and II should consider retaining the capability for decisive use of amphibi-
ous forces throughout the duration of Phase III.
Execution of the stated tasks is largely contingent upon the residual air and ground
combat power resident in previously engaged, but now massed amphibious forces.
Their success is dependent upon the availability of carrier and/or land-based Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft, naval surface fire support platforms, integrated C3I systems,
1 3 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
PHASE III
CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY:
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TASKS
• CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS TO RESTORE KEY NAVAL FACILITIES TO ALLIED CONTROL
• SUPPORT U.S./ALLIED COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
• CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATIONS TO ASSIST IN THE RESTORATION OF ALLIED
TERRITORY
• CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF U.S./ALLIED OPERATIONS TO
SEIZE SOVIET/WP TERRITORY
• REDEPLOY TO STABILIZE REMAINING TROUBLE SPOTS
PHASE III
CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY
• OBJECTIVES:
• ASSIST IN RESTORATION OF ALLIED TERRITORY
• ENSURE THAT CRITICAL SLOCs REMAIN OPEN
• AID IN STRIKING/SEIZING SOVIET/WP TERRITORY
• GAIN LEVERAGE TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES
• POLICE REMAINING TROUBLE SPOTS
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mine countermeasure assets, cargo off-load and discharge units and the logistical
sustainability resident in both AFOE shipping and follow-on strategic lift assets.
Finally, large scale employment of amphibious forces must be taken under the umbrella
of coalition warfare. That is to say, amphibious operations must be conducted in con-
cert with, supporting of, and supported by, available U.S./allied forces. Moreover, the
selection of employment options during the early phases should consider retaining the
capability for decisive use of amphibious forces late in the war; although this retention
should not preclude forward deployment of amphibious forces at the earliest practica-
ble opportunity.
As previously noted, the combined assets available in our amphibious ships and follow-
on Military Sealift Command shipping provide a capability to conduct MAB-sized
assault operations in two forward ocean areas simultaneously. If an early decision to
concentrate available amphibious shipping in a single theater has been taken, then the
massing of amphibious shipping to conduct a MAF-sized amphibious assault is clearly
possible.
Additionally, MAF or MAB-sized operations utilizing the Near-Term Prepositioned
Force and newly deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships could be conducted in appro-
priate theaters. Some allies, especially the British and South Koreans, have limited
amphibious assault capabilities that may be used to supplement our own.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 1 3 3
PHASE III
CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE OPTIONS
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The battleship surface action groups could be employed to good advantage in a naval
surface fire support role. Surface combatants, construction battalions, special opera-
tions and mine warfare forces have important roles to play here as well.
In addition to the execution or exploitation of the range of options outlined previously,
the effects of mobilization on both the industrial base and the manpower pool now
allow for large scale offensive naval operations.
Among the strategic options available to accomplish our objectives during the later
stages of Phase III are MAF-sized amphibious assaults on such diverse geography as the
Kola Peninsula, Sakhalin Island, the Baltic littoral of the Warsaw Pact states, restoral of
BENELUX ports to allied control or, in conjunction with an allied counteroffensive,
direct incursions into the Soviet homeland, such as: an attack through the Bosphorus
and Dardanelles into the Black Sea. Exercise of these options could accrue such benefits
as: (l) Blocking Soviet/WP ability to apply pressure on allied flanks, (2) Assist in rolling
back or amputating Soviet reach, (3) Seizing or disrupting activity at key logistical
chokepoints, thereby degrading the Soviets’ ability to resupply WP units, with the
resultant potential to fragment WP solidarity/combat effectiveness and (4) contribut-
ing to warfighting objectives in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan.
Most particularly in these later phases of the conflict, naval forces must be fully pre-
pared to fight in concert with active and reserve forces of all U.S. services and friendly
1 3 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
PHASE III
CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE OPTIONS
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states. Additionally, they must be most responsive to objectives perhaps as yet unde-
fined, set by the civilian leadership of U.S., allied and friendly forces.
Having presented the Amphibious Warfare Strategy, the following will provide a brief
summary of the key points set forth within the strategy.
It is critical that the Amphibious Warfare Strategy remain fully complementary to the
Maritime Strategy. This precept is vital if we are to translate these strategies into pro-
gramming and planning documents that will allow the Navy–Marine Corps Team to
both apply resources to its warfighting deficiencies and develop plans and policies
which are in consonance with national warfighting objectives and force capabilities.
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, as it is translated into operational policies, tactical
plans, force disposition and closure sequences, must take into account the considerable
support amphibious forces require from other naval forces; support that may not be
forthcoming until the accomplishment of other missions these forces must carry out
either prior to or in conjunction with the introduction of amphibious forces. Accord-
ingly, amphibious planning must be carefully integrated into all warfighting strategies
at the theater level.
The most valuable characteristic of amphibious forces in a global war is the flexible
way in which they can respond to accomplish missions across a wide spectrum and in
geographically-dispersed areas. This Amphibious Warfare Strategy seeks to exploit that
flexible response capability by offering a wide range of strategic options while avoiding
foreclosure on a given option due to malpositioning, ineffective early employment or
less productive expenditure of this national strategic asset.
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SUMMARY
• THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY IS A COMPONENT OF AND COMPLEMENTARY TO THE
MARITIME STRATEGY
• THE STRATEGY IS SUPPORTED BY AND SUPPORTIVE OF NAVAL FORCES AND THEIR ASSIGNED
TASKS AND MISSIONS
• AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING MUST BE INTEGRATED INTO WARFIGHTING STRATEGY AT THE
THEATER LEVEL
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE
• MARITIME STRATEGY OVERVIEW
• AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OVERVIEW
• CURRENT FORCE POSTURE
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The execution of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy hinges on the readiness of amphibi-
ous forces to forward deploy, their ability to sustain themselves while engaged, and
their capability to operate in consonance with other naval, sister service and allied
forces. Continued emphasis on these areas, along with the attendant application of
resources to insure their maintenance or future enhancement, will ensure that this
strategy remains a viable one.
Amphibious forces must be continuously postured to respond to changing national aims.
Therefore, it is critical that at every decision point in which the deployment/employment
of amphibious forces is considered, such decisions must be taken within the context of
the power projection/amphibious assault requirements that may emerge at any point
along the continuum of conflict.
A global war fought against a determined and able Soviet foe will be a conflict of
unprecedented ferocity requiring the total and unswerving commitment of the Western
alliance if eventual victory is to be achieved. Amphibious forces can make a material
contribution to the early success of Allied efforts by threatening vulnerable Soviet
flanks and causing a resultant divergence of enemy forces from the main focus of effort
in Central Europe. With the stabilization of the front on the European Continent,
Navy–Marine Corps amphibious task forces will play a key role in seizing the strategic
initiative by striking at key points of Soviet weakness to liberate conquered territory
and, if need be, carry the fight to the doorstep of Russia itself. By assisting in the attain-
ment of Alliance goals, U.S. naval forces and the hammer of decision resident in its
amphibious striking arm, can truly make the strategic difference.
1 3 6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
SUMMARY
• OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND RISKS: EARLY AND LATE EMPLOYMENT
• AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER NAVAL FORCES CAN MAKE THE
STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE STRATEGIC INITIATIVE
AND SUCCESSFUL ATTAINMENT OF ALLIED WAR GOALS
SUMMARY
• THE STRATEGY OFFERS A WIDE RANGE OF FLEXIBLE GLOBAL RESPONSE OPTIONS THAT TAKE
FULL ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET VULNERABILITIES
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The Maritime Strategy
Global Maritime Elements for U.S. National Strategy, 1985
On 1 November 1985 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, signed
the letter distributing a new version of the Maritime Strategy that superseded the one
circulated a year and a half earlier, in May 1984.* In forwarding the 1984 version Admi-
ral Watkins had announced his intention to do this, noting that “comments and sugges-
tions for the FY 85 revision are requested. It is anticipated that the FY 85 revision will be
presented initially at the beginning of the next programming cycle in October 1984, and
briefed at the October 1984 Fleet Commanders in Chief Conference.”†
In August and September 1984, work began on the new version.‡ By that time, routine
officer rotation had begun to bring in a new team in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations to deal with the Maritime Strategy issues. Commodore T. J. Johnson had
become Deputy Director of the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-60), Captain
Larry Seaquist had become Head, Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and Com-
mander T. Wood Parker was the new action officer for the Maritime Strategy.
At this point, a number of the commanders in chief were becoming critical of the strat-
egy. When Commodore Johnson had given the briefing at the October 1984 Fleet Com-
manders in Chief Conference he had received some negative reactions, comments that
dismissed it as “brochuresmanship,” a “PR job—not a strategy,” “not executable,” and
“lacking operational insight.” While having great respect for what had already been
done—and being determined to leave its basic structure (and map projection) intact—
Seaquist and Parker agreed on three principal goals: to enhance the substance of the
strategy; to get both the Navy and Marine Corps headquarters staffs to use the Maritime












* Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-85, serial 00/5S300379,
1 November 1985. This document was approved for declassification by the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 16 July 2007.
† Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-84, serial 00/4S300236,
4 May 1984, para. 4.
‡ For a more detailed explanation of the background to the 1985 document, see John B.
Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 83–91.
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budget, and procurement; and to “spread the gospel” throughout the Navy by wide-
spread briefings and writings.
Parker’s goals, as action officer, in reaction to the criticism were to get greater involve-
ment from the fleet commanders in chief for the next version; to describe more effectively
the idea of “war termination on favorable terms”; to expand on the portions that dealt
with peacetime operations, crisis-control operations, and transition to war; to include
both anti–Soviet SSBN operations and U.S. Navy SSBN operations as part of the overall
concept for the strategy; to deal with questions of time phasing and nuclear war that had
been omitted earlier; and to explain further the uncertainties involved in the strategy.
At the same time, Vice Admiral James A. Lyons—Vice Admiral Moreau’s successor as Dep-
uty Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy (OP-06)—came up with the idea of
“strategy stoppers”: procurement problems and issues that, if not funded, would weaken the
strategy or make it difficult to execute. The point was to reinforce the strategy as a source of
basic guidance and cohesiveness for the entire program acquisition process.
As the discussions continued, however, Seaquist and Parker concentrated on combating
the misperception that the Maritime Strategy was merely a budget document designed to
increase the size of the Navy, explaining it as rather the maritime component of the
national strategy, complementing the other services. As part of this effort, Admiral Lyons
and Commander Parker briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee and members of
the House Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, effectively
explaining the issues to some of the Navy’s most difficult critics.
Seaquist and Parker had completed the main work of revision by July 1985, at which
point Commander Albert C. Myers relieved Parker. Myers’s task was to compile the final
recommendations and changes emerging from a conference of working-level OPNAV and
fleet staff planners and then submit the final draft document up the chain of command
for Admiral Watkins to sign. In the letter circulating this third version of the Maritime
Strategy, Admiral Watkins pointed out that this version “has been refined to address
more fully: (a) Contributions of our allies and sister services, (b) Uncertainties associ-
ated with the execution of our strategy, (c) Strategic lift in all phases.”*
Going farther, Watkins emphasized, “The Maritime Strategy is the cornerstone of our
profession. It describes our role in executing national military strategy, is the basis for the
development of the Navy POM, for testimony in support of Navy budgets and programs,
for joint and allied cooperative planning efforts and for tactical development and
warfighting plans in the Fleet.”† Finally, he pointed out that “for the Maritime Strategy
to remain dynamic, our leaders must understand it; therefore, the strategy must be sub-
ject to study and continued evaluation.”‡ 
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* Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-85, para. 1.
† Ibid., para. 2.
‡ Ibid., para. 3.
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This is the Maritime Strategy, Global Maritime Elements of U.S. National Military Strat-
egy. It is the Navy’s preferred Maritime Strategy. It considers national and coalition
guidance, the various threats, force levels, and the inevitable trade-offs which occur
during crisis and non-crisis operations. It is a baseline strategy that is the nucleus from
which our other strategy options emanate.
Why do we have a Maritime Strategy? What are its purposes? Primarily, it provides a global
view of fleet operations, for deterrence and crisis control. Should deterrence fail, it is the
baseline integrated naval strategy for a global conventional war with the Soviet Union, with
war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. (The Maritime Strategy is the
foundation for the development of the annual naval program and budget submission.) It is
also the foundation for the U.S. Navy’s day-to-day fleet operations: routine fleet deploy-
ments; exercises; war games; and frequent requirements from the national command
authority for response in times of international crises. The strategy is also the basis for the
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 1 3 9
MARITIME STRATEGY—PURPOSES
• GLOBAL VIEW OF FLEET OPERATIONS FOR DETERRENCE
• INTEGRATED NAVAL STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL WAR
• BASIS FOR WARFARE APPRAISALS
• FOUNDATION FOR NAVAL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:31:30 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
development of the annual naval program which drives the priorities of our research and
development programs and the complex decisions regarding force structure.
The Maritime Strategy is derived from and contributes to our national policy and strat-
egy. The Soviet threat poses a constant challenge to our national strategy and its mari-
time component. Embedded within the Maritime Strategy are the plans and concepts
of the unified commanders and their naval component commanders.
The strategy is based on several key concepts. It is important to consider what is meant
by “strategy.” Strategy is a design for applying means to ends. In the Maritime Strategy
the means are military forces. These are forces which are not only available today, but are
also those which are seen to be available in the foreseeable future. This point is important
because the Maritime Strategy is a real-time strategy. It can be executed today, with exist-
ing forces. The additional importance of the strategy is that its fundamental tenets will
remain valid for years to come. Therefore, the Maritime Strategy can not only be based
on current forces and the present-day threat, but it can also serve as the basis for the
development of the POM which looks toward future forces and threats.
The objectives of the Maritime Strategy are deterrence across the range of conflict possi-
bilities and escalation control. If deterrence fails and conflict between the West and the
Soviet bloc occurs, the objectives of the strategy then become war termination on terms
favorable to the U.S. and our allies.
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The premises of the strategy are several. The strategy is a global, coalition strategy, fully
incorporating the forces of our allies and sister services. It is designed to achieve our
national objectives using conventional means while simultaneously avoiding nuclear
war. Should deterrence fail, the strategy assumes a protracted, conventional war. It is
based on the concepts of forward posture, high readiness and the advantages of advanced
technology. The strategy also exploits (to the maximum extent possible) the inherent
attributes of naval force flexibility and mobility.
The Maritime Strategy framework has four parts. The first underscores the relationship
between the Maritime Strategy and the national strategy. The Maritime Strategy is integral
to our national strategy, because if the United States must go to war, it must go to sea.
The second part addresses Soviet Strategy. The Maritime Strategy is not developed to
support the operations desired by the U.S. Navy. Rather, it was developed as a counter
to the strategy of the Soviet Union.
With these two areas in mind, we then proceed to the third part, the development of
the actual strategy, which includes analyses of peacetime and crisis operations as well as
global conventional war with the Soviet Union if deterrence fails. Some of the implica-
tions of conventional forces to nuclear deterrence are also examined.
The fourth part of the Maritime Strategy framework considers the uncertainties inherent in
the strategy. Uncertainties are not only difficult to predict, but they are also issues over
which we have very little, if any, control.
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Now to the relationship between the Maritime Strategy and our national strategy. The
essential elements of our national strategy are deterrence, and if this deterrence fails,
defense as far forward as possible in a posture of global coalition defense.
There are two principal sources for our development of national strategy: National
Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), which are presidential decisions on national
strategy; and the alliances, treaties and agreements we have with countries around the
world.
Several other documents or sources which reflect the national strategy are also illus-
trated here. The Defense Guidance (DG) is the biennial Secretary of Defense guidance
on strategy and programs. The Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and the
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) are annual JCS documents that recommend
strategy to the National Command Authority (the President and the Secretary of
Defense), and provide guidance to the unified and specified commanders, respectively.
The concepts and plans of those commanders describe the strategy for their respective
theaters and functions.
The Navy and Marine Corps contribute to the development of these documents, and
naval forces are among those responsible for their execution.
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One of the principal National Security Decision Directives is NSDD-32, signed by President
Reagan in May 1982. It is the basic document setting forth the current national strategy.
NSDD-32 indicates that our principal threat is from the Soviet Union and that a war
with the Soviets would likely be global in scope. The importance of global, conventional,
balanced and forward deployed forces is highlighted, as is the vital importance of our
allies in our national strategy.
Sequential operations in different theaters may be necessary because we do not have
the superiority of forces and resources, particularly in view of the capabilities of the
Soviet forces, necessary to do everything we need to do, everywhere, simultaneously
“Sequential” in this context also applies to intratheater operations. The idea of “rolling
the enemy back” in a sequential manner will become clear as the Maritime Strategy is
discussed.
The Maritime Strategy is in harmony with NSDD-32, but the strategy is not limited to
the threat of the Soviet Union. There are other NSDDs which address regional threats
and other concerns, and the Maritime Strategy also takes them into account.
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The first of the documents reflecting the national strategy which will be discussed is
the Defense Guidance. The Defense Guidance (DG) is published biennially by the Sec-
retary of Defense with the primary purpose of guiding the development of the annual
Program Objectives Memorandum (POM).
The DG also establishes regional priorities for general Department of Defense plan-
ning. Our top defense priority is North America including the Caribbean Basin. The
remaining regional priorities in descending order are: NATO and its lines of communi-
cations; then, the coequal priorities of access to oil in Southwest Asia, security of our
Pacific allies, and the security of Pacific and Indian Ocean lines of communications;
followed by the security of friendly nations in South America and Africa; and then in
other parts of the world.
The DG contains only one global war planning scenario. It has the war commencing
with a Soviet attack in Southwest Asia, then spreading to Europe and the Pacific six-
teen days later. The DG scenario is useful in sizing certain U.S. forces and establish-
ing capability requirements driven by the most demanding distance-related scenario,
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but it is not intended as a force employment guide for U.S. forces. One concern is
that this scenario can be used to influence planning and programming to an unwar-
ranted degree.
The current Defense Guidance is very positive in its guidance on maritime posture.
It provides the Navy with clear force planning guidance and warfighting goals. It
emphasizes destruction of the enemy fleet (even in high threat areas), control of vital
sea areas (highlighting the Norwegian Sea, Northwest Pacific), sealift, and power pro-
jection ashore. It commits the Department of Defense to a goal of allied maritime
superiority.
The Maritime Strategy does not purport to tell the regional CINCs how to fight in
their respective theaters. The actual execution of the war will be carried out by the
CINCs and Major NATO Commanders (MNCs). The Maritime Strategy, therefore,
provides a set of global maritime options that could be executed by the CINCs and
MNCs.
The Maritime Strategy must be in consonance with the JSCP and current CINC war
planning, but because of overlapping requirements it must transcend an uncritical
compilation of these preferred concepts of operations. The Maritime Strategy melds
the frequently divergent approaches in the DG, the JSCP, the DPQ, and CINC concepts,
and presents a central, preferred baseline strategic course of action.
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Besides the strictly national documents and the plans and concepts of the CINCs, we
also have alliances, treaties and formal agreements with countries around the world.
These alliances and treaties together form the skeletal frame of global coalition warfare,
another of the bases for our national military strategy. It is fundamental that by
defending our allies, we defend ourselves.
In addition to the seven formal defense treaties which include forty-three separate
nations, we have common military interests with other countries which affect the
Maritime Strategy. For example, there are nineteen other countries outside the for-
mal alliance system with which we have significant Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
agreements. These defense treaties and other agreements result in a set of global com-
mitments and interests for the United States. The Maritime Strategy takes these com-
mitments and interests and the requirements of coalition warfare and combined
operations fully into account.
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An exceptionally important part of our coalition strategy is, of course, NATO Strategy.
NATO’s overall strategic concept is contained in a NATO Military Committee docu-
ment known as MC 14/3. The primary goal of this NATO Strategy is to preserve the
peace through the credible deterrence of any threatened or actual aggression against
the North Atlantic Treaty Signatories from covert war to nuclear war. If deterrence fails,
NATO’s first objective is to counter the aggression without escalation and preserve or
restore the integrity and security of the NATO area. The NATO Strategy also states that
NATO must be prepared to escalate to nuclear weapons if necessary.
The Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) of the three Major NATO
Commanders—SACLANT, CINCHAN and SACEUR—is designed to counter the mari-
time operations of the WARSAW PACT and to support the land battle with carrier air
strikes and amphibious assaults. The protection of the vital sea lines of communication
is emphasized throughout the document, with the ultimate goal being to “win the
new peace.”
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The Maritime Strategy is based on the concept of joint and combined operations. To be
successful against the combined forces of the Soviet Union, it is essential that U.S. and
allied air forces, land forces and naval forces operate jointly. Naval operations support
land forces, and land and air operations support maritime forces. There is one com-
mon, unifying goal for all of our forces—favorable war termination.
Illustrative of the progress the United States is making in the area of joint operations is
this listing of the United States interservice cooperation initiatives. The Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force addresses the maritime
roles of the U.S. Air Force especially in air defense, but also in aerial mining and anti-
surface warfare. The Navy-Army MOA discusses the overall subject of sealift. The
Army–Air Force MOA contains eleven initiatives in which the Navy is actively involved,
with the ultimate objective being enhanced interoperability. The Navy–Coast Guard
MOA establishes the United States Maritime Defense Zones (MDZ).
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All of the guidance the Navy has received can be reduced to a few basic goals for the
Maritime Strategy. This strategy has been developed to implement these goals.
The operations within the Maritime Strategy must be planned and executed in close
conjunction with our allies and sister Services.
The Maritime Strategy was developed as a counter to the strategy of the Soviet Union.
In order to understand the Maritime Strategy, a review of Soviet strategy is essential.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 1 4 9
MARITIME STRATEGY FRAMEWORK




Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:31:44 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
This chart shows Soviet worldwide force levels today. The orders of battle for the four
principal fleets and a representative order of battle for each of the Soviets’ normal out
of area deployments are illustrated. The patrol areas of Soviet SSBNs and SSGNs off
the U.S. coasts are notionally represented, and the normal operating areas of other sub-
marines, surface ships and aviation forces are also shown. Note especially the Soviet
worldwide disposition.
The Soviet Navy continues to increase in size and capabilities. Its aviation strike forces
are supplemented by the Soviet Air Force (SAF) which can also be used for strikes
against carrier battle forces or other forces in the maritime theaters. Soviet naval forces
are supplemented by more than 1700 ocean-going Soviet merchant ships, the most mil-
itarily adaptable merchant fleet in the world, deployed globally. Soviet naval forces are
supported in the Baltic by the Polish and East German fleets, in the Black Sea by the
Romanian and Bulgarian navies, and elsewhere by other forces friendly to them.
The Soviets have learned to employ their Navy to exert political influence in peacetime,
and they are doing it effectively. The Soviet Navy, with its increasing capabilities for
global operations, has been an important factor in the Soviet Union’s long range and
heretofore successful strategy of encroachment throughout the world.
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The current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval wartime strategy illustrates
the best current agreed estimate by the U.S. Intelligence Community. The Soviets believe
that war between the coalitions will be global in scope. They state that nuclear escalation is
likely, because they believe that NATO will escalate. However, the Soviets also believe that a
prolonged conventional war is possible.
The NIE states that the Soviets primarily emphasize strategic strike, including the use of
general purpose naval forces to defend their SSBN force, and strategic defense in depth
of the maritime approaches to the USSR, as primary tasks of the Soviet Navy. Support
for ground operations and interdiction of the sea lanes are seen as other, initial tasks.
Therefore, according to the NIE, relatively few forces would be allocated to open-ocean
SLOC interdiction at the beginning of a global war.
Soviet naval strategy, like our own, is part of an overall unified military strategy and
cannot be properly understood outside that context.
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Initial estimated Soviet wartime operating areas provide for Sea Denial Zones to 2000
kilometers. Within these Sea Denial Zones are Sea Control Zones. The Sea Denial
Zones engulf most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and those of several of
our allies, as they extend far out into “blue water.” If secured, the zones sever the vital
sea lines of communication.
In the Sea Control areas, the Soviets would present a multi-platform threat. In the Sea
Denial Zones, the threat would largely be air and subsurface. Beyond the Sea Denial
Zones, the threat would largely be subsurface.
While the essentials of Soviet naval strategy should not appreciably change over the
next 15 to 20 years, the Sea Denial Zones will probably extend another 1000 kilometers
to 3000 kilometers by that time.
It is clear that the Soviet Navy has capabilities in excess of their current sea control/sea
denial zone defense needs, but the NIE represents the best current estimate of their doc-
trine. The implications of what could happen if they adopt a different strategy and the
question of what their strategy will be as the conflict unfolds will be discussed later in
this presentation. But there is no doubt that the Soviets intend to challenge our for-
ward strategy.
SOVIET INITIAL WARTIME AREAS OF OPERATION
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:31:48 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
The Maritime Strategy is designed to defeat the strategy of the Soviets by precluding
their successes, interrupting their time lines, attriting their forces, and exploiting their
sensitivities and vulnerabilities.
The Soviets have optimized their force capabilities for operations in their desired Sea
Control and Sea Denial Zones. They are a formidable foe. Several of their strengths are
listed here. In addition to their large numbers of forces and their design for a combined
arms defense in depth, the Soviets possess and utilize an offensive operational mentality.
Their objective is to seize the initiative, or to gain an advantage over an adversary
through deception, initiative and massive strikes. Their offensive operations plan to
execute their primary tasks of providing a secure strategic strike force and defending
the maritime approaches to the homeland. The Soviets attempt to anticipate every con-
tingency, then carefully and completely plan their operations to meet those contingen-
cies. Their training programs are closely orchestrated to ensure the preparation of their
naval forces to carry out those plans.
But the Soviets are not invulnerable, and they have weaknesses that can be exploited dur-
ing war. We define sensitivities as those things about which the Soviets are especially con-
cerned, and vulnerabilities as the weaknesses that we perceive to be particularly troublesome
to the Soviets. The objective of our Maritime Strategy is to exploit Soviet sensitivities and
vulnerabilities so that the Politburo will stop its military actions, reevaluate its intentions,
analyze whether it can achieve its objectives through military means, and desist from ini-
tiating additional actions and from continuing or escalating the conflict.
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The strategy itself will now be developed. Although the focus of the Maritime Strategy
includes a careful examination of global conventional war with the Soviet Union, the
strategy encompasses the applications of naval power in peacetime and during crisis
response operations as well.
Maritime forces serve the U.S. across the entire range of conflict possibilities, from peace-
time presence to strategic nuclear war.
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The U.S. Navy’s peacetime presence is constant and worldwide. The objectives of peace-
time operations are enhancing deterrence, supporting the diplomatic objectives of the
U.S., and sustaining the high readiness and rapid response capability of the overall strategy.
The Navy’s peacetime presence is an important counter to the strategy of the Soviet
Union—encroachment. The Maritime Strategy recognizes this process and addresses it
in the U.S. Navy’s peacetime presence operations.
Similarly, the U.S. Navy’s forward peacetime operations are designed to deter acts of
state sponsored terrorism, and if that deterrence fails, to be positioned to respond to ter-
rorist acts rapidly and effectively.
Naval forces underscore American commitments and interests around the globe daily.
Their forward presence is a physical demonstration of U.S. will, encouraging allies and
friends, deterring and reducing the influence of enemies, influencing neutrals, and
asserting and reinforcing principles of international law and freedom of the seas on a
continuous basis.
Why does the U.S. Navy go to sea? The foremost reason is that it has numerous commit-
ments requiring forward operations around the world. Some of these commitments are
illustrated here. The circled numbers represent thousands of ship operating days at sea or in
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port in areas where they are assigned, to a considerable extent accrued as the result of meet-
ing the various commitments.
Because of training requirements, naval units naturally spend much time operating in
the western Atlantic and eastern Pacific. A major presence is also maintained in the
western Pacific. Permanent deployments, in force, are made to the Mediterranean, the
Caribbean Sea, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. Naval operations are also
conducted in the northeast Atlantic and north Pacific, because those are vital areas to
places where naval forces must be prepared to defeat the enemy.
At any point in time, a full third of the fleet is at sea with over 110 thousand Navy men
and women. In addition to Navy operations in many parts of the world, there are three
to four thousand civilian mariners providing afloat logistics support.
Satisfying the multitude of commitments and other requirements demands a naval
presence that is forward and mobile. The global mobility of naval forces is illustrated
here with the order of battle of the major FY 85 Navy and Marine Corps forces. These
forces are assigned to Fleet Commanders and are normally deployed as shown. These
force levels include units in overhaul, but not in the Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP).
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The Maritime Strategy—like CINC war planning—addresses current forces, that is,
those available at the end of Fiscal Year 85. This avoids the uncertainties concerning the
attainability of forces now planned or programmed for the future.
The Tomahawk cruise missile weapons system enhances the capabilities of the forces
depicted here. It is a significant change to our strike and anti-surface warfare posture.
Tomahawk continues to be phased in during FY 85 in its anti-ship (TASM) and nuclear
land attack (TLAM-N) forms. The USS New Jersey will soon have an Interim Opera-
tional Capability (IOC) for employment of the conventional land attack version
(TLAM-C).
In addition to the commitments already addressed, naval forces annually participate in
a demanding series of peacetime exercises. Dozens are held each year, often with allies
and other services. This chart shows only a few of the most important ones conducted
last year. The largest of them were the Fleetex’s in the Pacific and the sequence Solid
Shield/Teamwork in the North Atlantic.
These exercises enable U.S. naval units to operate routinely with sister services and
allied forces, and also to test and update joint and combined procedures. The exercises
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thereby strengthen alliance cohesion, enhance interoperability, improve combat effective-
ness, and demonstrate joint and combined capabilities which enhance deterrence.
A previous slide depicted the worldwide mobility of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
team. The more theater-oriented U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force also play important
roles in the development of the Maritime Strategy. A significant number of their forces
are stationed overseas. Shown here are some aspects of their worldwide posture, as
they relate to the Maritime Strategy. In addition to the Army posture, it shows Air
Force Tactical Fighter Squadrons, AWACS Aircraft, and B-52 Squadrons with a current
minelaying or anti–surface missile capability.
There is a close interrelationship between maritime and land campaigns. Naval oper-
ations support land forces, and land/air operations support maritime forces. For
example, the U.S. Army reinforces the Aleutian Islands, Iceland and the Azores dur-
ing a global crisis with the Soviet Union. Maintaining control of these strategic loca-
tions would be crucial to successful maritime operations in a global war.
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The U.S. global alliance force structure must also be included when the naval forces
available to fight are counted. Full commitment of all allies is assumed here, including
the French, Japanese, and others.
This chart and table show the current peacetime disposition of those allied naval forces
that could be expected to play a significant role in a global war. There is a predomi-
nance of smaller blue-water surface combatants and mine counter-measures ships. The
bulk of our allies’ forces are in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters.
When viewed in isolation, it could be concluded that the naval forces of our allies are
mainly at the lower end of the capabilities spectrum. But when they operate in con-
junction with U.S. naval forces, there is a synergistic effect, and allied naval forces make
exceptionally important contributions to the overall Maritime Strategy.
Certain forward land-based allied air superiority, air defense, airborne early warning, and
ground radar forces could help significantly in reducing the air threat to the maritime
effort. NATO Air Forces and ground radars could assist in the European flanks, as the
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 1 5 9
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Japanese and Koreans could assist in East Asia, and the French squadron at Djibouti
could assist in the Indian Ocean.
Allied merchant marine assets will be also required. In certain areas (like Norway, Tur-
key, and Japan), allied coastal defense forces would be important. Certain allies, notably
the British and Dutch, possess limited amphibious assault forces.
This chart illustrates the normal peacetime operating areas of both the U.S. and Soviet gen-
eral purpose naval forces, including those areas in which the two Navies “overlap.” Also
indicated are calendar year 1984 diplomatic port visits. These port visits are an important
aspect of our peacetime naval presence. The dots represent only countries visited—108. To
show the individual ports themselves would overwhelm such a small chart.
Routine port visits are conducted not only to ensure adequate crew rest and relaxation,
but also to promote better relations between the United States and the allied, friendly,
and neutral countries visited. Additionally, the visits demonstrate American military
strength, professionalism and support.
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The Maritime Strategy is designed to meet the national commitments assigned to the
Navy, provide the forward presence called for by our national strategy, bolster deterrence
across the spectrum of conflict possibilities, counter Soviet encroachment, and rein-
force alliance cohesion.
Crisis response is the next major U.S. Navy role. Since World War II, the U.S. Navy has
been used for this purpose more often than any other service: In the past forty years, the
Navy has participated in approximately 80 percent of the crises in which the United
States has been involved.
Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Forces have been the primary instruments of
naval crisis response, but most other types of naval forces could also have been used.
Naval forces are sometimes employed in crises in conjunction with other U.S. ser-
vices, and to a lesser extent allied forces, usually outside formal alliance
frameworks.
The objectives of the strategy are to support national policy objectives, protect American
interests, provide flexible options to the National Command Authority, and control esca-
lation of the crisis.
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This chart locates many of the over 200 crises in which U.S. Naval forces have been
involved since World War II. The majority of these crises have occurred in the Middle
East and Caribbean/Central America regions. Regrettably, we live in an era of “violent
peace” in which crises and armed conflicts, especially in the Third World, will continue.
Naval forces are forward, ready and mobile, and they provide a broad range of strong
options to the National Command Authority. Navy crisis response can range from
varying deployment patterns to express specific concern and support, through
clear demonstrations of warfighting capabilities, to the actual use of force in sup-
port of national objectives. Naval forces can be used across the full spectrum of
responses to crises, from countering acts of state-supported terrorism, to engaging
in single-theater wars.
The Maritime Strategy is designed to respond quickly to crises, avoid maldeployment of
forces when responding to a crisis, control the crisis and ensure that it does not escalate,
and apply the lessons learned in all crisis operations to ensure that the strategy is vali-
dated continuously.
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From peacetime presence and crisis response operations, the U.S. Navy’s baseline strat-
egy for fighting a global conventional war with the Soviets can be developed. The strategy
is designed first to deter such a war. If deterrence fails, the objectives are to fight success-
fully, prevent nuclear war, and contribute to the war’s termination on favorable terms.
At the conclusion, some of the implications for escalation to nuclear war will be discussed.
The Maritime Strategy is separated into three phases. Phase I is a period of rising tensions,
crises, or a serious confrontation between the superpowers. The operations envisioned by
the strategy during Phase I are for the purpose of deterrence. The objective in Phase I is to
control escalation of the crisis and to deter the outbreak of outright hostilities.
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If deterrence fails and the Soviets have attacked, the Maritime Strategy moves into
Phase II, during which U.S. and allied maritime forces would operate to seize the initia-
tive. The objective during Phase II is the establishment of maritime superiority in key
ocean areas.
Success in Phase II will enable the United States to move into Phase III, when maritime
forces can take the fight to the enemy. The objective of Phase III is war termination on
favorable terms. War termination is by no means restricted to Phase III. If the war can
be stopped on favorable terms during Phase II, it will be, of course, terminated as soon
as possible.
There are deliberately no time frames attached to these three phases, because they repre-
sent the general direction in which the Navy would prefer to go, not a timetable.
Phase I, the deterrence or transition phase, includes rising tensions and could include
one or more crises, a serious confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
and/or a regional war involving U.S. or Soviet forces. The goals of the strategy are listed
on the left and the tasks to achieve those goals are listed on the right. Clearly we would
prefer this phase to be the final phase, by controlling a crisis or keeping a “small war”
from spreading.
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The tasks will be tempered by the apparently conflicting demands of each. For example,
positioning forces forward and ensuring no maldeployment could be mutually exclu-
sive. The point to be made is that in a Phase I situation, tough decisions will have to be
made and tradeoffs are inevitable.
Timely and firm political decision making will be crucial. The U.S. National Command
Authority (NCA) and the leadership of the allies will probably be attempting to make
decisions in very ambiguous circumstances. Nonetheless, in a grave crisis which may
result in open conflict between the West and the Soviet Bloc, speed and decisiveness are
essential if all the available political-military incentives are to be brought to bear to
control the crisis and deter conflict. Several items that will be especially important are
the early forward movement of naval and air forces, timely activation of reserves, imple-
mentation of Maritime Defense Zone plans, requisition of civilian sealift and airlift assets,
and consistent alliance cohesion.
For deterrence to be successful, our national and coalition leadership will have to act
quickly and collectively, exerting maximum political-military leverage. All of the diplo-
matic and military options will have to be closely and effectively coordinated.
In this phase we would expect the Soviets to sortie into their Sea Control and Sea Denial
areas. They could also reinforce their Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and/or South China
Sea forces, especially with submarines. We would probably detect all this movement fairly
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early, and have about two weeks warning before they would be in their desired positions for
their initial worldwide attacks.
Soviet aviation strike forces would redeploy to their dispersal bases, and the Black and
Baltic Sea Fleets and the four other Warsaw Pact Navies would prepare to support joint
operations ashore. The Soviet Merchant Fleet would chop to naval control to provide
intelligence and lift. The Soviets, in short, would posture for global war, world-wide.
U.S. Naval forces would reposition as well, forward. This chart illustrates some
timeframes involved in considering moving naval afloat forces into position, and is
helpful in discussing what follows.
The important implication of these closure times is that timely political decisions are
essential. The canals are important in Phase I, and the forward posture of our naval
forces is vital in terms of rapid response to crisis.
The NCA may desire to move forces forward during conditions of ambiguity. Phase I
may be just such a condition. One approach may be to conduct a no-notice naval exer-
cise, moving forces to forward locations without the constraints that might otherwise be
imposed. The unique mobility of naval forces makes this option particularly desirable
when in ambiguous and dangerous circumstances.
Although U.S. and allied naval and air orders of battle were depicted previously, some
18 to 24 percent of the units mentioned would probably be unavailable in the early
months of the war due to conversions and overhauls in progress.
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Throughout the deterrence or transition to war phase there would be global forward
movement of U.S. Naval forces, a complex operation. SSNs would move into far forward
positions, including the Arctic, deep in the Soviet Sea Control and Sea Denial areas.
Battle Groups would begin to form into multicarrier battle forces to prepare to move
forward at the proper time. Forward deployed forces would increase readiness, demon-
strating that no major region would be ceded to the Soviets.
Battleship and other surface action groups, the Patrol Hydrofoil Squadron, and Special
Warfare Groups would move out. Land based patrol aircraft (VP) would reposition for-
ward, worldwide, and intensify surveillance. Regarding mining plans, the CINCs would
have to make hard trade-offs, assigning mining missions to scarce multi-role platforms,
and commencing mine loadout. Forward deployed amphibious task groups would
increase readiness, and lead portions of a Marine Amphibious Brigade would move to
Norway to join their prepositioned equipment. Other Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
would begin loadout, and sealift of multi-service reinforcements would commence.
Rapidly deployable, prepositioned equipment aboard the Maritime Prepositioning
Ships (MPS) and other pre-positioned ships is an important ingredient in our forward
strategy. MPS Squadron One is pre-positioned in EASTLANT, and MPS Squadron Two
will be set up in Diego Garcia. Several former NTPF ships (now called Afloat
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Positioning Ships) remain ready in the Indian Ocean. MPS Squadron Three will be set
up in Guam outside the time frame covered by this document.
Again, the purpose of this global forward movement is deterrence, but if deterrence
fails, naval forces need to be forward to transition to warfighting rapidly.
Because of the seriousness of the scenario envisioned, activation of reserves is antici-
pated during Phase I. The Army and Air Force are much more dependent on reserve
activation than the Navy, but the Maritime Strategy relies to a significant degree on the
capabilities and contributions of the Naval Reserve, as well as on protection of U.S.
harbors and coastal Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) by the Maritime Defense
Zone (MDZ) commands. Reserve patrol aircraft squadrons and the U.S. Naval Reserve
surface combatants move forward, and Reserve Minesweepers prepare for mine coun-
termeasures in U.S. ports, harbors and coastal areas. The reserves perform several other
critical functions such as cargo handling and Naval Control of Shipping.
The question of whether the 100,000 Reserve personnel call-up would be adequate
would depend upon the circumstances at the time. Timely activation of reserves is
crucial.
Twelve modern Coast Guard High-Endurance Cutters would be made available to the
CINCs, and other Coast Guard units would prepare for coastal defense duties. The
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Commanders, Coast Guard Atlantic and Pacific, in their roles as Commanders, U.S.
Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic and Pacific, responsible to Navy Fleet Commanders-
in-Chief, will implement their plans for conducting coastal defense and for protection of
coastal SLOCs.
Marine reserves would also be activated, under CINCLANTFLT. This chart shows only
the major Coast Guard and Naval Reserve ships and aircraft, and does not depict the
totality of the vital contribution that Coast Guard and Reserve Personnel would make.
U.S. and allied armies and air forces would be active as well in moving forward in con-
junction with operations supporting U.S. national military strategy.
While the U.S. Army’s central focus would be on reinforcement by airlift and sealift of
the European Central Region, it is envisioned that active or reserve Army infantry bri-
gades would reinforce the Aleutians and Iceland, and an Army military police battalion
would reinforce the Azores. Retaining control of these islands is vital to the success of the
Maritime Strategy. Allied Army deployments are also important to the Maritime Strat-
egy including movement of the Ace Mobile Force, UK/NL Amphibious Brigade, and
the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group to Norway.
U.S. Air Force TACAIR would also focus on the Central Region, but it is anticipated that
some reinforcements would go to the NATO flanks, Iceland, the Azores, Japan, and
Korea. Some U.S. Air Force fighters would deploy to Southwest Asia, the Aleutian
Islands, and Florida (opposite Cuba). Canadian and British TACAIR would reinforce
Norway. U.S. and Allied AEW aircraft (AWACS, NATO AWACS, Nimrods, and E-2’s)
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would also take up stations. The U.S. AWACS in Saudi Arabia would probably redeploy
to Europe.
Our allies would probably increase their readiness and, in accordance with plans,
reposition some of their forces in accordance with agreements in force. The NATO
Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic and the Channel would increase readiness, and
the Naval On-call Force, Mediterranean would be constituted. The Royal Navy would
send SSN’s forward and a British ASW task group, centered around at least one carrier,
would put to sea in EASTLANT. French carrier task groups and submarines could be
expected to put to sea in the Western Mediterranean.
The Federal Republic of Germany’s Navy would move to conduct forward operations
in the Baltic. The Turkish Navy, especially its submarines, would do the same in the
Black Sea. The Italian Navy would deploy in the north central Mediterranean, and a
Spanish ASW carrier task group would get under way in the Atlantic, positioned near
Gibraltar.
British and Dutch Marines would reinforce Norway. The Japanese and other allies
would also sortie. On a worldwide basis, combined ASW tracking by maritime patrol
aircraft (MPA) would intensify, and readiness would be increased. NATO and other
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allies would begin to marshal sealift assets, to support U.S. and other reinforcement
movements.
Mobile, flexible naval combat operations cannot be sustained at great distances without
mobile and shore-based forward logistics support. This support is essential in all three
phases of the strategy.
To support the forces that are forward deployed during Phase I, U.S. and Allied mobile
logistics support force ships would be formed into Underway Replenishment Groups
(URGs), supported by strategic sealift and shuttle shipping.
Forward bases would be reinforced with Advanced Base Functional Components
(ABFC’s) to provide battle group logistics support; to sustain P-3 operations and to
provide hospital, repair, and construction support. Host nation support would be used,
worldwide, to the maximum extent possible, especially to provide cargo handling and
port services. U.S. Navy and Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions would also be
required. Advanced forward bases, especially for P-3’s and Marines, would require
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (SEABEES) support. Also illustrated is the mas-
sive sealift that would be necessary if full reinforcement of Southwest Asia was
required.
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The result of all of the reinforcements and forward movement of forces is as depicted.
Mutually supportive land and air forces converging at strategic locations in conjunc-
tion with a wide range of options provided by forward positioned maritime forces pro-
duce strong leverage to control crises, and simultaneously, full preparedness for war if
these deterrent actions fail.
Note the northern Arctic areas in which U.S. and allied nuclear powered attack subma-
rines would be operating, as well as the notional depiction of Poseidon and Trident
SSBNs that would be providing the essential strategic nuclear deterrent backdrop to the
overall crisis.
The growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet has been constant and significant, and that
growth is continuing. Given the relative lack of U.S. forces in the Alaskan area, the
growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet poses an increased threat to the Aleutian Islands.
Thus, an important objective is to increase the size and capabilities of the forces that
are assigned to defend the Aleutian Islands.
The purpose of the operations envisioned by the Maritime Strategy in Phase I is deter-
rence of war; we hope this is the final phase.
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With enemy and Allied forces moving into place globally, at some point a major Soviet
attack could occur. In that event, actual large-scale warfare would commence. If so, it
would probably spread among a number of theaters, especially at sea.
It is the Soviet Union’s aversion to multi-theater war which enhances the deterrent rep-
resented by the global presence of U.S. forces in peacetime. If we withdraw forces from
key theaters, confining the conflict may be possible, but the likelihood of the conflict
occurring would also be dramatically increased.
This is Phase II, in which the Navy would seek to seize the initiative, as far forward as
possible. The objective of operations in Phase II is the establishment of maritime superi-
ority in key ocean areas. Protection of U.S. harbors and coastal SLOC’s through Mari-
time Defense Zone commands is an important supportive element in achieving that
objective. Phase II is preparatory to carrying the fight to the enemy.
The war at sea cannot be discussed without consideration of the land/air/battle. This
chart shows the likely Soviet initial land/air attack posture once the situation
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transitioned to global war. The primary Soviet thrust would be in Central Europe.
Smaller attacks would also occur to attempt to seize Northern Norway and the Turkish
Straits.
In the Far East, the Soviets would attack U.S. forces in the Pacific. They would also
pressure the Japanese to deny to the U.S. the use of naval and air facilities. If they fail
because of the U.S.-Japanese alliance (as the Maritime Strategy assumes), they would
attack Japan, initially by air. North Korea might take the opportunity to attack South
Korea. The Soviets would seek not to provoke the Chinese into entering the war against
them but would not let their guard down in Asia. Even if the Chinese attacked the Sovi-
ets, however, the Soviet focus would nevertheless remain on Europe.
The Soviets are unlikely to initiate hostilities in Southwest Asia as a deliberate precursor
to global war. Any hostilities which might occur during such a war would involve
mainly unreinforced and less capable forces.
At sea, should the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact and other allies attack, our initial
course of action would be to counter that attack, attrite enemy forces, and seize the ini-
tiative. Vital Sea Lines of Communication would be defended as far forward as possible.
Protection of U.S. harbors and coastal SLOCs would be provided by Maritime Defense
Zone commands. Naval forces would improve their positioning as they move forward
throughout Phase II ready to move into Phase III in the event that favorable war termi-
nation was not achieved.
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The tasks of Phase II are listed on the right. While this strategy describes each warfare
task separately, each would actually be implemented, more or less, simultaneously.
While operations in one geographic theater may continue in Phase II for a considerable
period, operations in another area may well move to Phase III very quickly. The prior-
ity of warfare tasks would depend on the theater and the circumstances at the time.
These considerations underscore the fact that the geographical focus of the Maritime
Strategy must always be global, avoiding exclusive treatment of any single theater.
The destruction of the Soviet submarine fleet, as far forward as possible is fundamenta1 to
our eventual success. As shown here, a coordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ini-
tiative is a complex undertaking, involving a wide variety of platforms, weapons sys-
tems, and tactics.
Forward and barrier ASW operations would have as their goal the destruction of Soviet
submarines operating in the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas and submarines
seeking to break out to attack U.S. reinforcement and resupply shipping further out.
SSNs would conduct ASW operations far into the Soviet sea control zone against the
range of available targets, requiring operations under the Arctic ice cover. Allied task
groups would perform area ASW operations. U.S. and allied mine and submarine bar-
riers would be initiated at key choke points. Selective mining of Soviet port area
approaches would also be implemented.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 1 7 5




Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:32:15 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Forward-positioned maritime patrol aircraft, in conjunction with SOSUS, and aug-
mented by mobile passive acoustic systems, conduct ASW operations to the maximum
extent possible, without interfering with SSN operations.
In the initial anti-air warfare (AAW) campaign, as our carrier battle forces move for-
ward, they would be attacked by Soviet Long Range and Naval Aviation Strike Forces.
The carrier battle forces will seize the initiative, engaging Soviet air attacks as far for-
ward as possible in outer air battles, to cause maximum Soviet attrition. Land-based
TACAIR would complement these efforts in the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean,
and the Northwest Pacific.
The AAW campaign is not limited to defeating air and missile attacks against carrier battle
forces. The Soviets will, of course, conduct strikes against land targets as well. Joint and
combined CVBF/USMC/USAF/Allied operations will be necessary in all theaters to counter
these strikes. Land-based TACAIR could also address the Cuban air threat, if necessary.
Maritime operations in the various theaters pose problems to the Soviet leadership, in
that the Soviets will have conflicting demands as to where they should send their avia-
tion reserves.
French carriers would probably operate in the western Mediterranean possibly securing
western Mediterranean SLOCs and providing backing for U.S. carriers moving east,
while they retain their primary national theater nuclear reserve role.
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When hostilities commence there will be a number of early and intense anti-surface
warfare (ASUW) engagements, especially in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.
Effective rules of engagement and innovative tactics will be used to complicate Soviet
targeting and to seize the initiative. As U.S. and allied maritime forces move forward,
they will continue to attrite opposing Soviet surface forces.
The Federal Republic of Germany’s Navy, naval air force and air forces would make
contact with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces moving across the Baltic. Battleship surface
action group and/or PHM Battles may occur in the Caribbean. Similar surface clashes
are possible elsewhere. The U.S. objective will be to eliminate all out of area Soviet
forces. Soviet intelligence gathering ships (AGIs) as well as combatants would be
sought out and destroyed, and merchantmen will be sunk as targets of opportunity.
U.S. and allied surface, subsurface, and air assets would be engaged, including ASM-
equipped allied TACAIR. U.S. Navy submarines, mines, and Harpoon-equipped P-3’s,
although primarily engaged in ASW, could contribute—as could TASM-equipped
SSN’s. TASM will also be available on a few surface combatants. Harpoon-equipped B-
52’s, if made available, could also contribute.
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Even with the campaign still in Phase II, and the massed power of carrier battle
forces and amphibious forces not yet in a position to strike the Soviets far forward,
certain initial projection operations could nevertheless occur. This slide shows vari-
ous options that could be mounted from the maritime theaters in this phase to sup-
port the major land action in progress.
If necessary, air strikes and offensive mining may be conducted against Cuba, Libya,
Vietnam and Korea, possibly by CVBF’s enroute higher threat areas. Strikes may be
necessary to support forces repelling Soviet attacks in Norway, Thrace, and Japan.
USAF and allied support would be particularly useful, especially in Asia. Soviet tar-
gets in Asia are more accessible to direct U.S. attack than those in Europe at this
stage.
SPECWAR surveillance, intelligence and raiding options, for instance, against C3
sites, would be valuable supplements. U.S. and allied Marine operations in Norway
and—possibly—amphibious insertions elsewhere are also options.
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Mine Warfare (MIW) includes both offensive mining and mine countermeasures oper-
ations. The U.S. and allied offensive minefields illustrated here are almost exclusively
employed against Soviet submarines in choke points or in their SSBN patrol areas.
The primary mine countermeasures campaign will be as far forward as possible, targeting
delivery platforms to prevent mines from being sown at all. For those that get through
and must be swept, envisioned U.S. and allied mine countermeasures responsibilities
are depicted here. It is anticipated that the allies would bear the lion’s share of the task.
Besides the threat of open ocean attack, a major threat to the SLOCs would be mines at
the terminals. The allies would secure their own inshore waters. For the United States,
coastal defense responsibilities would fall to units of the U.S. Naval Reserve and U.S.
Coast Guard, operating in Maritime Defense Zones under the Fleet Commanders.
There are clearly not enough U.S. or allied assets to clear all our areas of responsibility
simultaneously. The slide also indicates many additional critical choke points and ports
considered to be of interest to the Soviets and where shipping could be disrupted by
them. Any threats to those areas would have to be countered by redeployment of scarce
assets from other areas.
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The Soviets recognize that U.S. Naval forces will generally be moving forward in the
three ocean areas as depicted here. Their Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS) is
global in scope and is used to detect, locate and track the movement of U.S. naval
forces. Several of the elements of the SOSS are listed.
The neutralization of the SOSS is extremely important for the success of U.S. and allied
air, surface and subsurface naval operations. C3I countermeasures programs and opera-
tions are designed to confuse, deceive and disrupt the SOSS, thereby precluding its effec-
tiveness and making the targeting of naval forces much more difficult. Some of the
options available to the on-scene commander include force dispersal, emission control,
deception, decoys, and the destruction of AGIs and tattletales as well as the neutraliza-
tion of Soviet C3I nodes.
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The importance of space in the Maritime Strategy is inexorably increasing. All naval
warfare missions depend to a degree on the use and control of space for essential I&W,
reconnaissance, command and control, navigation, weather and environmental data for
executing all phases of the Maritime Strategy.
Because of Soviet capabilities, the focus of strategy vs. strategy must have a space com-
ponent. The Soviets view space as an extension of terrestrial theaters of operation—
one to control and dominate. Soviet current capabilities include an ocean reconnais-
sance and targeting system (RORSAT, EORSAT, SALYUT), a global command and con-
trol network, a worldwide navigation system, and an anti-satellite system. They also
have a quick launch system for mission essential naval warfighting C3 systems.
The objective of a “space strategy” is to exploit the unique benefits of space and control it
through all levels of conflict, ensuring force enhancement and denying the effective use
of space to the Soviets.
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The use of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) would continue to be critical
throughout Phase II. Sealift from CONUS to deployed U.S. forces is central to American
and allied success. Over 95 percent of the American reinforcement and resupply dry
cargo and 99 percent of petroleum resupply must go by sea. Also, the oil SLOCs are
important for long-term prosecution of the war, especially by the allies. Because of
stockpiles and conservation measures that would be implemented, the oil SLOCs would
not become critical until approximately D+60 to D+90.
Reinforcement and resupply sealift for all services and our allies would be provided by
the U.S. Military Sealift Command nucleus fleet, the Ready Reserve Fleet, other ships of
the U.S. National Defense Reserve Fleet, merchant ships requisitioned by the Depart-
ment of Transportation, and allied ships.
All of these SLOCs must be defended. The primary defense would be made well north of
the major transoceanic SLOC, as has been shown, but a certain close-in-threat would
always be present, especially from Soviet pre-deployed submarines and those that slip
through U.S. and allied forward and barrier operations. The defense against this close
in threat will be discussed later.
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The routing of the major military reinforcement and resupply SLOCs depicted also
seeks to minimize the risk of Soviet land-based air attack. Should the forward AAW
and ASW battles go favorably, the SLOCs could be shifted northward to reduce the
transoceanic distances involved.
The intended results of Phase II operations are illustrated here. U.S. and allied mari-
time forces would have achieved forward sea control inside the sea denial and sea con-
trol zones of the Soviets. These forward operations are the most effective means of
protecting the SLOCs and assisting in repelling Soviet attacks on the flanks. They are a
vital factor in keeping the alliances intact. As a result of the attrition suffered by the
Soviet Navy, plus the improved position of U.S. and allied maritime forces, the Soviets’
options are diminished and the combat stability of their forces is threatened and their
willingness to continue the war could start to be questioned. U.S. and allied maritime
forces are now in a position to provide sustained power projection according to the
directions of the NCA and the joint and combined commanders.
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Success in Phase II will enable U.S. and allied maritime forces to carry the fight to the
enemy. The objective throughout Phase III is to provide conventional pressure and
leverage against the Soviet Union in order to force war termination on terms favorable
to the U.S. and its allies. Disruption of Soviet willingness to continue fighting is a pur-
pose of the Maritime Strategy.
In this third phase the tempo of strike and amphibious warfare operations would be
accelerated. Special warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and forward
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anti-surface warfare would be continued. As before, some geographic theaters may see
movement into Phase III operations more quickly than others.
The goals are quite straightforward, including the ultimate objective, favorable war
termination.
Heavy strikes on the flanks culminating in possible attacks on Soviet territory would be
conducted as battle forces massed and moved farther forward with reduced risk and
higher confidence of success. In accordance with DG-87-91 policy, in Europe the Navy
would now be projecting power ashore in support of the land battle. In East Asia the
Navy would be denying to the Soviets a secure flank.
Of the 13 deployable FY-85 CVBGs, two are assumed to be in overhaul at the beginning
of the conflict. The strategy assumes that these two carriers would be available during
Phase III. Therefore, four or five would be available for Norwegian Sea or North Sea
battle force operations; four to six for the Northwest Pacific; two or three (plus the
French) for the Mediterranean; and zero to one for the Arabian Sea. In this way, full
global pressure would be applied.
This assumes, however, that there is no attrition of carriers and that all units are capa-
ble of contributing to the war effort. Delayed and sequential operations would be neces-
sary if we have lost battle groups, or if enemy threats from Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, or
Korea complicate the equation. Sequential operations are also likely with early destruc-
tion of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron and its support facilities, leading to
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redeployment of most U.S. naval forces from the Indian Ocean to the Northwest Pacific
or the North Atlantic.
The combined assets available in our amphibious ships and follow-on Military
Sealift Command shipping provide a capability to conduct Marine Amphibious
Brigade–sized assault operations simultaneously in two forward ocean areas. Assault
operations requiring more than a brigade, however, would require the concentration of
amphibious ships in one forward ocean area or the other. This justifies the high
priority accorded defense of the Panama Canal and its approaches in DG FY 87–91.
Additionally, Marine Amphibious Brigade operations utilizing the Maritime
Prepositioning Ships and other prepositioned ships could be conducted in appropriate
theaters. Some allies, especially the British, have small amphibious assault capabilities
which can supplement ours.
The two battleship battle groups and other surface action groups could be employed to
good advantage in a naval gunfire support role. Construction battalions, special opera-
tions forces, and mine warfare forces have important roles to play as well. Amphibious
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operations would have the purpose of gaining leverage for war termination, securing
strategic choke points, or recovering territory lost to Soviet attack.
Phase III would see the continuation of sealift, airlift and shuttle shipping from
the throughput ports to battle force positions. Maritime Defense Zones would play
a key role in keeping U.S. harbors and coastal SLOCs open. Also, notionally
shown here are forward deployed tenders for mobile maintenance and forward
rearming and battle repair. Protection for these tenders will be an important
consideration.
Forward and intermediate bases will be used for repair and refit facilities for battle dam-
age and the receipt and distribution of supplies. These facilities, as well as hospital and
construction support, will increase in importance as the conflict progresses. New major
bases would probably have to be established in Western Europe.
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Currently envisioned responsibilities for close-in protection and control of military ship-
ping along the SLOCs are as shown. Naval protection of shipping (NPS) against subma-
rine, air, and surface attack could include a variety of options: not only convoys (which
are escort-intensive), but also protected lanes, independent sailings for fast steamers,
and so on. U.S. forces required would be primarily of the destroyer and frigate classes
(active and reserve), Coast Guard high endurance cutters, and maritime patrol aircraft.
U.S. responsibilities would be focused on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, the
Western and Central Atlantic, the Central Pacific, and the Northern Indian Ocean. Our
allies would have similar responsibilities in adjacent areas. They do not, however, have
sufficient escort forces. Encouraging the allies to fulfill—and expand upon—their cur-
rent escort commitments and force levels is a major on-going USN task.
Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) is a worldwide allied effort, with Naval Reserve per-
sonnel fulfilling the major U.S. Navy role.
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If the conflict is of a long duration, international mobilization would become increas-
ingly important. This effort would require continuation of economic shipping and,
therefore, the protection of economic SLOCs as shown here. Not only oil, but also stra-
tegic minerals and industrial products would have to pass by sea to support industrial
production and the war effort of the free world. In addition to providing the tools and
equipment for warfighting, mobilization would provide much-needed additional man-
power to the battlefields.
In peacetime, United States imports account for over 12 percent of the gross national
product. The figures for allied nations are considerably higher. Estimates of U.S. and
allied wartime import dependency vary, but it is clear that some level of imports would
be necessary, and that imports would become increasingly more vital as a war pro-
gressed. These imports, including weapons systems components, would have to come
across a number of SLOCs. If peacetime patterns hold more imports [will be] coming
from East Asia than from either Europe, the Mideast, or Latin America. Therefore the
Maritime Strategy must provide for protection of vital Pacific SLOCs.
As discussed earlier, it is projected that the import of strategic materials would not
become critical until approximately six months into the conflict. An ongoing task is
encouraging our allies to build up their strategic reserves of raw materials so that the
requirement for early protection of economic shipping would be further reduced.
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Strategic reserve sufficiency could also be a factor in deterring the Soviets initially, or in
causing them to pursue a negotiated settlement should deterrence fail.
It is important to point out that although the Maritime Strategy is a conventional
warfighting strategy, the theater nuclear weapons of the U.S. Navy are a very important
part of the strategy. They are available on a large number of different types of naval
combatants—attack submarines, Tomahawk capable surface ships, and aircraft carriers.
The combination of the threat posed by these weapons, when combined with the attri-
tion of the Soviet fleet and the forward sea control achieved by the Maritime Strategy,
discourages the Soviets from escalating to the use of nuclear weapons and is viewed as
an important factor in encouraging the Soviets to accept a negotiated termination.
The Soviets are very conscious of the nuclear capabilities of individual U.S. naval com-
batants. Indeed, they still view U.S. aircraft carriers as strategic nuclear strike platforms.
With their own at-sea nuclear capabilities markedly diminished as a result of the attri-
tion suffered by their fleet, the Soviets will then recognize that U.S. naval forces can
employ theater nuclear weapons against not only air and naval targets in the maritime
theaters, but also, because of the TLAM(N) weapon, against a wide range of targets
ashore. The deterrent effect of these theater nuclear weapons is considerable.
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The desired culmination of this strategy is war termination on terms favorable to the
U.S. and its allies. This requires putting sufficient conventional pressure on the Soviets to
convince them that they would have no gain in continuing aggression and that they
should in fact cease hostilities, while simultaneously giving them no incentives to esca-
late to nuclear war. For the Navy, this means neutralization or destruction of the Soviet
Navy and of ground and air forces on the Eurasian flanks; sea control; and intervention
in the land battle. In this way, maritime forces provide strong leverage for the Soviet
Union to accept a negotiated termination of the conflict.
At the end of the conflict, from the Soviets’ perspective, the operations envisioned by the
Maritime Strategy would defeat their strategy and amputate their global reach by neutral-
izing or destroying their fleet. The Communist Party would remain in control of the
Soviet Union, and the homeland would be intact, although it would now be threatened.
From the viewpoint of the U.S. and its allies, the Maritime Strategy would have been suc-
cessful, the alliance would be intact, and the strategic reserve (strategic nuclear strike sub-
marines) would also be intact. The United States would also have viable general purpose
naval forces in being at the end of the conflict. These forces would be very important to
any envisioned post-war world because of the likely continued East-West tensions and
heightened Third World instability. These forces would sustain a global forward presence
to deter further conflicts and support the interests of the U.S. and its allies.
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What happens at sea is important because of its contribution to the land battle ashore
or to a favorable settlement of the conflict. If the operations of the strategy are success-
ful, maritime forces will contribute significantly to making a strategic difference in a
war with the Soviet Union.
Naval forces provide the visible and essential linkage between ourselves and our for-
ward allies and forces. They also bolster the position of neutrals. In addition to provid-
ing strong incentives for deterrence, naval forces, by foreclosing options and
multiplying uncertainties for the Soviets, force them to focus on only a narrow range of
strategic choices. Naval forces preclude Soviet flanking operations, surrogate support,
and SLOC interdiction, and protect against attacks on our shores.
Naval forces force the Soviets to commit resources to the defense of otherwise secure
flanks against the entire range of naval offensive capabilities. Pacific operations should
prove critical to keeping Japan in the war, defending Korea, and ensuring that China
maintains at least an aggressively neutral posture. These operations, in conjunction
with operations in the Norway region, tie down considerable Soviet forces which could
otherwise redeploy to the Central Front.
Moreover, naval forces provide the nation with the ability to continue the war for as
long as the National Command Authority desires, as well as contributing important
leverage at war’s end.
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We will now take a hard look at the uncertainties inherent in the strategy as it has been
outlined.
A key feature of the framework provided by the Maritime Strategy is its addressal of
uncertainty. No strategy can address all the unknowns which will certainly be encoun-
tered in crises or war.
This final section of the strategy outlines the five broad areas of uncertainty identified
to date. Each of the following slides identifies an area of uncertainty, suggests the
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plausible range of that uncertainty, specifies the assumptions made by the strategy, and
shows how the strategy is designed to positively counter the uncertainty.
The framework of the strategy and the associated CINC-executed operations include
uncertainties. Strategy Stoppers are factors which may preclude us from executing the
full Maritime Strategy as designed, but ones over which we can exercise some control
and thereby reduce the risk. This is a list of the potential Strategy Stoppers developed for
the POM-88 programming cycle. This list of current potential Stoppers includes bilat-
eral arrangements that would enable us to move forces forward during a crisis even if
the multilateral political decisionmaking process were lagging.
There are also a number of potential Stoppers that need Naval programming and bud-
getary attention to improve our capabilities in several areas. They include strike effec-
tiveness, lethality of weapons systems, long range reconnaissance, targeting and battle
damage assessment (BDA), mine warfare, tactical nuclear and chemical capabilities,
sustainability, physical and operational security, and interoperability.
The range of options that are available includes decisions to reduce our effort, main-
tain the present level of commitment, or to increase the level of commitment to reduce
risk. In other words, the Maritime Strategy is executable now, but we must keep improv-
ing to reduce the risk.
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In addition to the Strategy Stoppers, there are four other sets of uncertainties over
which we have little control. The first of those involves timely political decisions.
The Maritime Strategy assumes approximately two weeks of warning time and a transi-
tion to global war. Although the intelligence system will probably provide excellent
I&W to the National Command Authority, the overall environment would be replete
with uncertainty and ambiguity. In such a situation, the timeliness and decisiveness of
political decisions will be a major concern. For example, will the NCA permit the early
forward positioning of forces and the timely activation of reserves? Will the NCA main-
tain a global perspective during a grave crisis or conflict with the Soviets, or will they
limit their view to a particular theater of operations? Finally, will the political leader-
ship of the U.S. and its allies maintain the political will and the cohesion of effort and
objectives that will be crucial to the interests of the Free World?
The range of uncertainties runs from slow and uncertain decisions to fast and firm
ones. The Maritime Strategy assumes rapid and firm political decisions, although the
strategy recognizes that NATO as a collective body will probably lag the decisions made
by the U.S. or other individual allied governments.
Naval forces provide strong, positive and executable options to the NCA, even in those
ambiguous circumstances that may preclude our national leaders from the fast and firm
decisions postulated. For example, the forward movement of forces in Phase I and
afterwards will be a strong enhancer of alliance solidarity.
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Would the Soviets act as we anticipate they will? The unpredictability of the Soviets is
another uncertainty, both in terms of their strategy at the initiation of conflict and
their strategy as the conflict unfolds. The questions surrounding their initial strategy
include the purpose or goals of their actions in precursor crises as well as the questions
about what role, if any, their surrogates or clients might play.
There is also considerable uncertainty concerning their follow-on strategy as the con-
flict progresses. One question that is particularly troublesome is whether and when the
Soviets will mount an anti-SLOC campaign primarily using their large submarine and
mining forces.
The range of uncertainties for the Soviets’ strategy goes from immediate use of nuclear
weapons to an early flush of many conventional forces into the open oceans. The
National Intelligence Estimate concludes that the Soviets will adopt an echelon defense
strategy with some out of area forces. The Maritime Strategy limits the options available
to the Soviets by (1) deploying forward early and thereby precluding the Soviets from
flushing large numbers of ships and submarines to the open ocean; and (2) defeating
their chosen strategy head-on and destroying large numbers of their maritime forces,
thereby precluding a later breakout.
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The Maritime Strategy focuses on conventional war with the Soviet Union, while it
deters escalation to theater and strategic nuclear war. Because nuclear war at sea would
be disadvantageous to the United States, the U.S. would in all probability not initiate
one at sea. The use of nuclear weapons at sea would probably result from prior Soviet
decisions based on campaign progress ashore. If the Soviets do choose to preempt with
nuclear weapons, they would do so on a massive scale.
The areas of uncertainty include the question of whether our efforts to deter nuclear
war would be successful. A corollary question is whether the operations of the Mari-
time Strategy would provoke the Soviets to escalate. For example, would the use of
naval forces to attack Soviet nuclear forces or the Soviet homeland produce escalatory
actions by the Soviet leadership? All of these operations would be subject to tight con-
trol by the National Command Authority.
One particular issue that is an important facet of this uncertainty is the subject of attacks
against Soviet SSBN submarines. The U.S. intelligence community is clear in its judg-
ment. The Soviets are not believed to consider that the destruction of potential strategic
assets, such as SSBNs, during conventional war would by itself trigger an escalation to the
use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, they would expect to lose a number of SSBNs.
Other areas of uncertainty are the questions of whether U.S. and allied naval forces
could survive nuclear strikes, and whether the forward operations of the Maritime
Strategy would remain viable in a nuclear environment. The likelihood of Soviet use of
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chemical or biological weapons is another uncertainty. CW/BW use may not be of
great concern to naval forces in the open ocean, but chemical and biological weapons
are definitely important in terms of amphibious operations and protection of advanced
naval bases.
The Maritime Strategy raises the nuclear threshold by achieving its objectives through
conventional means while deterring escalation. In addition to the deterrent provided by
U.S. and allied ballistic missile submarines and the nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles
and aviation weapons, maritime forces can alter Soviet perceptions of the nuclear bal-
ance, or to use their term, the correlation of nuclear forces, by destroying their SSBNs
and other platforms. The strategy, therefore, discourages escalation and encourages war
termination by reducing Soviet confidence in the combat stability of their sea based
nuclear strike forces.
Finally, how will the war be terminated? There has not been a global war between the
superpowers in the nuclear age. The duration of the conflict, the character of military
operations during negotiations, and the final transition from fighting to the “new
peace” are all areas of uncertainty.
Furthermore, the post-war environment is uncertain. East-West tensions would proba-
bly continue, and instability in the Third World would probably continue as well. The
importance of the Free World having viable naval forces in being at the end of the war
is again apparent. These forces will be instrumental in deterring further conflicts and
in supporting the interests of the U.S. and its allies.
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The Maritime Strategy contributes powerful leverage to terminating the war without
escalation to nuclear weapons. Thus, the assumption of the strategy is that the achieve-
ment of war termination will fall, within a range of possibilities, somewhere between
Soviet victory and Soviet total surrender.
This model summarizes the Maritime Strategy, illustrating that it is a dynamic concept.
The Navy’s peacetime presence and crisis response operations, while lower in intensity
than the Navy’s global warfighting role, nevertheless affect the strategy for carrying out
that role. In close coordination with the FLEET CINCs and the Naval War College, the
Navy continually tests and evaluates the Maritime Strategy through exercises, war
games, and from “lessons learned” from crisis and single-theater war operations, such
as those that took place in the Middle East, Grenada, and the Falklands. Additionally,
the Navy’s global deterrent and warfighting strategy influences its peacetime and crisis
activities.
The Maritime Strategy provides the context for evaluating the strengths and weak-
nesses of the Navy’s force structure, and for driving priorities in plans for research and
development and procurement.
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U.S. national policy, Soviet strategy and the Maritime Strategy comprise a strategic
architecture. The national policy gives direction to the global maritime elements of U.S.
national military strategy. Based on deterrence, the strategy is global, forward, and cedes
no vital area by default.
The Soviet Union is the principal threat to the United States and the interests of the
Free World, and the Maritime Strategy is designed to contribute to countering that
threat. The bottom line product for the United States and its allies is a full forward pres-
sure strategy for the employment of maritime forces.
This summary recapitulates several of the major points of the Maritime Strategy, the
Global Maritime Elements of U.S. National Military Strategy.
That strategy is consistent with U.S. and coalition policy, and it provides the flexibility
of response that has always been expected of naval forces. Full forward pressure is
required of maritime forces. It is risky, but it is doable. The Navy must, however, have
the forces, the sustainability assets, and the assistance of allies and the other U.S.
services.
The Soviets are a very formidable foe, but they are not invincible.
The Maritime Strategy addresses the full spectrum of threats, from peace to crisis to
global war. The contributions of the forces of our allies and the other U.S. military
2 0 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
SUMMARY—STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURE
MARITIME FORCES MAKE A STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:32:38 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
services are vital. The strategy itself is clear—full forward pressure, with deterrence or
favorable war termination as the goals.
If the operations envisioned by the strategy are successful—and we are confident that
they will be—then maritime forces will make a strategic difference.
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The Maritime Strategy, 1986
This document is the widely distributed, unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy
that appeared as a special supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings.* This
forty-eight-page pamphlet included four articles, of which the first three are included
here:
• Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, “The Maritime Strategy”
• General P. X. Kelley, USMC, and Major Hugh K. O’Donnell, Jr., USMC, “The
Amphibious Warfare Strategy”
• John F. Lehman, Jr., “The 600-Ship Navy”
• Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN, “Contemporary U. S. Naval Strategy: A
Bibliography.”†
In first presenting this collection to the public, the Naval Institute’s executive director
Captain James A. Barber, Jr., wrote:
Naval Strategy has recently received more attention than in any peacetime era since Alfred
Thayer Mahan dominated the scene. This unusual prominence stems from the Navy’s attempt to
think through and spell out a maritime strategy within the national military strategy. Because
the best developed and most detailed statements of “The Maritime Strategy” have been available
only in classified versions, public debate between supporters and detractors has often suffered
from misinterpretations or exaggerations.
This supplement provides the most definitive and authoritative statements of the Maritime
Strategy that are available in unclassified form. They are the nearest thing to a British “White













* The Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Md. U.S. Naval Institute, January 1986), pp. 2–17.
† Revised, updated, and expanded versions of the bibliography that Captain Peter Swartz initially
prepared in 1986 were published in 1987, 1988, and most recently included as appendix 2 to
John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport
Paper 19 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 185–277. The bibliography was an
attempt to gauge reactions to the strategy and its effectiveness in explaining U.S. naval service
roles in the public arena.
‡ The Maritime Strategy, p. 1.
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As anticipated, a further public debate and discussion did ensue, and an updated bibli-
ography of these comments has been more recently published.
Captain Roger Barnett and Commander Peter Swartz completed a draft of an unclassi-
fied version at the same time that they were completing the 1985 classified version (see
document 2). Admiral Watkins approved them both at the same time in May 1984, but
this unclassified version was not cleared for release at that point. The OPNAV Security
Office recommended that it first be cleared for release by the Department of Defense, the
Joint Staff, and the other services, since the document made reference to joint warfare,
the Army, and the Air Force. The document never cleared this review, as the other agen-
cies saw it as only a parochial force-building argument for the Navy.*
The idea to publish an unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy arose again between
January and June 1985, a period when Admiral Watkins was very closely and personally
involved with the development and “selling” of the strategy. At this period, the staff offi-
cers of the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Executive Panel (OP-00K) were assigned
the task of drafting another unclassified version. As the form of the booklet began to take
shape, a variety of other influences, events, and people became involved in the drafting
and preparation of the various sections that eventually appeared.
In May 1985, the Naval War College sponsored a conference on the Maritime Strategy.
One of the participants in that conference, Dr. John J. Mearsheimer of the Political Sci-
ence Department, University of Chicago, gave a highly critical assessment of the Mari-
time Strategy.† Another participant in the conference, Captain Linton F. Brooks, at that
point assigned to the CNO Executive Panel, came back to Washington from Newport and
recommended to Admiral Watkins that an unclassified version would help to offset such
criticism. Brooks then went ahead to prepare a rebuttal to Mearsheimer’s remarks that
eventually appeared side by side with Mearsheimer’s article later that year in the journal
International Security.‡
Energized by Brooks’s report from Newport, Admiral Watkins moved ahead with
renewed plans for an unclassified version. Meanwhile, Major Hugh K. O’Donnell,
USMC, an officer in the Marine Corps programming office—and a Maritime Strategy
“insider”—had been attending a graduate-level course at night at Georgetown Univer-
sity, for which he wrote a paper on the Northern Flank aspects of the Maritime Strategy.
O’Donnell’s paper earned high academic marks, and his instructor, Dr. Philip Karber,
recommended that he try to publish it. Accepted immediately for publication by the
Naval Institute, the paper laid out the general ideas of the Maritime Strategy. It
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* Peter Swartz, e-mail to Hattendorf, 18 July 2008.
† A revised version of the paper given at the Naval War College was published as John J.
Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe,” Interna-
tional Security, 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 3–57.
‡ Linton F. Brooks, “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy,”
International Security, 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 58–+88.
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appeared in September 1985. Preceding publication of the Mearsheimer and Brooks arti-
cles, O’Donnell’s article explained the Maritime Strategy for the first time in public,
although it concentrated just on the Northern Flank aspects of the strategy.*
About the time O’Donnell’s article appeared in print, the chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, Democratic representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin, planned to open
hearings on the six-hundred-ship navy. Anticipating that this might become a hostile
series of hearings for the Navy, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s
Seapower Subcommittee and Aspin’s rival for the chairmanship of the main committee,
Democratic representative Charles E. Bennett of Florida, convened his own series of
hearings in 1985. The hearings began with Secretary of the Navy Lehman, Admiral
Watkins, and General Kelley, followed by both critics and supporters, to become a com-
prehensive public statement of official views.† These hearings gave Lehman, Watkins,
and Kelley their first opportunity to read and hear each other’s strategic concepts in
extended detail. All three came away from the hearings with a feeling that they had
jointly delivered a powerful and synergistic message. Admiral Watkins immediately con-
cluded that his statement before the committee could form the basis for the unclassified
version of the strategy that he had long wanted circulated.
When Secretary Lehman heard of Watkins’s intentions, Lehman wanted to parallel
Watkins’s statement with one of his own. Captain Peter Swartz, by then a staff member
in the Secretary’s Office of Program Appraisal, recommended that additional statements
be included from both the Commandants of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, but
in the end, only General Kelley’s statement was added.
For this new statement, Admiral Watkins decided to make public for the first time the
logic and rationale for the anti-SSBN campaign that was part of the Maritime Strategy.
Captain Linton Brooks, then serving as director of Defense programs on the staff of the
National Security Council, and Commander R. Robinson Harris, on the staff of the
CNO Executive Panel, began to draft the unclassified text for Admiral Watkins, with
Brooks playing a key role in dealing with the subject of the anti-SSBN campaign.
Remarkably, this aspect of Watkins’s article was the first time that any Maritime Strategy
document at the secret level of classification or below had discussed this subject, except in
the most cryptic fashion.
Dr. Harvey Sicherman and Captain Peter Swartz collaborated to support Secretary of
the Navy John Lehman’s work as Lehman became personally involved to create his own
statement on the six-hundred-ship navy. Major Hugh K. O’Donnell worked directly with
General Kelley on the Marine Corps Commandant’s piece while serving as Joint
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Matters–Defense Guidance Officer in the USMC Requirements and Programs Division
under Major-General Thomas Morgan.* Meanwhile, Captain Swartz and Fred Rainbow
at the Naval Institute worked together to select the illustrations and wrote the captions
that complemented the written texts, with prominent images that included U.S. Coast
Guard cutters, British aircraft carriers, U.S. Air Force tankers, and other images to dem-
onstrate interservice and allied components of the strategy that were not being explicitly
mentioned in the articles.
By the end of 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley had all
ensured that the draft statements met their own needs and criteria as well as reflected
the policies and views of President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger, and the administration. With that done, each submitted the final version of
his article to the Naval Institute Proceedings for publication in early January 1986.
When this group of articles appeared in the Naval Institute’s Maritime Strategy booklet,
they formed an extremely important statement that clearly demonstrated how very
closely the Navy and the Marine Corps were in their strategic thinking. On top of this,
Secretary Lehman’s article clearly demonstrated the fundamental interrelationship
between the Navy’s goals in force development and the strategy that such a force was
designed to carry out, as well as the affordability measures the Navy was undertaking
to demonstrate its effective stewardship of the increased resources granted to it by the
Reagan administration. 
The United States is inevitably a maritime nation, and the United States and its Navy
have inescapable global responsibilities. A carefully designed strategy has always been
an imperative, but the need for a sound strategy has grown all the more important as
the Soviets developed a formidable blue-water Navy able to challenge U.S. interests
worldwide. Accordingly, three years ago, we reviewed our extant strategy—a strategy
with broad contours reasonably well understood, but one which had not been submit-
ted to the rigor inherent in codification. The result of that effort was the Maritime
Strategy.
The Maritime Strategy, the maritime component of the National Military Strategy,
helps us think and plan intelligently for the global use of naval forces from peacetime
through global war to war termination. It is a strategy for today’s forces, today’s capa-
bilities, and today’s threat. It also is a dynamic concept. We continually gauge its ade-
quacy through our everyday operations, exercises, and war games, and we apply the
lessons learned from these experiences to improve and enhance the strategy.
Before discussing the strategy in detail, it is important to define its bounds and per-
spective. The Maritime Strategy is firmly set in the context of national strategy,
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emphasizing coalition warfare and the criticality of allies, and demanding cooperation
with our sister services. Moreover, the Maritime Strategy recognizes that the unified
and specified commanders fight the wars, under the direction of the President and the
Secretary of Defense, and thus does not purport to be a detailed war plan with firm
timelines, tactical doctrine, or specific target sets. Instead, it offers a global perspective
to operational commanders and provides a foundation for advice to the National Com-
mand Authorities. The strategy has become a key element in shaping Navy program-
matic decisions. It is of equal value as a vehicle for shaping and disseminating a
professional consensus on warfighting where it matters—at sea.
National Military Strategy and the Maritime Role
Our national military strategy is designed: to preserve this country’s political identity,
framework, and institutions; to protect the United States, including its foreign assets
and allies; to foster the country’s economic well-being; and to bolster an international
order supportive of the vital interests of this country and its allies. To achieve these
ends, our national strategy is built on three pillars: deterrence, forward defense, and
alliance solidarity.
Deterrence simply means convincing a potential aggressor that the risks involved in
aggression are greater than its possible benefits. The Soviets, or any other potential
aggressors, will not be deterred by empty threats and rhetoric. A credible deterrent
must have ready and capable forces behind it and the commitment to use them if nec-
essary. Our formal alliances and treaties with 43 nations also require forward posture
to reaffirm United States resolve and bolster alliance solidarity, which redounds to the
credibility of our deterrence.
As the naval component of the National Military Strategy, the Maritime Strategy is
designed to support campaigns in ground theaters of operations both directly and
indirectly. Its success depends on the contributions of our sister services and allies.
Accordingly, we place great emphasis on joint operations. In addition to our historic
relationship with the Marine Corps, we have strengthened our partnerships with the
Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard in the planning, exercising, and executing of joint
operations.
An important part of our cooperative effort has been the Memorandum of Agreement
I signed with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in September 1982. This agreement
accelerated such ongoing efforts as routinely including Air Force units in fleet exercises,
developing doctrine and procedures for employment of AWACS and B-52s in maritime
missions, and identifying aerial refueling requirements. It also led to several new
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initiatives such as data link and communications interoperability, and joint air combat
training ranges.
A similar example of cooperative efforts to correct combat deficiencies is the Memo-
randum of Agreement with the Coast Guard establishing Maritime Defense Zones.
Under this agreement, Coast Guard units combined with naval forces, both active and
reserve, will defend harbors and shipping lanes along our coasts in time of war.
The Navy has also identified 11 areas in a Memorandum of Agreement signed last year
between the Army and Air Force where we can contribute to enhanced joint opera-
tional effectiveness, and we are pressing ahead to do so. Efforts like these complement
vigorous Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) initiatives including JCS-directed joint exercises
and pilot projects on tactical and strategic air support to maritime operations.
The Era of Violent Peace
Preparation for global war is the critical element in ensuring deterrence, but our peace-
time operations and response in time of crisis are also crucial contributions to deter-
rence and stability. Therefore, while the peacetime presence and crisis response
components of our Maritime Strategy are less detailed and formal than the warfighting
component, they are no less important. In fact, the volatility of today’s international
situation suggests that we must expect to employ these elements of our Maritime Strat-
egy in an expanding set of the world’s trouble spots. To understand the scope of their
worth, we must recognize the chief characteristic of the modern era—a permanent
state of what I call violent peace.
The Soviets do not desire a superpower confrontation, for two principal reasons. First,
they recognize that there would be no easy victory and the costs would be high. Equally
important, though, and consistent with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, they believe that
history is on their side and that the West will collapse because of the “natural dialectic.”
To channel the course of history, the Soviets foster evolutionary—as well as revolutionary—
change, and support proxies and surrogates—such as Cuba, Libya, Angola, and North
Korea—who do their bidding. This results in worldwide challenges to the United States
and our allies. We may be technically at peace, but the period since 1945 can be charac-
terized as an era of violent peace.
A principal feature of this era is the continuing and widespread existence of localized
conflicts and crises, mostly in the Third World, but often with global implications. This
profusion of crises and conflicts has been a feature of the international environment
since World War II. In 1984, millions of people were involved in more than 30 armed
conflicts throughout the world. These ran the gamut from civil unrest in Sri Lanka, to
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insurgencies in Central and South America, to civil war in Chad, to direct conflict
between states in the Persian Gulf.
These conflicts and other crises with the potential to break into hostilities frequently
involve U.S. and allied interests. Transcending the interests of states directly involved,
these confrontations often serve as backdrop for potentially more serious conflicts
between major powers. A fundamental component of the nation’s success in deterring
war with the Soviet Union depends upon our ability to stabilize and control escalation
in Third World crises.
As a result, our Navy devotes much of its effort to maintaining this stability. Potential
crises and the aftermath of crises have increasingly defined the location and character
of our forward deployments. We now maintain a continual presence in the Indian
Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Caribbean, as well as our more traditional forward deploy-
ments to the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific. Although we are not at war today,
our operating tempo has been about 20% higher than during the Vietnam War. This
indicates increased need for forces-in-being during peacetime, a need made more acute
by the probability that, should war come, there will be only a brief time for mobiliza-
tion. In this age of violent peace, the Navy is on the front lines already, and will be for
the foreseeable future.
The international setting is complicated by the proliferation of modern, high-technology
weaponry in the Third World. Certainly the most alarming aspect of this proliferation
is the growing numbers of nations in positions to acquire mass annihilation weapons—
chemical, biological, and even nuclear. Even in the absence of such weapons, impressive
conventional arsenals possessed by Third World nations pose an immediate concern.
While these weapons do not fundamentally change the causes of instability, they do
change the nature of conflict and the threats we face. Naval forces must be prepared to
encounter high-technology, combined-arms threats in virtually every ocean of the
world.
The rise of state-sponsored terrorism is a new and disturbing phenomenon. Its unpre-
dictability, worldwide scope, and anonymity render it one of the most insidious threats
we face today. Terrorism is not new, but the threat has increased because terrorism has,
in some cases, become a preferred arm of state action. If not countered, it can be effec-
tive against targeted forward-deployed forces. By placing at risk forward-deployed
forces, terrorists (and their state sponsors) hope to be able to intimidate us into with-
drawing, thereby undermining our credibility.
At the same time, the Soviets exploit instability in the Third World to promote govern-
ments that support Soviet ideology, improve the Soviet strategic position, and reduce
Western influence. Soviet methods include support and encouragement of limited
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warfare by Cuban, Libyan, and North Korean proxies as well as direct crisis response by
their own forces.
Since 1948, the Third World has been the most common arena for United States–Soviet
competition, and this pattern will continue. U.S. interests and commitments are world-
wide, and increasingly focus on the Third World. Our economy and security require oil
from the Persian Gulf and Caribbean, and strategic minerals from southern Africa. Our
trade with nations of the Pacific Basin now surpasses that with Europe. Obviously, we
have vital stakes in what happens in these and other key areas.
As the challenges to peace and stability increase, so do the Soviets’ capabilities for
global military reach. Their military airlift and sealift have grown significantly. The
Soviet Navy, with a large deck aircraft carrier under construction, is increasingly capa-
ble of sustained distant operations. In addition, the Soviets continue to expand and
improve their attack submarine force, making it a formidable global threat. They also
have enhanced their access to air and naval facilities in key strategic locations, includ-
ing Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cuba, and Vietnam.
Moscow recently established its first fully developed overseas base at Cam Ranh Bay,
Vietnam. These facilities can support a large concentration of Soviet naval forces,
maintaining a permanent naval force astride key sea-lanes to our Pacific allies and
friends. From this base Soviet forces can strike key United States and friendly forces
and installations as far north as Hong Kong.
Improved power projection forces and global access provide the Soviets a growing
capability to intervene militarily in the Third World. They steadily improve their ability
to sever vital sea lines of communication, while improving their ability to counter U.S.
crisis reaction moves. Responding effectively to Third World crises may well require
that U.S. Navy units bring the range of capabilities necessary to deal with Soviet as well
as Third World threats.
Soviet Military Strategy
The Soviet Union has an integrated strategy which seeks to use all Soviet military
forces in a coherent fashion to meet Soviet national goals. While we are uncertain of
the details of Soviet strategy, its broad outlines are clear. The Soviets appear to
assume a future war with the West will be global in scope, violent, and decisive. In
such a war the total military power of the state will be expected to serve clearly defined
political goals.
Even in such a war the Soviets would not use nuclear weapons lightly, preferring to
achieve their goals with conventional means. Nuclear weapons nonetheless have a cen-
tral place in Soviet military thought. A war between the superpowers may not involve
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immediate nuclear weapons use, but it is, in Soviet eyes, still a “nuclear” war in the
sense that the nuclear balance is constantly examined and evaluated in anticipation of
possible escalation. Because of this aspect of Soviet doctrine, the Soviets place a high
priority on changing the nuclear balance, or as they term it, the nuclear correlation of
forces, during conventional operations.
The probable centerpiece of Soviet strategy in global war would be a combined-arms
assault against Europe, where they would seek a quick and decisive victory. As prudent
military planners, the Soviets would, of course, prefer to be able to concentrate on a
single theater; a central premise of U.S. strategy is to deny them such an option.
Soviet overseas clients and surrogates outside the Warsaw Pact may join in an attack.
Figure 1 shows that some of these clients sit astride critical sea lines of communication.
Any Western strategy must, of necessity, hedge against such third country involvement.
Naval forces are ideally suited to provide such a hedge. Routinely forward deployed in
the vicinity of these nations, naval forces possess the required warfighting capability to
accomplish the task and move on to more demanding requirements.
While Soviet ground and air forces conduct a massive offensive, a critical Soviet Navy
role in a future conflict would be to protect the Soviet homeland and their ballistic
missile submarines, which provide the Soviets with their ultimate strategic reserve.
Consistent with its overall stress on the nuclear balance, Soviet doctrine gives high pri-
ority to locating and destroying Western sea-based nuclear assets, including aircraft
carriers, ballistic missile submarines, and Tomahawk-equipped platforms. The Soviets
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FIGURE 1
Soviet Clients and Surrogates
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would particularly like to be able to destroy our ballistic missile submarines, but lack
the antisubmarine warfare capability to implement such a mission. Other roles, such as
interdicting sea lines of communication or supporting the Soviet Army, while impor-
tant, will probably be secondary, at least at the war’s start.
This view of the Soviet Navy’s role in overall Soviet strategy suggests that initially the
bulk of Soviet naval forces will deploy in areas near the Soviet Union, with only a small
fraction deployed forward. Soviet exercises confirm such an interpretation. Figure 2
shows the areas in which these exercises take place. It is important to recognize that
these arcs encompass Japan, Norway, and Turkey. Thus, the option some advocate, of
holding our maritime power near home waters, would inevitably lead to abandoning
our allies. This is unacceptable, morally, legally, and strategically. Allied strategy must
be prepared to fight in forward areas. That is where our allies are and where our adver-
sary will be.
The Maritime Strategy: Peacetime Presence
Sea power is relevant across the spectrum of conflict, from routine operations in peace-
time to the provision of the most survivable component of our forces for deterring
strategic nuclear war. The Maritime Strategy provides a framework for considering all
uses of maritime power. Among the greatest services we can provide the nation is to
operate in peacetime and in crises in a way that will deter war. Figure 3, which illus-
trates the spectrum of conflict, draws attention to the importance of the lower levels of
violence where navies are most often the key actors.
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FIGURE 2
Soviet Naval Exercise Areas
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By its peacetime presence throughout the world, the Navy enhances deterrence daily.
Our forward deployments maintain U.S. access on fair and reasonable terms to oil,
other necessary resources, and markets, and deter and defend against attempts at physi-
cal denial of sea and air lines of communications critical to maintenance of the U.S.
and allied economies. They provide a clear sign of U.S. interest in a given nation or
region, and of U.S. commitment to protect its interests and its citizens.
One key goal of our peacetime strategy is to further international stability through
support of regional balances of power. The more stable the international environment,
the lower the probability that the Soviets will risk war with the West. Thus our peace-
time strategy must support U.S. alliances and friendships. We accomplish this through
a variety of peacetime operations including naval ship visits to foreign ports and train-
ing and exercises with foreign naval forces.
In 1984, for example, the Navy and Marine Corps visited 108 countries and conducted
joint exercises with 55 foreign countries. Often taken for granted, port visits and joint
training and exercises have a material impact around the world in stabilizing peace,
reminding friend and foe alike that we are able and have the will to defend the interests
of ourselves and our treaty allies.
The Maritime Strategy: Crisis Response
The heart of our evolving Maritime Strategy is crisis response. If war with the Soviets
ever comes, it will probably result from a crisis that escalates out of control. Our ability
to contain and control crises is an important factor in our ability to prevent global
conflict.
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FIGURE 3
The Spectrum of Conflict
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:32:41 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
2 1 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Crisis response has long been the business of the Navy and Marine Corps. Between
1946 and 1982, in some 250 instances of employment of American military forces,
naval forces constituted the principal element of our response in about 80% of the cri-
ses. Reasons for selecting naval forces as the instrument of choice for crisis manage-
ment and deterrence of conflicts are illuminating:
• Forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility make naval forces readily available at
crisis locations worldwide, providing significant deterrent value and reducing the
likelihood of ambiguous or short warning.
• Naval forces maintain consistently high states of readiness because of forward
deployments, ensuring operational expertise and day-to-day preparedness.
• Naval forces increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces and sister
services.
• Naval forces can be sustained indefinitely at distant locations, with logistics support
relatively independent of foreign basing or overflight rights.
• Naval forces bring the range of capabilities required for credible deterrence.
Capabilities demonstrated in actual crises include maintaining presence, conducting
surveillance, threatening use of force, conducting naval gunfire or air strikes,
landing Marines, evacuating civilians, establishing a blockade or quarantine, and
preventing intervention by Soviet or other forces.
• Perhaps most importantly, naval forces have unique escalation control
characteristics that contribute to effective crisis control. Naval forces can be
intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening, and easily dispatched but
just as easily withdrawn. The flexibility and the precision available in employing
naval forces provide escalation control in any crisis, but have particular significance
in those crises which might involve the Soviet Union.
The peacetime and crisis response components of the Maritime Strategy are evolving,
robust, and designed to foster a stable international setting. This is important for deter-
rence. Although deterrence is most often associated with strategic nuclear warfare, it is
a much broader concept. To protect national interests, we must deter threats ranging
from terrorism to nuclear war. This requires a credible peacetime and wartime capabil-
ity at the level of conflict we seek to deter. Our national interest also requires an
extended deterrent capability. Perhaps most importantly, protecting national interests
while preventing war requires the ability to control escalation, and naval forces and our
peacetime strategy are ideally suited for that purpose.
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If our peacetime presence and crisis response tasks are done well, deterrence is far less
likely to fail. Deterrence can fail, however, and we must consider how the Navy would
be used in a global war against the Soviets.
The Maritime Strategy: Warfighting
Should war come, the Soviets would prefer to use their massive ground force advantage
against Europe without having to concern themselves with a global conflict or with
actions on their flanks. It is this preferred Soviet strategy the United States must coun-
ter. The key to doing so is to ensure that they will have to face the prospect of pro-
longed global conflict. Maritime forces have a major role to play in this regard. The
strategy setting forth their contribution consists of three phases: deterrence or the
transition to war; seizing the initiative; and carrying the fight to the enemy. There are
no fixed time frames associated with these phases; they provide a broad outline of what
we want to accomplish, not an attempt to predict an inherently unpredictable future.
Phase I: Deterrence or the Transition to War: The initial phase of the Maritime Strategy
would be triggered by recognition that a specific international situation has the poten-
tial to grow to a global superpower confrontation. Such a confrontation may come
because an extra-European crisis escalated or because of problems in Europe. In either
event, this phase of the Maritime Strategy deals with a superpower confrontation anal-
ogous to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where war with the Soviet Union is a real
possibility.
The goal of this phase is deterrence. Through early, worldwide, decisive use of sea
power we—along with sister services and allies as appropriate—would seek to win the
crisis, to control escalation, and, by the global nature of our operations, to make clear
our intention to cede no area to the Soviets by default and to deny them the option to
engage in hostilities on their terms. While seeking to enhance deterrence at the brink of
war, we must also consider that deterrence may fail. Thus preparing for the transition
to war, specifically to global war, is an integral aspect of this phase.
Keys to the success of both the initial phase and the strategy as a whole are speed and
decisiveness in national decisionmaking. The United States must be in position to deter
the Soviets’ “battle of the first salvo” or deal with that if it comes. Even though a sub-
stantial fraction of the fleet is forward deployed in peacetime, prompt decisions are
needed to permit rapid forward deployment of additional forces in crisis. Table 1 indi-
cates the times required for illustrative movements of combatants and support ships
throughout the world and illustrates the importance of the Panama and Suez Canals in
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The need for forward movement is obvious. This is where the Soviet fleet will be,
and this is where we must be prepared to fight. Aggressive forward movement of
anti-submarine warfare forces, both submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, will force
Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile
submarines. This both denies the Soviets the option of a massive, early attempt to
interdict our sea lines of communication and counters such operations against them
that the Soviets undertake.
Early embarkation of Marine amphibious forces takes advantage of their flexibility and
would be matched with forward movement of maritime prepositioning ship squadrons
toward most likely areas of employment. Moving one Marine amphibious brigade by
air to rendezvous with its prepositioned equipment and reinforce Norway provides a
convincing signal of alliance solidarity.
Early forward deployment of sea-based air power also is essential to support our allies,
particularly Japan, Norway, and Turkey. Early forward movement of carrier battle
forces provides prudent positioning of our forces in order to support the requirements
of the unified commanders and to roll back Soviet forces, should war come. It does not
imply some immediate “Charge of the Light Brigade” attack on the Kola Peninsula or
any other specific target.
FROM TO STEAMING DAYS
U.S. East Coast Northern Atlantic 7
U.S. East Coast Mediterranean 10
U.S. East Coast Indian Ocean 241
U.S. West Coast Northern Atlantic 312
U.S. West Coast Western Pacific 9
U.S. West Coast Indian Ocean 24
Mediterranean Northern Atlantic 6
Mediterranean Indian Ocean 213
Indian Ocean Northern Atlantic 24
Western Pacific Indian Ocean 14
1. Subtract 6 days by using Suez Canal
2. Subtract 13 days by using Panama Canal
3. Subtract 15 days by using Suez Canal
Note: Based on closure times at 20-knot speed of advance.
TABLE 1
Combatant Repositioning Steaming Times
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Forward deployment must be global as well as early. Deployments to the Western
Pacific directly enhance deterrence, including deterrence of an attack in Europe, by
providing a clear indication that, should war come, the Soviets will not be able to
ignore any region of the globe. Should deterrence fail, such deployments tie down Soviet
forces, especially strike aircraft, limiting the Soviets’ ability to concentrate their forces on
Central Europe. Thus, even in its earliest phase, the Maritime Strategy, by exerting global
pressure on the Soviet Union, can help ease the burden for NATO forces in Europe.
In addition to allowing rapid deployment, speed and decisiveness in national
decisionmaking are crucial to the strategy’s overall execution. As more functions are
transferred to the reserve forces, execution of the President’s authority to call up
reservists (currently limited to 100,000 in number) becomes increasingly crucial to suc-
cessful implementation of the strategy. Virtually the entire Navy cargo-handling capa-
bility, for example, and all Navy combat search and rescue capability depend on
reservists. Their prompt call-up is imperative. In a similar fashion, an early decision to
place the Coast Guard under Navy command and control will have a major impact on
the rapidity with which the strategy can be implemented.
An important aspect of the strategy’s initial phase is sealift. In 1984, the Secretary of
the Navy established sealift as the third primary mission of the Navy, along with sea
control and power projection. This increased emphasis recognizes the importance of
both economic and military resupply. By the end of the decade, we will have adequate
sealift for the movement of military forces. But we will neither be able to tolerate attri-
tion typical of World War II nor provide adequate dedicated sealift to transport the
strategic raw materials we will require. For this reason, early and effective uses of exist-
ing sealift are essential.
Phase II: Seizing the Initiative: We cannot predict where the first shot will be fired
should deterrence fail, but almost certainly the conflict will involve Europe. If war
comes, we will move into the second phase of the strategy in which the Navy will seize
the initiative as far forward as possible. Naval forces will destroy Soviet forces in the
Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and other forward areas, neutralize Soviet clients if
required, and fight our way toward Soviet home waters.
Seizing the initiative is vital for several reasons. First, it demonstrates to our allies this
country’s determination to prevail and thus, contributes to alliance solidarity. Second,
the history of war tells us that gaining the initiative is the key to destroying an oppo-
nent’s forces. Finally, seizing the initiative opens the way to apply direct pressure on the
Soviets to end the war on our terms—the new goal of our strategy once deterrence has
failed. Indeed, it is possible that, faced with our determination, the Soviets can be
induced to accept war termination while still in this phase.
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The Soviets will probably focus their offensive on Central Europe, while attempting
to maintain a defensive posture elsewhere. Instead, we must dilute their effort, divert
their attention, and force them to divide their forces. We must control the type and
tempo of conflict, making sure the Soviets understand that they can take no area for
granted. To accomplish this, maritime forces must counter a first salvo, wear down
the enemy forces, protect sea lines of communication, continue reinforcement and
resupply, and improve positioning. We must defeat Soviet maritime strength in all its
dimensions, including base support. That converts to classic Navy tasks of antisub-
marine warfare, antisurface warfare, counter command and control, strike opera-
tions, antiair warfare, mine warfare, special operations, amphibious operations, and
sealift. Each is essential if the strategy is to succeed.
One of the most complex aspects of Phase II of the Maritime Strategy is antisubmarine
warfare. It will be essential to conduct forward operations with attack submarines, as
well as to establish barriers at key world chokepoints using maritime patrol aircraft,
mines, attack submarines, or sonobuoys, to prevent leakage of enemy forces to the
open ocean where the Western Alliance’s resupply lines can be threatened. Maritime air
and anti-submarine warfare units will be involved, along with offensive and defensive
mining. As the battle groups move forward, we will wage an aggressive campaign
against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines. This aggressive
action ensures that we prevent such losses as the Germans inflicted on allied shipping
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between January and July of 1942 when 14 of 50 then-operational German U-boats
sunk 450 ships, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Antiair warfare is equally complex and equally important. It demands both offense and
defense in depth, long-range indication and warning, long-range interception and sur-
veillance, and base neutralization, and is an area where the contribution of our allies
and sister services is particularly important. The overriding goal is to counter the Sovi-
ets’ missile-launching platforms, to shoot the archer before he releases his arrows. Not
only is it easier to destroy bombers than missiles, but the bomber destroyed today can-
not return with more missiles tomorrow. Our strategy envisions making extensive use
of jamming, deception, and decoys to counter the enemy’s targeting capability. Area
defensive weapons will deal with in-bound missiles or, in some cases, aircraft that leak
through our offensive thrust. No single approach will be sufficient; countering the
Soviet air threat through offensive antiair warfare demands a layered approach.
Antisurface warfare involves carriers, submarines, cruise missile–equipped surface
ships, and land-based forces eliminating forward-deployed Soviet surface ships at the
outset of conflict. This requires appropriate rules of engagement at the brink of war to
avoid losing the battle of the first salvo which is so important in Soviet doctrine. Our
allies also have a critical role to play in antisurface warfare. Germany, for example, will
bear the brunt of the campaign in the Baltic while the Turks will be key players in the
Black Sea. As our forces move forward, antisurface warfare will continue, with as a goal
the elimination of the Soviet fleets worldwide.
Successes in antiair, antisubmarine, and antisurface warfare are crucial to effective
prosecution of offensive strike warfare. The battle groups are central to defeating Soviet
air, submarine, and surface forces. To apply our immense strike capability, we must
move carriers into positions where, combined with the U.S. Air Force and allied forces,
they can bring to bear the added strength needed on NATO’s Northern or Southern
flanks, or in Northeast Asia. Further, selective use of naval forces on the Central Front
could have an important stabilizing impact. The strike power of carrier battle forces
can also be augmented with conventional land-attack Tomahawks launched from sub-
marines or surface ships. All of these would be brought to bear as the unified com-
manders direct. The strategy does not envision automatic attacks on any specific
targets, but the main threats to our fleet during this phase are the “Backfires” and other
missile-carrying aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation. The United States cannot allow our
adversary to assume he will be able to attack the fleet with impunity, from inviolable
sanctuaries.
The nature of these battle force operations is not always understood. One often hears
self-appointed strategic experts suggest that elimination of a carrier battle group would
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be a simple task and that such a group represents a single target. In attempting to
explain the evolution of battle force formations since World War II, I sometimes use
pictures like Figure 5, showing the Eastern United States on the same scale as the
56,000 square miles that a typical carrier battle group formation might occupy.
In amphibious warfare, the United States has the flexibility of conducting a Marine
amphibious brigade size raid or forcible entry by the 55,000 men of a Marine amphibi-
ous force. Such operations could be conducted alone or in conjunction with the allied
marine forces, as directed by the unified commanders. The principal requirement
would be to seize a beachhead for the introduction of follow-up forces, either from
other services or from other countries.
Mine countermeasures form yet another important aspect of the strategy. The West
must be ready to clear mines whenever and wherever necessary. Mine warfare provides
a striking example of the importance of our allies to the Maritime Strategy. The Com-
mander, Mine Warfare Command, executes a very aggressive cooperative program with
our allies, traveling to roughly 40 nations every year to ensure that we integrate both
allied mine-clearing and allied offensive mine-laying operations.
In addition to these traditional combat tasks, implementing Phase II of the Maritime
Strategy depends on other efforts. It is crucial that we counter the Soviets’ capability
both to control their forces and to locate and target ours. Maritime forces, working
with other assets, must confuse, deceive, and disrupt Soviet command and control.
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FIGURE 5
Carrier Battle Group Dispersed Formation
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They must also deny the Soviets a targeting capability through platform destruction,
jamming, dispersal, and emission control.
Finally, we must support our forces as we fight. Mobile logistic support forces, sus-
tained sealift, and the use of Navy Seabees to establish advanced bases all play a role in
a forward logistic support concept which is a prerequisite for seizing the initiative.
Logistics and sustainability are integral to the success of any strategy; they are espe-
cially vital in one such as ours which demands aggressive, sustained, forward
operations.
Phase III: Carrying the Fight to the Enemy: The tasks in this phase are similar to those of
earlier phases, but must be more aggressively applied as we seek war termination on
terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Our goal would be to complete the
destruction of all the Soviet fleets which was begun in Phase II. This destruction allows
us to threaten the bases and support structure of the Soviet Navy in all theaters, with
both air and amphibious power. Such threats are quite credible to the Soviets. At the
same time, antisubmarine warfare forces would continue to destroy Soviet submarines,
including ballistic missile submarines, thus reducing the attractiveness of nuclear esca-
lation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor.
During this final phase the United States and its allies would press home the initiative
worldwide, while continuing to support air and land campaigns, maintaining sealift,
and keeping sea lines of communication open. Amphibious forces, up to the size of a
full Marine amphibious force, would be used to regain territory. In addition, the full
weight of the carrier battle forces could continue to “roll up” the Soviets on the flanks,
contribute to the battle on the Central Front, or carry the war to the Soviets. These
tough operations close to the Soviet motherland could even come earlier than the final
phase.
I have discussed various tasks separately, but they must be implemented simultaneously
on, over, and under the sea. Our forces combine in a synergistic way, both to deter and
to win if deterrence fails. One of the truly unique aspects of naval warfare is its awe-
some complexity, as forcefully portrayed in Figure 6.
The complexity of the tasks makes it essential that we not attempt to micro-manage the
war from Washington, but rather that we provide options and broad concepts to assist
the unified commanders in implementing their detailed plans. Command, control,
communications, and intelligence combine to form the glue that binds this entire effort
together. And space is an essential factor in command, control, communications, and
intelligence. The Navy is the number one tactical user of information from space. We
recover the information, fuse it in real time, and continuously disseminate it to all tac-
tical users at sea. Although we have long understood the importance of space
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 2 2 1
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:32:44 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
intuitively, the Maritime Strategy clarifies the essentiality of space for a Navy with
global responsibilities.
Maritime Strategy and War Termination
The goal of the overall Maritime Strategy, particularly of Phase III, is to use maritime
power, in combination with the efforts of our sister services and forces of our allies, to
bring about war termination on favorable terms. In a global war, our objectives are to:
• Deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global pressure, indicating that the
conflict will be neither short nor localized.
• Destroy the Soviet Navy: both important in itself and a necessary step for us to
realize our objectives.
• Influence the land battle by limiting redeployment of forces, by ensuring reinforcement
and resupply, and by direct application of carrier air and amphibious power.
• Terminate the war on terms acceptable to us and to our allies through measures
such as threatening direct attack against the homeland or changing the nuclear
correlation of forces.
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FIGURE 6
The Complexity of Modern Naval Warfare
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The Soviets place great weight on the nuclear correlation of forces, even during the
time before nuclear weapons have been used. Maritime forces can influence that corre-
lation, both by destroying Soviet ballistic missile submarines and by improving our
own nuclear posture, through deployment of carriers and Tomahawk platforms around
the periphery of the Soviet Union. Some argue that such steps will lead to immediate
escalation, but escalation solely as a result of actions at sea seems improbable, given the
Soviet land orientation. Escalation in response to maritime pressure serves no useful
purpose for the Soviets since their reserve forces would be degraded and the United
States’ retaliatory posture would be enhanced. Neither we nor the Soviets can rule out
the possibility that escalation will occur, but aggressive use of maritime power can
make escalation a less attractive option to the Soviets with the passing of every day.
The real issue, however, is not how the Maritime Strategy is influenced by nuclear
weapons, but the reverse: how maritime power can alter the nuclear equation. As our
maritime campaign progresses, and as the nuclear option becomes less attractive, pro-
longing the war also becomes unattractive, since the Soviets cannot decouple Europe
from the United States and the risk of escalation is always present. Maritime forces thus
provide strong pressure for war termination that can come from nowhere else.
Our strategy is not without risk. The strategy depends on early reaction to crisis and
the political will to make difficult decisions early. It will require flexibility to meet the
inevitable changes in Soviet strategy. To some, that aspect of the strategy which focuses
on altering the nuclear balance may seem dangerous. But the risks exist for both sides;
that is the nature of deterrence.
Executing the Maritime Strategy
Strategy is a design for relating means to ends. The ends are clear: deterrence or—
should deterrence fail—war termination on terms favorable to the United States and its
allies. The means are also clear: the 600-ship Navy. The warfighting capabilities of our
ships, aircraft, and submarines, and the immense advantage of American sailors with
their well-known pride and professionalism, provide powerful means. But can the
design work? Will the means be sufficient? My answer to both questions is yes.
I am confident that we can succeed if put to the test because of the vast intelligence and
experience that has been brought to bear in the Maritime Strategy’s development. It is
based on the collective professional judgments of numerous flag officers, especially
those in command positions in the fleet. It has benefited from the efforts of the Strate-
gic Studies Group, top-performing Navy and Marine Corps officers who spend a year
in Newport working directly for me in refining and expanding our strategic horizons.
It has been reviewed, examined, and improved by military and civilian scholars inside
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and outside of government. Thus, our strategic thinking represents the collective judg-
ment of the very best thinkers.
I also have confidence in the Maritime Strategy because we test it in exercises, in war
games, and in real-life scenarios. In 1984, for example, the Navy participated in 106
major exercises, 55 of which involved our allies. Such exercises are an integral part of
our deterrent strategy and a major source of my confidence that, should deterrence fail,
maritime forces will have the skill, capability, and experience to prevail.
We augment these exercises with war-gaming, especially at the war-gaming center in
Newport. These games stress the combined-arms nature of war and involve our allies
and our sister services. Recently, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored a crisis
war game in which all the joint chiefs and all unified commanders personally
participated.
Finally, I am confident we can implement our strategy because we measure it against
the real world. For example, recent lessons from the Falklands, air action in the Bekka
Valley, Grenada, and the mining of the Red Sea have all been incorporated in our
dynamic approach to strategy implementation. To give but one example, in 1984 Secre-
tary Lehman and I instituted the Naval Strike Warfare Center (“Strike University”) in
recognition of our need to develop more aggressive strike capabilities in implementing
our forward strategy.
Summary
The basic strategy of the United States, fully supported by the Maritime Strategy, is
deterrence. Through worldwide peacetime operations and the ability to react in crisis,
maritime forces play a major role in binding together alliances in preventing escalation.
If we continue to do our job properly, our strategy for global conventional war will
remain a theoretical topic.
In establishing the maritime component of national strategy, we have been guided by
several principles:
• Maritime Strategy is derived from national military strategy and is an integral
component of that strategy. The purpose of our strategy is deterrence; should
deterrence fail our strategy relies on forward defense and allied cooperation to bring
about war termination on terms favorable to ourselves and our allies.
• Maritime Strategy must counter Soviet strategy and deny the Soviets the luxury of
fighting the type of war they choose. Our strategy must accomplish the difficult feat
of using sea power to influence the result of a land battle, both directly and
indirectly. To do this, the Maritime Strategy effectively integrates all elements of
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United States military power in the maritime arena in order to make the greatest
possible contribution to the unified commanders’ mission.
• Maritime Strategy must consider the nuclear balance even during the conventional
phase of the war. Our strategy must seek war termination leverage; maritime power
may be the only source of such leverage.
Despite the violent peace which characterizes our age, we have been able to maintain
our security while avoiding confrontation with the Soviet Union. Deterrence has
worked. Our goal is to ensure that it continues to do so. Should deterrence ever fail,
maritime power, imaginatively employed, can help bring about war termination and
restore the freedom and security of the United States and our allies.
THE REAL REFORMERS
The development and application of maritime strategy profoundly af-
fect today’s Navy in many ways. Perhaps the most important of these is
the way in which our revitalized emphasis on strategy provides a focus
for substantial reform of the Navy from within. The Navy has changed;
the Navy is changing; and the Navy will continue to change. This
change, however, is neither mindless or directionless, nor is it a defen-
sive reaction to criticisms from outside the Navy. The evolution of our
Navy is today based on the recently developed Maritime Strategy, con-
sciously adopted by the Navy’s leadership. We are, in fact, the real
reformers.
It appears, however, that these fundamental and substantial develop-
ments are invisible to those outside the profession. Public perceptions
frequently seem to be shaped by the superficially appealing manifestos
of self-proclaimed civilian defense reformers, who assert that those of
us in uniform have become bureaucrats rather than strategists and tac-
ticians, that we have no strategy, and that we are incapable of reform-
ing ourselves from within. To be sure, we carefully and repeatedly rebut
unfair criticisms and specific arguments which we find objectionable.
But to many people, our rebuttals seem to show us to be against a great
many things without being for anything other than the status quo.
There is a real danger that our critics have gained the intellectual high
ground, too often causing us to appear defensive and reactive, rebut-
ting their arguments in the perceived absence of clearly enunciating an
alternative vision.
This is why it is important to understand the nature of reform itself, and
the relationship of change and continuity in the naval profession. Re-
form is almost by definition a good thing, and continual reform is essen-
tial to the vitality of the Navy. Indeed, most naval officers can point with
pride to some reforms in which they have personally participated, rang-
ing from changes in the way a particular ship or squadron is run, to ma-
jor changes in the Navy as a whole.
But continuity and stability are also important. We cannot lightly under-
take reforms and endure a high percentage of failures. The conse-
quences of failed reforms are not simply economic; they can manifest
themselves in personnel and organizational turbulence that may persist
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for many years, even resulting in significant damage to military pre-
paredness. Some Navy experiences of the early 1970s provide object
lessons in damage caused by well-meaning reforms that failed in
execution.
Further, tradition and continuity are crucial to our organizational culture
and identity, and to our ability to perform consistently. Our professional
ethic, standards, and codes of behavior are the legacy of 200 years of na-
val tradition. We depend on this legacy to provide us perspective, help us
through difficult periods, and bind together the community of seagoing
men and women. Over the past several years, we have seen the payoff of
programs to rebuild a once mislaid sense of pride and professional compe-
tence. Interestingly, most of these programs were simply a return to our
traditional values and ideals.
Recent emphasis on the Maritime Strategy as the focus for our profession
represents a significant change in the contemporary naval establishment
and a continuation of the traditions of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and
the great naval reformers of a century ago. It is worthwhile to consider
how reforms have been tied to the strategy.
The most striking and far-reaching trend within the naval profession in re-
cent years has been the emphasis on strategy as the focus of naval
thought, planning, resource allocation, and operational employment.
Since its beginning, development and application of the Maritime Strategy
have been and continue to be efforts by naval officers. After decades of
abdicating strategic thinking to civilian academicians and armchair strate-
gists, naval officers are again at the forefront of developing strategy and
strategic concepts.
Further, development of the Maritime Strategy has been an internally gen-
erated, active effort to understand new global realities, and to relate
means and resources to national objectives in a changing world. In strug-
gling with this formidable task, the Maritime Strategy has developed sev-
eral important characteristics, some of which represent a substantially
changed strategic vision from that which existed five or ten years ago:
• The Maritime Strategy is fully consistent with the
national strategy documents and directives of this
administration which emphasize the importance of
maritime superiority to our national defense.
• It is a global strategy designed to meet a global and
diverse threat, embracing all possible theaters of
operation and their complex interrelationships, in
peace, crisis, or war.
• It is a forward strategy, keeping with the national
policy of forward defense and drawing on the
forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility of
naval forces.
• It emphasizes the importance of alliances and coali-
tions, relying on their major contributions to na-
tional security. Further, the Maritime Strategy
recognizes the crucial role that naval forces play in
binding together our alliances and coalitions.
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• It emphasizes the criticality of joint operations with
our sister services, an emphasis reflected in exer-
cises and operations, and in a growing number of
interservice memoranda of agreement.
• It focuses primarily on the central strategic issue of
deterring and, if deterrence fails, fighting a global
war against the Soviet Union.
• It increasingly grapples with the issue of diversified
violence in an era of violent peace, and considers
how to provide deterrence across the entire spec-
trum of possible conflicts.
• It presents a cohesive menu of global options for
controlling escalation, drawing on the flexibility
and range of capabilities inherent in naval forces,
avoiding reliance on nuclear weapons, and recog-
nizing potential impacts of altering the balance by
conventional means.
Clearly, the Maritime Strategy has generated substantial interest in mari-
time forces both within the naval profession and beyond. It has helped us
explain the Navy’s purposes to a number of audiences. Most important, it
has produced substantial—though not highly visible—reform of the Navy
from within. These reforms can be divided into three general categories.
Program development. First, the Maritime Strategy has rationalized, disci-
plined, and focused Navy program development, budgets, and procure-
ment to a degree that would have seemed remarkable five years ago. Since
1982, the annual Navy program development cycle has commenced with
a presentation of the Maritime Strategy. Strategy now drives the entire
process and the resulting procurement and research and development de-
cisions. The strategy presentation raises a number of key issues that must
be resolved in the budget process. The strategy also provides the founda-
tion for subsequent warfare appraisals, which identify critical require-
ments to execute the strategy in terms of antiair warfare, antisubmarine
warfare, and other warfare areas as well. Finally, the strategy provides a
clear framework against which all budget proposals are judged and a com-
mon reference point for all related discussion.
This process of applying the Maritime Strategy to program development
has produced a number of important organizational and programmatic
spinoffs. For example, we recently consolidated responsibility for all elec-
tronic warfare programs into a single office under the Director of Naval
Warfare. The impetus for this reform came from appraisals of electronic
warfare requirements to execute the Maritime Strategy. These appraisals
had clearly shown the need for a cross-platform viewpoint—one that
avoided piecemeal solutions.
Another example is the recent Master Antisubmarine Warfare Strategy. A re-
view of long-range antisubmarine warfare requirements to execute the Mari-
time Strategy showed the need for a comprehensive reexamination of our
antisubmarine warfare programs to deal with the rapidly advancing Soviet
submarine threat. This process has already led to significant changes in anti-
submarine warfare research and development programs, and will provide the
rationale for our assignment of cross-platform organizational responsibilities.
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Yet another example is a growing awareness of the importance of space-
based systems to maritime forces. For too many years, we viewed space as
a technological and scientific playground outside the mainstream of naval
warfare. But the process of developing a global, forward strategy and us-
ing it to drive Navy programs has brought into sharp focus the essential
tactical contributions of space-based systems across all mission areas and
platforms. This awareness led to the establishment of the Naval Space
Command to direct space-related operations, the formation of a Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command to manage procurement and re-
search and development, and formulation of programmatic actions to de-
velop new systems and make better tactical use of existing ones.
Strategic and tactical thought. The Maritime Strategy has produced signifi-
cant reform in a second fundamental way, by stimulating strategic and tac-
tical thinking among the Navy’s leaders. Strategic matters now infuse the
informal, everyday discussions among senior naval officers. This simply
was not the case five years ago, and it represents a noteworthy change in
our organizational culture.
Further, we are building institutional reinforcements for this revival of stra-
tegic thinking. Many involve the Naval War College, which once again is
the crucible of strategic and tactical thought that it was a century ago.
Within the past several years, we began sending virtually all of our com-
manding officers to the Naval War College on completion of their com-
mand tours. This enables these officers to reflect on strategic issues in light
of their recent operational experience, and also offers the benefits of their
experience to students in other programs.
We have also invigorated the Wargaming Center at the Naval War College.
This is the most advanced such facility in the world, and allows us to test
alternative strategies and tactics. It is heavily used both by shore- and sea-
based organizations.
Also important is the work of the Strategic Studies Group, associated with
the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College. During the
past five years we have selected a small group of Navy captains and Marine
Corps colonels who have distinguished themselves as strategists and tacti-
cians. These officers deal with major issues of direct relevance to Maritime
Strategy for a full year. They report directly to me and have full access to
top Navy leaders, including the fleet commanders-in-chief. Through this
interaction, their work has materially affected the ongoing development
of the strategy.
The Naval War College’s role in strategic thinking illustrates an important
point. Development of the Maritime Strategy has consistently benefited
from a wide variety of opinions and perspectives from multiple and dispa-
rate centers of thought. The operating Navy—commanders-in-chief and
fleet commanders—has contributed as much as the Washington head-
quarters and such research centers as the Naval War College. This plurality
of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas have made for a ro-
bust strategy—one that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strategic
issues and the validity of multiple perspectives. This experience is directly
relevant to the development of national strategy and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff reform issue. The process of national strategy development and ad-
vice must involve multiple centers of thought and plurality of advice if the
resulting thinking is to be truly vigorous and reflective of the complexity of
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issues involved. The process may be somewhat untidy, but it is distinctly
American. It works, and it must be preserved.
Emphasis on warfighting. A final way in which the Maritime Strategy has
served as a focus for reform is by shaping an emphasis on tactics and
warfighting at the operational level. For too many years, our fleet exercises
suffered from a lack of realism and focus, and our routine operations
seemed to be lacking in purpose. But the Maritime Strategy now forms a
framework for planning realistic, purposeful exercises, and provides a stra-
tegic perspective for daily fleet operations in pursuit of deterrence.
Largely as a result of the Maritime Strategy, we have begun emphasizing
exercises with multiple carrier battle forces, which would be required in a
major war. We have increased our exercises in the Northern Pacific and
Norwegian Sea, to build our base of experience in these key areas. We
have begun exercising our submarines in Arctic waters, where they might
be called upon to execute portions of the Maritime Strategy.
Thus, the Maritime Strategy has produced substantial reform. It has fo-
cused Navy program development, stimulated strategic and tactical think-
ing, and engendered an emphasis on tactics and warfighting in the fleet.
The Navy can take considerable pride in the substance of these reforms,
and in the strategic vision that they represent. We can also take
pride in the fact that these reforms are clearly ours. We initiated
them, and we sustain them—without much hoopla and without the
help of self-appointed military reformers outside our profession, who are
more adept at criticism than at proposing realistic solutions.
We have met the real reformers, and they are us. We have implemented,
and will continue to implement reforms, to meet new realities based on a
continuously evolving strategic vision. Our critics may take issue with our
strategy. We welcome such debate. But they cannot argue that we have
no strategy, or that we are not capable of reform.
The Maritime Strategy is a powerful statement of what we stand for, and a
focus for reform that is in keeping with our finest traditions.
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The Amphibious Warfare Strategy
GENERAL P. X. KELLEY, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, AND
MAJOR HUGH K. O’DONNELL, JR. , U.S. MARINE CORPS
I also predict that large-scale amphibious operations will never occur
again.
—GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY, 19 OCTOBER 1949
When these words were uttered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before a
House Armed Services Committee hearing on unification and strategy, many in the
audience must have concluded that the day of the amphibious assault, and perhaps of
the Marine Corps, was fast drawing to a close. General Bradley’s pronouncement not
only carried the credibility of his position as the nation’s senior military officer, but
was reinforced by the fact that he had led the great amphibious assaults onto the
beaches of Sicily and Normandy.
Omar Bradley’s prediction mattered little to General Douglas MacArthur when his
United Nations forces were being pummeled by the North Korean Army less than one
year later. Within days of the outbreak of the Korean Conflict, MacArthur knew that an
amphibious assault in his enemy’s rear would create the opportunity for decisive vic-
tory that a frontal offensive could never offer. On 15 September 1950, the hastily
assembled First Marine Division spearheaded MacArthur’s landing at Inchon, breaking
the back of the North Korean offensive and reaffirming the effectiveness of the Navy–
Marine Corps amphibious striking arm in support of the national military strategy.
The 35 years since Inchon have reverberated with echoes of Bradley’s words from other
corners, mostly characterized by a cynical scorn for a form of warfare which these crit-
ics deride as being outmoded or suicidal in the modern age. Some of these wolves have
even tried to don sheep’s clothing by maintaining that the Marine Corps didn’t need to
be tied to the Navy and that there was plenty for the Corps to contribute in the battles
for Central Europe without being shackled to an amphibious mission. Absent such a
change in mission and focus, we were told, the Marine Corps would become strategi-
cally irrelevant.
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Fortunately, this siren’s song went unheeded. The last six years have witnessed a
reawakening to the strategic need for both U.S. naval power and its capability to con-
duct amphibious forcible entry operations. Where once Marine participation in NATO
training exercises was only thinly tolerated, we now have Marine air-ground task forces
(MAGTFs) exercising in Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Turkey, on a regular basis. Where
once there were no new amphibious assault ships scheduled for construction—to
replace a rapidly aging and deteriorating fleet—we now have a solid program of ship-
building that will give us an expanded and modernized amphibious lift capability by
the mid-1990s. Where once there were initiatives that would have “heavied-up” the
Marine Corps to create a mechanized clone of existing Army divisions, today we are in
the middle of an expansive modernization program that will allow MAGTFs to be
lethal and mobile, but still light enough to maintain their amphibious character.
What has caused this resurgent emphasis on maritime and amphibious power? Why are
naval forces now being viewed as central—rather than secondary—elements of our mili-
tary strategy? What role will the Navy–Marine Corps amphibious team be called upon to
play in the execution of this strategy across the spectrum of conflict? Is the Marine Corps
capable of fulfilling the requirements a maritime-oriented strategy has thrust upon it?
We believe that an examination of the issues underlying these questions will illuminate
the reasons behind the rediscovery of the strategic utility inherent in the Navy–Marine
Corps team. Although the demands and responsibilities of our strategic role are great,
Marines have been long accustomed to the challenges and hazards associated with
being our nation’s force-in-readiness. We would have it no other way.
The World Environment
The greatest threat to the security and well-being of the Western Alliance lies in the
quest for world domination by the Soviet Union. Emerging from the devastation of a
valiant and costly victory over the German Wehrmacht in 1945, the Soviets have con-
structed a military machine that is equaled only by our own. This gives substantial
credibility to their stated goal of eventual global conquest.
The Soviet military effort has gone through a number of stages since the end of World
War II. Until the time of Stalin’s death, the focus was on relearning the lessons of the
Great Patriotic War, building massive conventional armies, and playing catch-up in the
development of nuclear weapons. Soviet deficiencies in nuclear armaments and naval
power caused them to fear the might of the U.S. Strategic Air Command and the flexi-
ble striking power of U.S. amphibious forces above all other possible threats.
Khrushchev dispensed with much of Stalin’s political style and brought radical reform
to the arena of military affairs, as well. Believing that nuclear weapons had made
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conventional forces an expensive and useless commodity, he placed top priority on the
formation of the Strategic Rocket Forces; cut the numbers of ground formations; and
brought a halt to the construction of new naval warships. As a consequence—lacking
the naval capability to counter a U.S. maritime blockade—the Soviets suffered the
humiliation of having to withdraw their missiles from Cuba. Dissatisfied with the
entire focus of a nuclear-only defense program, the Russian military subsequently
played a central part in the removal of Khrushchev from power in 1964.
The changes in Soviet military strategy since 1965 have been both profound and trou-
bling. Continuing Khrushchev’s expansion of strategic nuclear forces, Brezhnev also
launched a massive modernization program for both ground and naval forces. While
the United States had its attention focused on Vietnam, the Soviets soon surpassed us
in the numbers of nuclear launchers and warheads and boosted the existing imbalance
of conventional forces even more in their favor. Huge naval complexes in the Kola Pen-
insula and the Northwest Pacific indicated that the Soviets intended to use their new
fleet to actively contest American maritime supremacy on the high seas.
After Vietnam, as America withdrew into an isolationist shell, forever foreswearing any
future foreign involvements, a new and distinctly more ominous Soviet capability
began to appear: power projection. No longer satisfied with being a “continental”
power, the Soviets began to use their navy for the battles of political influence that have
come to characterize the Cold War. Naval bases in Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Libya, and
Angola provided stark reminders that the Russian bear had gone to sea and was pre-
pared to use his naval power—both in general war and for crisis leverage—much as we
had for the previous 30 years.
The picture that confronted the West in the late 1970’s was not at all comforting.
Somewhat belatedly, we realized that we were faced with a multidimensional super-
power with ambitions beyond the continent of Europe and with the military means to
carry them out. Without the element of nuclear superiority, which we had enjoyed
until 1970, the conventional might of the Soviet Union, now including its expansion to
the world’s oceans, took on a menacing import that demanded serious consideration
by Western military planners.
Related to the extension of Soviet global military reach has been the growing number
of conflicts in the Third World. Wars of national liberation, whether in Central Amer-
ica, the Middle East, or Asia, have received varying degrees of support and encourage-
ment from the Soviets. We may have been soured by our Southeast Asian experiences,
but we still recognize the fact that many of these countries are important to the eco-
nomic health of the West. We have also recognized the need for a means of rapid U.S.
response, should a developing crisis in one of these countries worsen.
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Another element of instability in the world environment has been the emergence of
terrorism as a means of achieving political ends. The shocking murders during the
Munich Olympics in 1972 were a foretaste of the wanton violence we have subse-
quently witnessed in Europe and the Middle East. Whether seeking political anarchy, a
homeland to call his own, or the overthrow of a hated regime, the international terror-
ist has exhibited a devotion to his cause (even unto death) that respects neither social
mores nor rules of law. His reach is global, and his targets are rarely involved in the
immediate resolution of his struggle. The demonic unpredictability of this threat
makes it perhaps the most difficult and frustrating of all to counter and negate.
How, then, has the world environment changed as it relates to Western interests? We
are now engaged in competition with a Soviet Union that has emerged from a land-
locked view to stake a credible claim for its interests, through a global military capabil-
ity. Soviet instigation of revolutionary fervor in the Third World also threatens key
Western economic interests, and aids the expansion of Russian power and influence. If
one adds the “wild card” of terrorism to this already worrisome picture, the absolute
requirement for a rapidly deployable and flexible U.S. military capability becomes
self-evident.
National Military Strategy
As World War II came to a close in September 1945, the Marine Corps could look with
satisfaction and pride on its contribution to the Allied victory in the Pacific. Successful
amphibious assaults by both Marine and Army forces had led the way to Tokyo
through the Central and Southwest Pacific theaters. The development and use of the
atom bomb signaled a new era in military affairs, but—at the time—few would have
questioned the utility of maritime/amphibious power in the postwar defense of the
Free World.
As soon as the guns went silent, however, a new and radically different slant on Amer-
ica’s strategic needs began to emerge. Atomic weapons delivered by long-range bomb-
ers would provide our principal means of defeating future aggression. This became a
strategy with some measure of appeal in an era of American nuclear monopoly.
Dependence on strategic assets soon called into question the need for conventional
forces, and particular attention was directed toward the Marine Corps. Army and Air
Force leaders questioned the need for a “second land army” and recommended that the
Marine Corps be limited—both in size and responsibilities—to a police force
equivalent.
It was well for the defense of the nation that the Congress and the American people
were somewhat more farsighted than the President and his military leaders in sensing
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the continuing need for an amphibious force-in-readiness. In passing the National
Security Act of 1947, Congress ensured that there would be no piecemeal destruction
or limitation of Marine Corps roles, functions, and missions:
The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and
service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized,
trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air
components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the
conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.
This new legislation went on to assign principal responsibility to the Marine Corps for
the development of amphibious tactics, techniques, and equipment. An additional
charge, unique to the Marine Corps, required the performance of “such additional
duties as the President may direct: Provided, that such additional duties shall not
detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily
organized.”
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 served notice to the proponents of atomic
strategy that not all wars would entail direct confrontation between the major powers.
Despite Omar Bradley’s belief that atomic weapons had made amphibious operations
obsolete, MacArthur’s brilliant landing of a combined Marine Corps/Army force at
Inchon clearly countered the limited vision of such dire pessimists. Marine units went
on to fight effectively as part of the United Nations command for the next three years,
performing these additional non-maritime duties at the direction of the President.
American national strategy continued to emphasize the massive use of nuclear weap-
ons in the aftermath of the Korean War. The United States still had a substantial mea-
sure of nuclear superiority through the 1950s and ground force levels overseas were
reduced to provide a minimal conventional “trip wire,” to trigger massive nuclear retal-
iation. Congress had amended the National Security Act in 1951, to mandate that a
minimum of three combat divisions and three air wings would be actively maintained
by the Marine Corps. Without this legislative floor, the “New Look” proponents may
have turned their force-cutting cleaver on the Marine Corps as well.
The 1960s brought forth a revision to the national military strategy, initiated by a rejec-
tion of the rigid nuclear orientation of the massive retaliation policy. The two-and-
one-half war basis of the new strategy of flexible response called for the maintenance
of a nuclear deterrent force, along with the conventional capability to fight major wars
in Europe (against the Soviets) and Asia (against the Red Chinese) simultaneously with
a smaller war at another unspecified location. Due note was taken of the proliferation
of revolutionary wars around the world, and concrete programs were instituted to deal
with these conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum as well.
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Flexible response showed that America recognized that its global responsibilities could
not forever be discharged through the threat of nuclear Armageddon, particularly in
light of rapidly growing Soviet strategic capabilities. A truly global strategy requires the
ability to dominate the world’s oceans, and the flexibility of force employment that
only naval forces can provide.
The two-and-one-half war strategy ran aground in the 1960s when America became
involved in the fight for South Vietnamese independence. In seeking to quell what may
have started as a revolutionary war, we became involved in a large-scale conflict which
siphoned off significant numbers of our conventional forces, bringing into serious
doubt our ability to support simultaneously major conflicts against the Soviets and the
Chinese. Though initially employed in an amphibious expeditionary mode, Marine
forces were once again to engage successfully in sustained land combat at the direction
of the President.
The Nixon Doctrine of the early 1970s reduced the scope of our strategy from a two-
and-one-half to a one-and-one-half war commitment. The United States would be pre-
pared to fight a major war in Europe and a minor conflict elsewhere. Our intention was
to train and equip regional surrogates to defend our interests in areas outside of
Europe. The cry of “No more Vietnams” had found its reflection in this narrow,
ostrich-like strategic world view which all but abandoned historic, economic, and stra-
tegic ties. In seeking defense on the cheap, we basically told many of our allies and
friends that they were “on their own.”
Making a case for an offensively oriented Navy and Marine Corps is not an easy under-
taking if Europe is the primary U.S. area of interest. By the middle 1970s, the Navy’s
role was cast primarily in terms of sea control and convoy escort for the reinforcement
flow to Europe. Talk of maritime superiority was roundly discounted as the United
States opted to abandon its geostrategic naval advantages in order to combat the Sovi-
ets on the continental ground of their own choosing.
The Marine Corps was also subject to the ordeal of justifying its existence as an
amphibious force, while our Europe-oriented strategy demanded more armored and
mechanized divisions. Several noted pundits proclaimed that never again would we
have interests worth defending in the Pacific, and that Vietnam had made expedition-
ary forays a politically unacceptable option to the American people. We were told not
too gently that we had better abandon our identity as a naval service, buy some more
armored vehicles, bring our MAGTFs home from the Pacific, or risk being viewed as a
useless anachronism.
By the late 1970s many national security analysts had come to the conclusion that the
one-and-one-half war strategy was fatally flawed. Colin Gray and John Erickson
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warned of the tremendous buildup of Soviet naval power on the Kola Peninsula and in
the Northwest Pacific, as an indication that the Russians were prepared to take the war
to sea on a major scale. Soviet gains in Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Cambodia were
indicative of a power that was clearly seeking a global sphere of influence. The fall of
the Shah, the seizure of American hostages by the Iranian revolutionary government,
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan finally alerted our leaders to the fact that
Europe was not the only region whose loss could pose a threat to the United States and
its allies.
The proclamation of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980, declaring the oil supplies of
the Persian Gulf to be a vital American interest, was the first step along a continuing
path that has led to the revalidation of a global military strategy for the United States.
While trying to form a Rapid Deployment Force to implement the Carter Doctrine, our
governmental leaders soon found that carrier battle groups and amphibious forces
were the only military assets capable of establishing an American presence in the Ara-
bian region. The equipment for a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) was quickly put
aboard a set of near-term prepositioning ships and rushed off to Diego Garcia. Budgets
for the naval services, which had previously been cut to fund a ground buildup in
Europe, were now increased significantly in recognition of their capability to protect
our global interests.
The military strategy that has evolved over the last five years recognizes the importance
of Europe and the Pacific—and the energy resources of Southwest Asia—to U.S. secu-
rity interests. Wrapped around the principles of deterrence, forward positioning of
forces, and coalition operations with our allies, our strategy has come to recognize,
once again, the necessity for a maritime nation to control vital sea lines of communica-
tion through naval superiority. Though our primary threat may come from the Soviet
Union, modern and ready Navy-Marine forces give our decision makers the capability
to address a wide spectrum of possible challenges, from an all-out Soviet attack to a
hostage seizure in a Third World country. Clearly, it is the unexpected crisis that
presents us the greatest difficulties and most urgently requires rapid application of
the discreet power inherent in naval forces.
That our strategy has once again returned to its maritime focus is no surprise to those
of us in the naval services. For the Marine Corps, our refusal to renounce our naval
heritage and our amphibious nature has been more than vindicated by the renewed
confidence and trust our leaders feel in having a uniquely ready, hard-hitting, and sus-
tainable forcible entry capability from the sea.
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The Amphibious Warfare Strategy
The development of strategic concepts for the employment of naval forces is an ongo-
ing joint effort by the Navy and Marine Corps. Three years ago, the first edition of what
has come to be called “The Maritime Strategy” addressed the role of naval forces in the
execution of the National Military Strategy. Though classified in its initial iteration, the
Maritime Strategy has now been publicly briefed to the Congress and has been pub-
lished in an unclassified form in open sources.
Derived from pertinent policy and strategic directives and taking into account the
warfighting requirements of the unified and specified commanders-in-chief (CinCs),
the Maritime Strategy provides a planning and programming baseline for the employ-
ment of naval forces in a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. Currently
divided into three phases, this strategy provides a coordinated, sequential framework
which seeks to:
• Deter war, if at all possible.
• If deterrence fails: destroy enemy maritime forces; protect allied sea lines of
communication (SLOCs); support the land campaign; and secure favorable leverage
for war termination.
In June 1985, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps approved the publication of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy. Developed as a
subset of the Maritime Strategy, the Amphibious Warfare Strategy outlines the employ-
ment of Navy-Marine amphibious forces in support of our global National Military
Strategy. Though oriented to address the phased employment of amphibious forces in a
global conventional conflict, the Amphibious Warfare Strategy fully recognizes the util-
ity of these forces in the unexpected and more likely crisis scenarios at the lower end of
the conflict spectrum.
Low-Intensity Conflict: B. H. Liddell Hart, the great British military thinker, expressed
the following thoughts on the effectiveness of amphibious forces in low-intensity
conflict:
Since Russia has developed nuclear weapons in quantity to match America’s, a nuclear stalemate has
developed. In such a situation, local and limited aggression becomes more likely, and amphibious
forces become more necessary, both as deterrent and as a counter to aggression—a counter which can
be used without being suicidal and a deterrent which is therefore credible.
The role of the Marine Corps in the realm of low-intensity conflicts makes maximum
use of the inherent flexibility amphibious forces offer to the National Command
Authorities. Congress had this fully in mind when, in passing the 1951 act which dic-
tated the current Marine Corps force structure, it directed that the Marine Corps
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would be a “ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international
disturbances short of large-scale war.” It is from these roots that the term “force-in-
readiness” first appeared, and it is in this arena of rapid and effective crisis suppression
that amphibious forces can perform perhaps their greatest service in preventing minor
conflicts from growing into major confrontations.
The forward peacetime presence of amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with their
deployed MAGTFs in the Mediterranean and Pacific/Indian oceans serves as a visible
and credible indicator of American capability to react to sudden, unforeseen crises
involving U.S. interests. These groups possess the combined ground/air combat power
of a Marine amphibious unit (MAU), which can provide a rapidly available military
presence, to put out a brushfire incident before it has a chance to spread.
The advantages which these amphibious groups enjoy over forces which must be
deployed from the United States—or be permanently based in the region—are obvious.
Many Third World governments are understandably reluctant to grant permanent bas-
ing rights to U.S. forces because of the destabilization it could cause to the ruling
regime. Without regional bases, forces deploying from the United States must deal with
long flight times en route, limited lift capacity for support units and their equipment,
and refueling and overflight clearances.
Amphibious forces, on the other hand, can be stationed over the horizon at sea, need
no basing or overflight clearances, and provide their own sustainment. A MAU can
fight its way ashore if required and can be swiftly extracted back to the waiting ships of
the ARG. Often, however, the mere presence of the ARG offshore is enough to deter a
would-be aggressor from initiating trouble.
A new and innovative development in the crisis response arena has been the procure-
ment and fielding of three squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships (MPS), each
carrying equipment and supplies to sustain a MAB for 30 days. Strategically positioned
in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, MPSs will add a significant expansion to
our response capability when the program reaches completion this year. When married
with its airlifted troops and organic aircraft, an MPS-MAB can provide another means
of demonstrating American resolve, when employed either preemptively into a friendly
port/airhead or as reinforcement for a forward-deployed ARG.
An additional asset worthy of note is the capability of our deployed MAUs to conduct
naval/amphibious special operations. Amphibious raids and other special naval mis-
sions have always been a part of the Marine Corps repertoire and may well become
likely assignments for deployed MAUs in this era of international terrorism and insta-
bility. We intend in the near future to include the training for such missions in the
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standard pre-deployment workup for all of our MAUs and to have them designated as
MAU (Special Operations Capable).
These force projection options from the sea provide a flexible and valuable national
asset, in the effort to address and contain potential strife at the low end of the conflict
spectrum. The frequency with which we recently have had to face incidents of this type
shows that the investment of our defense dollars into amphibious forces is a wise use of
scarce resources.
Phase I—Deterrence or the Transition to War: The first phase of the Amphibious War-
fare Strategy postulates a growing crisis between the United States and the Soviet
Union. At the first sign of deepening tension or possible preparation for a Soviet gen-
eral attack, U.S. and allied naval forces would surge from their home ports and deploy
as far forward as possible. Carrier battle groups and attack submarines would attempt
to position themselves for maximum advantage in the event that deterrence failed. The
objective of this phase, however, is to assume a deterrent posture so convincing to the
Soviets that they would abandon any plans for a general offensive.
Marine forces will be extremely active in this initial phase, and can contribute signifi-
cantly to the credibility of our deterrent efforts. The very regularity of our amphibious
exercises enables us to load our available amphibious ships and deploy them from the
United States early in the crisis buildup, without unduly arousing suspicion. This will
allow for the massing of amphibious assets in the Atlantic and Pacific to at least MAB
size, and will thus give the CinC an in-theater capability for amphibious forcible entry.
While our amphibious forces are sailing to their forward operating areas, MPS squad-
rons will be repositioning themselves to best support anticipated requirements. The
airlifted MAB elements could be joined with their equipment at a preliminary staging
location or could be employed as a follow-on element to reinforce the massing
amphibious MAGTFs.
Although our Norway land prepositioning program—for a MAB set of equipment and
supplies—will not be completed until 1989, the Marine Corps will nonetheless deploy
a MAB via amphibious shipping to assist in the defense of Norway. The importance of
this region to the defense of the North Atlantic SLOC and its reinforcing flow to Cen-
tral Europe could dictate the eventual employment of a Marine amphibious force
(MAF) to NATO’s Northern Flank.
The deployment of amphibious task forces from the United States, movement of MPSs
to crisis areas, and the commitment of a MAB to the defense of Norway will materially
assist other Western efforts to dissuade the Soviets from launching a general war. If the
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Soviets attack despite these efforts, however, we will be deployed to engage the aggres-
sor far forward and to blunt his assault.
Phase II—Seize the Initiative: Should the Soviets commence a full-scale invasion of
Central Europe, the initial NATO strategy will be to counter the attack, to wear down
the enemy, and to seize the initiative. Attack submarines will quickly engage Soviet
naval forces in the Norwegian and Barents seas, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific
Ocean. Carrier battle groups will seek to negate or neutralize Soviet surface and air
threats, while allied antisubmarine warfare forces will seek out and destroy the Soviet
subsurface force.
The naval battle at sea will be fought to keep forward pressure on the Soviet flanks in
the northern region of Europe, the Mediterranean, and in the Pacific, thereby prevent-
ing any significant shift of Soviet forces to Central Europe or interdiction of NATO’s
reinforcing SLOCs. Allied naval superiority in these maritime theaters, gained through
the destruction of Soviet naval forces, will set the stage for a series of counteroffensives
aimed to ease the pressure on the land battle in the central region.
Amphibious forces could play many parts in this phase. One likely mission could be the
seizure of advanced naval bases. Amphibious raids of MAB size or full-scale MAF
amphibious assaults could be conducted for the follow-on introduction of U.S. and
allied forces. Although deployments may initially be made by MABs, every effort will
be made to combine amphibious, MPS, and follow-on MAGTFs so that employment
will be on a MAF scale.
NATO’s Northern Flank will be the scene of tense drama, in which amphibious forces
can play a key role. As allied naval forces fight for control of the Norwegian Sea, they
will be supported by the air component of MAGTFs ashore. As the Soviet invader is worn
down, opportunities will develop for amphibious assaults along the Norwegian coast to
his rear, to reclaim any airfields and ports that may have been lost in the war’s initial days.
Other areas that may lend themselves to amphibious operations are the North and Bal-
tic seas, the Mediterranean, and the Northwest Pacific. Operations in these areas offer
possible opportunities to exert pressure on the Soviet Rimland, which might in turn
divert Soviet energies from the struggle for the heartland of industrial Europe.
While NATO’s armies are containing the assault in Central Europe, every effort will be
made to retain amphibious forces for employment at the decisive point and time when
the Soviets have lost their momentum and are therefore most vulnerable. This does not
preclude the use of MAGTFs to support a NATO defense which is in extremis on the
English Channel coast. As always, Marines will fight where they are needed most. We
believe, however, that the employment of amphibious MAGTFs in a sustained land
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warfare role compromises their unique capability for flexible maneuver and, therefore,
should be avoided.
Phase III—Carry the Fight to the Enemy: Exhausted and contained by a stout NATO
defense in the central region, stripped of his naval forces through a bold and decisive
allied maritime campaign, and harried by NATO pressure on his flanks, the Soviet
invader will now be pounded by a succession of NATO sea, air, and land
counteroffensives.
Massed naval task groups will undertake attacks on Soviet forces and their supporting
infrastructure in Eastern Europe and the Soviet homeland. Naval offensives into the
Kola Peninsula and Northwest Pacific regions could attack key Soviet military targets,
thus helping to induce a measure of fear, uncertainty, and paralysis into the Soviet
warfighting machine.
Amphibious forces will once again play a prominent part in this final phase. Massed
amphibious task forces, together with supporting battleship surface action groups, will
now undertake landings to retake conquered territory and to seize key objectives in the
Soviet rear. Operating as a component of the naval campaign, MAGTFs could land on
the North Cape, the eastern Baltic or the Black Sea coasts, in the Kuriles, or on Sakhalin
Island—thereby adding a crucial measure of leverage to the successful conduct of the
maritime campaign.
The ultimate objective of our Alliance efforts is to bring the Soviets to the negotiating
table as quickly as possible, on terms that are favorable to the West. Maritime forces
offer the opportunity to avoid a long, costly, and uncertain land effort to push the Sovi-
ets back in Central Europe. Naval operations on the exposed Rimland flanks present
the option of striking quickly at key Soviet pressure points in a campaign of nautical
maneuver. Used in this manner, our naval forces can make the strategic difference.
The Amphibious Team
No matter how pressing the need or sound the strategy may be, the lack of a ready,
well-equipped, and professional amphibious force will make all else irrelevant. The
profession of arms is a very unforgiving taskmaster. Good intentions count for far less
than does superior battlefield performance.
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is a viable and meaningful concept because of the
Navy–Marine Corps amphibious team that will put it into execution. Improvements in
our amphibious capability in the last six years allow us to be supremely confident
about the health of this much-needed and frequently used military capability.
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People: The quality of the Marines and sailors in service with the fleet has never been
higher. Our ranks are filled with well-educated, physically fit, and spirited young men
and women who are proud of the important role they play in the country’s defense.
The victors of Iwo Jima, Inchon, and Khe Sanh would be proud to serve with today’s
young Americans in the uniform of their country.
Forces: The amphibious assault fleet of today is in its best shape, in recent memory, and
it is going to get even better. Six years ago, not a single amphibious ship appeared in the
Navy’s five-year defense program. Today, we are well into the production of the LSD-41
and LHD-1 classes of amphibious assault ships and have sound programs for the main-
tenance and upgrading of the amphibious ships currently serving with the fleet. By the
mid-1990s, we will have a total of 76 amphibious ships, which will be capable of lifting
the assault echelons of both a MAF and a MAB. The combination of the increase in
strategic lift we will realize from both an expanded amphibious fleet and our MPS
squadrons will significantly enhance our capability for global response.
Naval surface fire support for the landing force is critically needed in the early hours of
an amphibious assault, before our artillery is established ashore. The reactivation of the
four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships, along with programmed improvements in the
accuracy and lethality of our naval gunfire munitions, will ensure that Marines hitting
an enemy-held shoreline will have the accurate and responsive gunfire support they
require.
The Navy has made major commitments to improve the readiness and availability of
amphibious assault support forces. Construction battalions, cargo-handling groups,
and fleet medical support are often overlooked when novices discuss amphibious oper-
ations; the professionals know how easily an operation can founder without these naval
support elements.
We in the Marine Corps are looking to improve the effectiveness of our MAGTF con-
cept through the establishment of permanent headquarters. Instead of creating
MAGTF headquarters by drafting personnel from subordinate units on an “as-needed”
basis, we are now assigning Marines to our MAGTF headquarters on a permanent
basis, so that the teamwork and experience we gain will not be lost after every series of
exercises. Based on the feedback received from several recent exercises, this concept is
already proving its worth and will markedly improve our capabilities for effective com-
mand and control of amphibious operations in the coming years.
Equipment: If our amphibious forces are to triumph over a tough and determined foe,
they must be provided with effective and modern tools of war. Our modernization pro-
gram is geared to satisfy long-standing warfighting requirements for present and future
battlefields.
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Improvements in expediting the movement of Marines from the ship to the enemy
shore will be realized with the acquisition of the landing craft air cushion (LCAC) and
the MV-22A “Osprey” tilt-rotor aircraft. These platforms will allow for a much more
rapid closure to the beach, giving the amphibious task force the option of operating
from over the horizon, out of the range of many enemy weapon systems.
In addition, because the LCAC rides on a cushion of air, many beaches that were previ-
ously unsuitable for assault landings can now be considered. The significant strategic
impact of this development is that it considerably widens the range of possible landing
sites that an enemy must defend.
We have modernized the assault rifle, artillery, mortars, and the prime movers organic
to the MAGTF. In the next several years, we will be introducing a new tank and a series
of light armored vehicles which will improve the mobility and firepower of our
MAGTFs without making them too heavy to retain their expeditionary character.
The cumulative impact of our modernization initiatives will result in a MAGTF that
will be light, mobile, and lethal.
Doctrine: Although we have sound joint doctrine for amphibious operations, we are
constantly seeking to develop and refine improved operational concepts that will foster
the best use of our modern warfighting systems. The formulation of an operational
and tactical framework for amphibious operations from over the horizon is a high-
priority project, combining the efforts of Navy and Marine Corps planners. We have
chosen some of our brightest, most operationally experienced, and talented officers to
work on this endeavor. Their initial proposals show considerable promise and will be
subjected to operational validation in future amphibious exercises.
Boldness and innovation accurately describe the Marine heritage in putting forth new
warfighting concepts. Our development of amphibious doctrine in the 1920s, close-air
support for ground troops during World War II, and the use of the helicopter for verti-
cal envelopment in the 1950s are prime examples of this desire to develop new and
imaginative solutions to battlefield problems.
So too, today, Marines are working on the refinement of tactics that will increase the
effectiveness of the MAGTF ashore. Our schools have become hotbeds for the develop-
ment of new initiatives, and the volume and quality of the tactical debate in our mili-
tary journals indicate that the scope, depth, and enthusiasm of this effort runs deeply
throughout our Corps. We take pride in the fact that our Marines have taken seriously
their responsibility to enhance and advance the amphibious art. They have had, and
will continue to have, a positive impact on the combat effectiveness of our MAGTFs.
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Training: Nothing hones the fighting edge of our amphibious forces better than realis-
tic and demanding training exercises. An increase in funding to support a high opera-
tional tempo has enabled Navy–Marine Corps amphibious forces to conduct dozens of
exercises around the world, with frequent participation by our allies and by other
services.
Conducted in the cold and snows of Norway and Alaska, the heat and sand of Oman
and Somalia, and the jungles of Honduras and the Philippines, these exercises allow for
the validation of our operational concepts, tactics, and procedures. Feedback from
these exercises shows where our concepts are sound and where they require additional
attention.
For the MAGTF ashore, our Combined Arms Exercises at our desert base at
Twentynine Palms, California, provides the Marine air-ground team with the most
realistic live-fire training short of actual combat. Since their inception in 1975, these
exercises have broadened in scope from an initial MAU orientation to the point where
we now conduct live-fire training on the MAB level.
Readiness: The payoff we get from having superior people, necessary levels of force
capability, modern equipment, sound doctrine, and meaningful training is a Navy–
Marine Corps amphibious team that truly is a force-in-readiness. Tasked to respond to
a wide range of possible missions, from a show-of-force to a full-scale assault into a
hostile beachhead, amphibious forces must be prepared to respond rapidly and effec-
tively when the seemingly hypothetical suddenly becomes reality. The Navy–Marine
Corps amphibious team is ready, eager, and able to accept that challenge.
Renaissance and Revolution
A global Soviet menace, Third World instabilities and threats to key U.S. allies or trad-
ing partners, and the specter of international terrorism have combined to force a
readdressal of our National Military Strategy. Though we tried to pretend during the
decade of the 1970s that European security was our only vital overseas interest, we have
since relearned that a maritime nation in an ever-shrinking world has vital interests in
nearly every region. The protection of our allies and access to key economic resources
demand that we command the seas and possess the capability for maritime power
projection.
The National Military Strategy recognizes the requirement for a Navy and Marine
Corps capable of reacting quickly to a myriad of possible threats across the entire spec-
trum of conflict. Deployments in low-intensity or crisis situations are the most likely
happenstance. The Navy–Marine Corps team has been the force of choice in Lebanon
in 1958 and 1982, Thailand in 1962, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Grenada in
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1983. We are thankful that global war with the Soviets is the least probable scenario,
but we are prepared to contribute in a meaningful way to the attainment of allied vic-
tory should that unhappy conflict be forced upon us.
The importance of an amphibious forcible entry capability and its role in national
strategy were eloquently described by Liddell Hart:
The history of warfare shows that the basic strategic asset of sea-based peoples is amphibious flexibil-
ity. In tackling land-based opponents, they can produce a distraction to the enemy’s power of concen-
tration that is advantageously disproportionate to the scale of force they employ and the resources
they possess.
When reviewing the plans for the invasion of Sicily in 1943, General George Marshall is
said to have commented that a landing against an organized and highly trained oppo-
nent is “probably the most difficult undertaking which military forces are called upon
to face.” The conduct of forcible entry from the sea remains to this day an exacting and
complex endeavor, in which our central goal is most often the seizure of an objective
whose value is just as clearly evident to the defender as it is to us.
It is only through the dynamic synergism of the Navy–Marine Corps amphibious
brotherhood that risks are minimized, obstacles are overcome, and victory is achieved.
Those who seek to put Marines on the front in Central Europe or in other sustained
inland roles as land force division equivalents not only demonstrate their total lack of
appreciation for the effectiveness of our Marine air-ground team; they also convey the
most profound misunderstanding of the proper use of maritime power, the depth of
our naval heritage, and the pride with which we bear the title of “Soldiers of the Sea.”
Though some military commentators regard World War II to be the high point in the
development and conduct of amphibious warfare, we take a very different view. We
believe that there is ample evidence to suggest that we have entered a renaissance
period in the evolution of amphibious operations, with the broadening of our vistas
through the introduction of the LCAC and Osprey yet to come. Indeed, the incremen-
tal advances we have experienced in the art of amphibious warfare will soon be giving
way to an exciting era—in which the rapid pace of strategic, operational, and tactical
improvements will transform the current renaissance into nothing less than an
amphibious revolution.
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The 600-Ship Navy
JOHN F. LEHMAN, JR.
Clemenceau once declared that war was too important to be left to the generals. But if war
is too important to be left to the generals, it is also too important to be left to the civilian
experts. In the United States, with our constitutionally mandated civilian control of the
armed forces, we forget sometimes that hard-earned military experience must leaven the
theories of civilians if our system is to work.
We would do well to keep this in mind as we near our goal of a 600-ship Navy. Media-
anointed experts have raised questions about the size, character, and complexity of the
Navy: Do we really need so many ships? Are the Navy and Marine Corps effective in helping
to deter Soviet aggression—across the full spectrum of violence, from terrorism to nuclear
war? Do we have a strategy that guides the planning and training of our forces? Is it the cor-
rect strategy? If it is, are we building the right types and numbers of ships to execute it?
Finally, can this nation afford to sustain a 600-ship fleet—not only well-equipped but prop-
erly manned—for the long term? When defense restrictions become law in the zero-growth
1986 budget, and retrenchment is the theme of the hour, the answers to these questions take
on added significance.
Why 600 ships?
To understand how we arrived at the size of our planned fleet of ships, we must begin by
discarding the idea that this number has sprung, full blown, from the brow of some would-
be Napoleon of the high seas.
Since World War II, maritime force planners have found themselves at the mercy of three
enduring elements. First is geography. Water covers three quarters of the world; and the
United States is an “island continent” washed by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
Second are the vital interests of the United States, expressed in the web of more than 40
treaty relationships that bind us to mutual defense coalitions around the world. These rela-
tionships shape our national security requirements—together with the energy and com-
mercial dependencies that support our economy in peace and in war.
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:32:48 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
The third element is the Soviet threat. Whatever its original rationale, the Soviet Navy’s
postwar expansion has created an offense-oriented blue water force, a major element in
the Soviet Union’s global military reach that supports expanding Soviet influence from
Nicaragua to Vietnam to Ethiopia. From the Baltic to the Caribbean to the South China
Sea, our ships and men pass within yards of Soviet naval forces every day. But familiar-
ity, in this case, is breeding a well-deserved respect.
The Navy’s recently updated Understanding Soviet Naval Developments provides the
facts about the Soviet Navy. Every American should be aware, for example, that Soviet
nuclear submarines operate continuously off our coasts. “Victor”-class nuclear attack
submarines are routinely found lurking near many of our principal naval ports. Soviet
surface units are now making regular deployments to the contentious and vulnerable
chokepoints of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. Worldwide, we find the Soviet
Navy astride the vital sea-lanes and navigational chokepoints, through which most of
the Western world’s international trade must pass.
This is the new reality. The pattern of Soviet naval deployments has revealed itself in
only the last several years. These deployments constitute a post–World War II change in
the global military balance of power that has been surpassed only by the advent of
thermonuclear weapons. No planner, civilian or military, can ignore the growing
dimensions of Soviet maritime power.
Geography, alliances, and the Soviet threat combine to dictate the actual numbers of
ships—the “size of the Navy”—required to fulfill our commitments in each of our
maritime theaters. Before reviewing in detail the forces we need in each theater, some
observations are in order:
• Any view of the global disposition of the U.S. Navy reveals that we often deploy in
peacetime very much in the same manner as we would operate in wartime. For
purposes of deterrence, crisis management, and diplomacy, we must be present in the
areas where we would have to fight if war broke out. Of course, the operational tempo
is different—a roughly three-to-one ratio in wartime, as compared with peacetime.
We also train as we intend to fight. A full-scale general war at sea would rarely find a
carrier battle group operating alone. So we train often in multiple carrier battle
forces in such exercises as FLEETEX, READEX, and NATO exercises, like Northern
Wedding, which we conduct in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea.
• Our maritime security depends on significant assistance from allies in executing our
missions. Fortunately, we count among our friends all of the world’s great navies,
save one. Clearly, in areas such as diesel submarines, frigates, coastal patrol craft,
minesweepers, and maritime patrol aircraft, allies of the United States have assets
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absolutely essential to us for sea control in war and peace. In some regions, such as
the Eastern Atlantic and the waters surrounding the United Kingdom, our allies
supply a significant portion of the antisubmarine capability to counter the Soviet
threat. In fact, if we could not count on our allies, we would require a U.S. fleet
much larger than 600 ships, to deal with the 1,700 ships and submarines that the
Soviets can deploy against us. But the world’s greatest navies are on our side, and
this gives a tremendous advantage to the U.S. Navy and a significant cost savings to
the U.S. taxpayer.
• America’s increasing commercial and energy interdependence with Asia, and the
growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet—now the largest of the four Soviet fleets—have
negated the so-called “swing strategy” of the Sixties and Seventies, which planned to
reinforce the Atlantic Fleet with combatants from the Pacific in time of crisis. Today,
the United States has an Asian orientation at least equal to its historic engagement
in Europe. Existing treaty relationships in the Pacific have been augmented by
growing commercial connections. For example, in 1980, the value of U.S. trade with
the Pacific rim nations was roughly equal to trade with the country’s Atlantic partners.
Four years later, Pacific trade exceeded that with Western Europe by $26 billion.
Similarly, oil dependencies have shifted tremendously in the last five years. This forces
America to reconsider the priorities of naval deployments in the Northern Pacific and
Caribbean regions. The reorientation of U.S. sources for crude oil—on a hemispheric
axis—is a long-term geopolitical reality that has gone largely unnoticed. Western
dependency on Middle Eastern oil is still debated at length, for its impact on our mili-
tary thinking and force planning. But we must also take into account that, in 1985, the
United States imported eight times as much oil by sea from the Western Hemisphere as
it received from the entire Middle East. Oil from Mexico has increased to almost 25%
of our imports, while oil from Saudi Arabia has dropped to only 2.6% of the U.S.
import market. We no longer depend primarily on the Middle East and Persian Gulf
supply for our vital energy needs. Instead, the locus of our oil trade is in the Western
Hemisphere: Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Caribbean area.
With these observations as background, let us review our forces in the main geographic
areas: the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf. The
numbers used are “notional.” They illustrate force packages constructed for peacetime
tasks now assigned to our naval forces. But they are capable of expansion or contrac-
tion, should war break out—a flexibility characteristic of naval power.
The Atlantic: The large Atlantic theater encompasses the North Atlantic, the Norwegian
Sea, the Northern Flank of NATO including the Baltic throat, the South Atlantic, the
Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico. It includes the coasts of South America and the
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west coast of Africa, all vital sea-lanes of communications. And it involves the Mediter-
ranean and the Middle East.
The U.S. Navy operates in the Atlantic theater with two fleets, the Sixth and the Second.
The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is the principal fighting force of the NATO South-
ern Europe Command and provides strike, antiair superiority, antisubmarine, and
close air support for the entire Southern Flank of NATO—a principal makeweight in
the balance in the Central Front.
In addition, the Sixth Fleet is the principal naval force that supports our friends and allies
in the Middle East. The threat there is significant. The Soviets maintain a fleet in the
Black Sea and a deployed squadron in the Mediterranean. In wartime, we expect to see
also Soviet naval strike aircraft, aircraft carriers, a formidable number of diesel and nuclear
submarines, and a full range of strike cruisers, destroyers, and other smaller combatants.
To deal with this threat, as we do in all our planning, we start with a base of allied
forces in the areas under consideration. The navies of our allies are good. For example,
we count on them to provide about 140 diesel submarines, which are effective for
coastal and area defense, for establishing and maintaining barriers, and for certain
other useful missions.
In wartime, purely U.S. forces in the Sixth Fleet would have to include three or four
carrier battle groups, operating to meet NATO commitments. We would also need to
deploy a battleship surface action group and two underway replenishment groups. In
peacetime, we average over the year one and one-third carrier battle groups deployed in
the Mediterranean.
The Second Fleet is the heart of the Atlantic strike fleet for NATO. It is responsible for
naval operations in the North Atlantic, the Eastern Atlantic, Iceland, the Norwegian
Sea, the defense of Norway, and the entire Northern Flank including the North Sea and
Baltic throat. It must simultaneously accomplish any naval missions required in the
Caribbean, where we now face a very large Soviet and Cuban naval presence; in the
South Atlantic, where we have vital sea-lanes; and along the West African sea-lanes,
where the Soviets now deploy naval forces continuously.
For the Second Fleet, in wartime, we must plan to have four or five carrier battle
groups, one battleship surface action group, and three underway replenishment groups.
This is the equivalent firepower of 40 World War II carriers and can deliver accurate
strike ordnance on target equal to 800 B-17s every day. In peacetime, we generally run
higher than this, because most of our principal training occurs in the Second Fleet’s
operating areas.
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Today, we have six carrier battle groups cycling in the Second Fleet at one time or
another. We have exercises underway with our NATO allies, with our South American
and Central American allies, and with other nations, on an ad hoc basis, in every sea-
son of the year.
The Pacific: Clearly, our increasing commercial interests and historic security ties in the
Pacific impact on our naval planning for the area. If we are to protect our vital inter-
ests, we must have forces available to deploy—not only to the Atlantic theaters and the
Sixth and the Second fleets—but also to the Pacific simultaneously, to the Seventh and
the Third fleets and the Middle East Force of the Central Command. We cannot aban-
don one theater in order to deal with the other. The great paradox of the 1970s was the
reduction of the fleet’s size so that it could only be employed in a swing strategy—just
as that strategy was being rendered obsolete by trade, geopolitics, and the growth of the
Soviet Navy.
The Seventh Fleet is our forward Western Pacific fleet, which meets our commitments
to Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand, and in the criti-
cal straits of Southeast Asia, as well as the Indian Ocean. In wartime, we would need to
deploy five carrier battle groups to the Seventh Fleet, two battleship surface action
groups, and four underway replenishment groups. In peacetime, we average over the
year the equivalent of one and one-third carrier battle groups in the Western Pacific.
That, of course, helps us maintain a peacetime fleetwide operational tempo that pro-
vides for at least 50% time in home port for our people and their families.
We do not have a separate fleet in the critical area of Southwest Asia, the Indian Ocean,
and the Persian Gulf, although some have proposed the re-creation of the Fifth Fleet
for that purpose. In peacetime, we have the Middle East Force of the Central Command
and elements of the Seventh Fleet, normally a carrier battle group.
In wartime, we plan for two of the Seventh Fleet carrier battle groups to meet our com-
mitments in the Indian Ocean, Southwest Asia, East Africa, the Persian Gulf area, and
Southeast Asia. Notionally, a Seventh Fleet battleship surface action group and one
underway replenishment group would also be assigned to operate in these areas.
The Third Fleet has responsibility for operations off Alaska, the Bering Sea, the Aleu-
tians, the Eastern Pacific, and the Mid-Pacific region. In wartime, there would be con-
siderable overlapping and trading back and forth between the Seventh and Third fleets.
This happened in the Pacific during World War II. To cover that vast area, we must
assign two carrier battle groups and one underway replenishment group.
These requirements compel us to deploy a 600-ship Navy as outlined in Table 1. In
peacetime, we deploy in the same way to the same places we must control in war, but at
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one-third the tempo of operations. This allows a bearable peacetime burden of six-
month deployment lengths and 50% time in home ports. Looked at either way, we
require the same size fleet to meet peacetime deployments as we do to fight a war.
Taken together they add up to the following:
• Fifteen carrier battle groups
• Four battleship surface action groups
• One-hundred attack submarines
• An adequate number of ballistic missile submarines
• Lift for the assault echelons of a Marine amphibious force and a Marine amphibious
brigade
When escort, mine warfare, auxiliary, and replenishment units are considered, about
600 ships emerge from this accounting—a force that can be described as prudent,

















*Includes forces in overhaul
**Includes Indian Ocean forces
Note: CVBG = carrier battle group; BBSAG = battleship surface action group; URG = underway replenishment group.
TABLE 1
Current Navy Force Requirements
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reflecting geographic realities, alliance commitments and dependencies, and the Soviet
fleet that threatens them. Unless Congress reduces our commitments or the Soviet
threat weakens, there is no way to reduce the required size of the U.S. fleet and still
carry out the missions assigned to the Navy.
Does the Navy have a role in the national strategy?
While the Carter administration questioned whether the Navy could influence a “short
war” in Central Europe, such a proposition is indefensible today. The coalition of free
nations bound together in NATO must have maritime superiority as a prerequisite for
any defense strategy. Maritime superiority alone may not assure victory but the loss of
it will certainly assure defeat—and sooner rather than later. The chronicles of warfare
from the classical era forward are a consistent testament to the influence of sea power
upon history, in which great continental powers do not long prevail against an oppo-
nent with mastery of the seas. Today, continental defense in NATO rests on early
achievement of maritime superiority. The Soviet Union, as evidenced by its ongoing
naval expansion, understands the experience of history far better than our trendier mil-
itary reformists.
Does the Navy have a strategy? Is it the right one?
Now, consider the charge leveled by some parlor room Pershings that our current naval
buildup lacks an underlying strategy.
Not since the days of Theodore Roosevelt have the Navy and Marine Corps exhibited
such a strong consensus on the comprehensive strategy which now forms our naval
planning. Briefly stated, our strategic objectives are the following:
• To prevent the seas from becoming a hostile medium of attack against the United
States and its allies
• To ensure that we have unimpeded use of our ocean lifelines to our allies, our forward-
deployed forces, our energy and mineral resources, and our trading partners
• To be able to project force in support of national security objectives and to support
combat ashore, should deterrence fail
To achieve these objectives, we need a strategy at once global, forward deployed, and
superior to our probable opponents. Global, because our interests, allies, and opponents
are global; forward deployed, because to protect those interests and allies, and to deter
those opponents, we must be where they are; superior, because if deterrence fails it is
better to win than lose.
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But do we have the correct strategy? Today’s debates would benefit from a more precise
understanding of the role of strategy. Strategy is not a formula for fighting each ship
and deploying each tank in the battles that may take place around the world. That is
not the function of the military establishment inside the Washington Beltway. Such is
the proper function only of the theater commander who is given the responsibility to
carry out the defense objectives set by the national command authorities.
Beyond the central concept of global, forward-deployed, and superior naval forces,
strategy’s role is to give coherence and direction to the process of allocating money
among competing types of ships and aircraft and different accounts for spare parts,
missile systems, defense planning, and the training of forces. It provides guidelines to
aid us in allocating both resources and shortages.
Title 10 of the U.S. Code charges the Secretary of the Navy with ensuring the highest
level of training appropriate to the responsibilities placed upon both the Marine Corps
and the Navy. That is what strategy provides to us—a framework within which to train.
For example, U.S. naval forces recently conducted a major training exercise, “Ocean
Safari 85,” with our NATO allies and the U.S. Coast Guard and Air Force. The “Safari”
assembled off the East Coast of the United States and fought its way across the Atlantic,
moved north of England and east of Iceland, and ended up in the Norwegian Sea.
Approximately 155 ships and 280 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters operated for four
weeks in this environment, against 19 real Soviet ships and submarines and 96 Soviet
aircraft sorties.
That is very effective training, and it is being carried out as part of a coherent training
operational plan—linked to the way that the theater commanders intend to fight a war.
One will search in vain, however, for a Navy cookbook that tells those on-scene com-
manders when to move aircraft carriers, or how or where to move attack submarines or
Aegis cruisers at any given point after a conflict commences. There should never be any
such cookbook and certainly it should never come from Washington. Those who criti-
cize our strategy for being the wrong cookbook or for not having a cookbook do not
understand strategy.
Other critics argue that our Navy should be less global, less forward-deployed, or less
superior, with the resources saved to be poured into a stronger continental defense. To
be less global means to abandon some area of our vital interests. To believe that in the
case of the Northern Flank of NATO, for example, a “passive” defense line thrown
across the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap will somehow protect our sea-
lanes or defer an engagement with Soviet forces demonstrates a lack of understanding
of the fundamental mechanics of war at sea and the workings of NATO and the Soviets’
own operational requirements. No coalition of free nations can survive a strategy
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which begins by sacrificing its more exposed allies to a dubious military expediency. To
suggest that naval support of Norway or Turkey is too dangerous because it must be
done close to the Soviet Union is defeatist. To suggest that such a strategy is provocative
of the Soviets just indicates the lengths to which some critics will go, in order to por-
tray Soviet intentions as solely defensive.
As for strengthening our continental defenses, we and our allies are also doing just that.
To discard maritime superiority in an attempt to match the larger Soviet ground forces,
however, would give us neither conventional deterrence on land nor secure access by
sea unless the Western democracies are prepared to militarize their societies to an
unprecedented, and unwise, degree.
Are we buying the ‘right’ Navy for the strategy?
Because research and development projects span decades, and ships take many years to
build, the makeup of our fleet can not change radically with each administration.
Instead, the fleet evolves over time with policy and technology. The fleet today reflects
the wisdom of the deck plates, the labs, and lessons learned from our exercises. The size
and design of our ships and weapons reflect the inputs of sailors in contact with Soviet
“Victor” submarines, Kiev-class carriers, and “Bear” aircraft. The wisdom of common
sense and the highest available technology are tremendous advantages, brought to the
design of today’s Navy and Marine Corps.
Of course, there are many kinds of ships not in the fleet today that could do very well.
The British Invincible-class vertical or short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) carriers are
quite capable antisubmarine warfare ships. It would be nice to have some of them in
the U.S. Navy. There are many attractive European frigate designs, and we could make
good use of them. There are also diesel submarines in our European alliance navies that
fulfill very effective roles.
If the taxpayers of our allies around the world were not buying these vessels, the bur-
den would fall upon us. But happily, they are carrying a considerable share of the cost
of naval defense and American taxpayers do not have to fund a Navy greater than about
600 ships.
Perhaps the most debated issue on newspapers’ front pages and television talk shows is
whether our aircraft carriers should be large or small. There is no absolute answer to
this question, but in my view, the evidence still seems overwhelmingly in favor of the
Nimitz (CVN-68)–class carrier of 90,000 tons as the optimum size and design for
putting air capability at sea.
Could we gainfully employ more mid-size carriers like our 64,000-ton Midway (CV-41)
and Coral Sea (CV-43)? Yes, indeed. They would be very useful. The Navy would like to
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have five more of them if we could afford to buy them. At least, we will keep these two
smaller carriers steaming in the force for a long time to come.
Similarly, with our nuclear attack submarines, we could buy more of them if we com-
promised on their capabilities. But our tremendous edge in technology is a permanent
potential built into the nature of our culture and our economic system compared with
the Soviets. We must build to this advantage, and not trade it away for cheaper, smaller,
less capable ships built in greater numbers, which is the forte of a totalitarian, central-
ized, Gosplan economy.
It would be a great mistake for us to adopt a defense strategy at sea—any more than on
land—that attempts to match totalitarian regimes in sheer numbers of cheap repro-
ducible items. Time and again, the high-tech solution has proved to be the wisest
investment, and by far the most advantageous one for the United States and its allies.
This is true of our missiles, our aircraft, and our ships. We have the world’s finest fight-
ing equipment.
So we are getting the “right” Navy. Although there are plenty of other kinds of ships we
would like to have, and we could certainly use the larger Navy long advocated by the
Joint Chiefs, we have stayed consistently with the 600-ship fleet because we are pre-
pared to bet that our allies will continue to maintain modern, effective navies and air
forces. We are prepared to accept the risk that our nation will make the right decisions
to prevent losses of forces early in a conflict, and we think that that is a prudent risk to
run in order to have an affordable Navy.
Can we afford the Navy this nation needs?
Numerous studies and surveys, among them a tome by the Congressional Budget
Office, suggest that we cannot afford to sustain, or properly man, a 600-ship Navy. Just
the reverse is true. Consider the facts. We have now, under construction and fully
funded, all of the ships necessary to attain a 600-ship Navy centered on 15 carrier battle
groups, four battleship surface action groups, and 100 nuclear-powered attack
submarines.
Our long-term plans in a “zero growth” budget for fiscal year 1986 now reflect reduc-
tions in our shipbuilding and aircraft procurement programs. These reductions will be
to levels we call the sustaining rate for the 600-ship Navy, an average 20 ships a year in
new construction. The actual number will be higher or lower in a given year, depending
on the block obsolescence of various types of ships.
The 20-ship average is a sound basis for planning, in part because of improved mainte-
nance and the corresponding increase in longevity. Instead of the average 26 years of
life that we realized from our ships in the 1960s and the 1970s, we are now getting 30
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years’ service from our ships, because of better maintenance, the absence of a big back-
log of overhauls, and the higher technology that we are putting into our ships.
This “good news” should not blind us to the requirements of the future. A steady 20-
new-ships-a-year average will require 3% budget growth. A future of zero-growth bud-
gets would mean that we will be unable to sustain a 600-ship Navy—or for that matter,
a capable defense. We know from painful experience in the 1970s that the damage done
by no-growth funding is far greater than the mere percentage budget loss would indi-
cate. With zero- or negative-growth budgets, the industrial infrastructure vital to fleet
construction and support shrinks dramatically. The result is a loss in competitive bid-
ding and a return to sole-sourced monopolies. Rates of production must then be cut,
individual unit costs increase dramatically, productivity falls, and, in the final account-
ing, the American taxpayer gets much less “bang for the buck.” Even worse is the
decline in the quality and morale of the people who man the fleet, as we saw in the late
1970s.
Is 3% real growth beyond our means? Throughout the past two decades, many com-
mentators favoring a reduced defense effort have repeatedly predicted that the Ameri-
can people will not support sustained defense growth. That refrain is now put forward
by some, including the Congressional Budget Office, as a fact of life. While it may
express their hopes, it is not supported by history. That view takes as its norm the flat
or even declining figures of the immediate post–Vietnam War period. In fact, except
for those years, post–World War II naval budgets maintained growth commensurate
with our national economy. The middle and late Seventies, by contrast, are now being
seen as an anomaly in U.S. history. It is not apparent, the Congressional Budget Office
notwithstanding, that the American people wish to “restore” that aberrant pattern of
declining numbers of ships, morale, and readiness.
In procurement, we should not assume that Congress will refuse to make the necessary
legislative changes in the way we in the Department of the Navy are permitted to con-
duct our business. Indeed, I suggest that, in the current aura of public concern over
budget deficits and government spending, there would be few more cost-effective and
money-saving moves that Congress could undertake than the removal of excessive reg-
ulations and red tape that characterize the environment in which the Navy operates
today. For example, there repose in the Library of Congress today no less than 1,152
linear feet of statutory and regulatory law governing procurement alone! That is the
real Washington Monument!
Along with over-regulation, we are faced with excessive, layered bureaucracies, and the
accretion of authority without concomitant responsibility into a confusing labyrinth of
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congressional oversight committees and federal agencies without end, creating tremen-
dous inefficiencies.
The Congressional Budget Office staffers and others who look at the Navy’s future costs
assume that just because this bloated, inefficient congressional-executive system has
been in place it will remain in place. I do not accept that. Moreover, we have shown in
the Navy a historic reversal of the trend of inevitable cost increases.
Today, for example, the last contract that we signed for a follow-on Aegis cruiser was
$900 million. Four years ago, these cruisers cost more than $1.2 billion each, and were
projected to reach $1.6 billion by the end of 1985. It did not happen, though, because
we brought competition into the program. Both producing yards brought in new effi-
ciencies and instituted strict cost discipline, while we in the Navy applied a new asceti-
cism to our gold-plating lusts. All of our shipbuilding programs show the same pattern.
We have gone from only 24% competition in 1981 to 90% competition in 1985, pro-
ducing an average of $1 billion in cost underruns for each of the last four years.
Contrary to what the nay-sayers predicted, the costs of Navy aircraft have been going
down, not up. This is a sea change, a break with 30 years of uninterrupted cost escala-
tion in naval aircraft procurement. During 1976–1981, growth in aircraft unit prices
averaged about 10% in constant fiscal year 1980 dollars. In 1981, we implemented vig-
orous cost management programs which emphasized competition, no design changes,
and firm fixed-price contracts. These efforts have paid off in reduced aircraft prices
every year since 1982.
For example, we reached agreement with McDonnell Douglas on a fiscal year 1985 fly-
away price of $18.7 million for the F/A-18 strike fighter. In terms of fiscal year 1982
dollars, this is a price 32% below that paid in 1982. Purchases in 1985 represent a sav-
ings to the taxpayer of $126 million for that year alone.
So, there is nothing inevitable about escalating costs and overruns in defense procure-
ment. During the last four years we proved that it can be just as consistent to have
underruns. And so if we just make prudent assumptions, not even optimistic assump-
tions, there is no question that we can maintain the size and the current mix of our
force through the rest of this century with a 3% growth budget.
Just as significant, we can also maintain the tremendous turn-around in readiness that
we have achieved with President Ronald Reagan’s 7% growth budgets. During the past
four years, the readiness of our ships and aircraft has increased nearly 40%. Even these
statistics do not do justice to the palpable difference in the fleet itself, in morale, in
readiness, and in safety—i.e., uncrashed airplanes and unbroken equipment and reduc-
tion of tragic accidents.
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We know what we have accomplished during the past five years. Furthermore, we know
we can maintain this record of success with the size budgets that are currently envi-
sioned by the President.
The German military philosopher Clausewitz once observed that in the balance of
power among nations, battle is to deterrence as cash is to credit in the world of com-
merce. One may live entirely by paper transactions only when there is no doubt about
one’s ability to settle accounts with hard currency when challenged.
Similarly, there must be no doubt in the minds of Soviet leaders that the United States
and its allies can and will settle accounts, on both land and sea, if challenged. The
600-ship Navy is an essential element in this credibility. We can, and must, afford the
naval power that will sustain the defense of this country’s allies and interests around
the world.
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Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy
On 1 July 1986, Admiral Carlisle Trost succeeded Admiral James Watkins to become the
twenty-third Chief of Naval Operations; he would serve in that position until 29 June
1990 and the end of the Cold War. This short, unclassified article was published in the
January 1987 issue of the Naval Institute USNI Proceedings,* exactly a year after the
unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy had been published, and when Trost had
been in office for just six months.
The article was an important public statement about the Maritime Strategy. The article
affirmed Trost’s backing of his predecessor’s earlier statement by briefly restating the
Maritime Strategy’s fundamental ideas on deterrence, forward defense, and alliance soli-
darity, as well as its global view and adherence to the fundamental flexibility of the
national military strategy. However, it went farther than the earlier statements in dis-
cussing the role of antisubmarine warfare.
The first article had its origins in Admiral Trost’s preparations for his 1987 testimony to
Congress in support of the Navy’s programs and budget.† At that point, following the
high expenditure in the first years of the Reagan administration, Congress was in a mood
to cut the defense budget. Through his private discussions with members of Congress and
senior staff members, Trost realized that there was a perception that the Maritime Strat-
egy was confined to dealing with the existing threat posed by the Soviet navy’s increas-
ingly capable naval forces. To counter that misperception, Trost explained,
I planned to focus my [congressional] testimony on the broader applications of naval power in
support of U.S. national interests. My staff suggested that it would be useful to reiterate the broad
sense of the Maritime Strategy to a wider audience by means of a USNI [Proceedings] article.
* Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN, “Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings (January 1987), pp. 13–16.
† See U.S. Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Hearings on the Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, 100th Cong., 1st sess.; and U.S.
Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Hearings on National Security Strategy, 101st Cong.,
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Obviously, my end goal was to sustain the naval capability which we had and were continuing to
build.*
Admiral Trost had had a long association with the development of the Maritime Strat-
egy. As a vice admiral in 1982 and 1983, he had been Director of Navy Program Plan-
ning (OP-090), and had personally engaged in and contributed to the development of
the first and second iterations of the Maritime Strategy (see documents 1 and 2). In pre-
paring this article, Admiral Trost provided an outline and verbal instructions to Captain
Anthony Maness, who was the executive director of the CNO Executive Panel (OP-00K)
from September 1986 to July 1988. This article was drafted by officers assigned to the
CNO Executive Panel staff, who were simultaneously preparing Trost’s annual posture
statements and policy and strategy papers, among their other duties.†
Significantly, this article gave priority to antisubmarine warfare. No other version of the
Maritime Strategy, before or after, gave priority to any one warfare task, although car-
rier strike and amphibious assault were always identified as the culminating tasks.
Trost’s highlighting of antisubmarine warfare was significant, given his own submarine
service background and the effects of the discovery and breakup of the espionage ring run
by Chief Warrant Officer John A. Walker, Jr., and Jerry Whitworth in May 1985. Their
espionage had passed vast amounts of information to the Soviet Union on American
naval communication, submarine, and surface operations. The United States had real-
ized in the mid-1980s that Soviet submarines seemed to be becoming more aggressive
against Western sea lanes of communication.‡
As expected, this article also brought further public comment and discussion,§
appearing as it did in the wake of the pubic discussion that began in late 1985 and
early 1986. At this point, the relations between the Navy and the Marine Corps
remained very close. On the world scene, China appeared to be a potential ally against
the Soviet Union and an economic partner with the United States. At this juncture,
Trost’s article was designed to continue the move forward by adding further to the
momentum already in progress. 
Much has been said and written over the years about U.S. Maritime Strategy that has
touched off exceptionally vigorous discussions. As a side effect, some of those discus-
sions have left the province of professional strategists—naval officers and civilians—to
parade with other defense issues in the shooting gallery of defense criticism. Watching
this happen, I am reminded of a comment by Mark Twain in his memoir, Life on the
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* Letter from Adm. C. A. H. Trost to Hattendorf, dated 2 September 2007.
† Ibid.
‡ Owen R. Cote, Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with
Soviet Submarines, Newport Paper 16 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003), pp. 72–73.
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Mississippi: “War talk by men who have been in a war is always interesting; whereas
moon talk by a poet who has not been in the moon is likely to be dull.”
In the last several years, there has been a lot of moon talk about the Maritime Strategy;
much of it confuses our Maritime Strategy with employment of forces, campaign
plans, or the local strategy of battle force or theater commanders. Some of it overlooks
plain fact and even plainer common sense.
In this article, I would like to share with you my perspective on the subject.
The Global View: The transcendent fact of modern American history is the emergence
of the United States as a world power, with worldwide interests and responsibilities that
we ignore only at our peril. The wishful view of a “Fortress America,” secure within its
insular shores, ignores reality. Vital alliances, trade, communications, the travel of
American citizens, and even our generous spirit and idealistic nature compel us to look
overseas.
At the same time, our interests are being contested by a confederation of powers whose
highest priority is to replace all free and democratic societies with totalitarian states.
The threat to the security of the Free World is global, capable, and growing daily. Much
of it is directed from a center of power in the Soviet Union. Some of it is directed to the
same general end by fanatics in other countries.
The Soviet Union, a land power, enormous, sprawling, self-contained, operates on inte-
rior lines of communications which require virtually no intercourse with other coun-
tries. It doesn’t need a large navy to be secure within its borders, but it has one anyway,
a fine navy, larger than our own. Although we have always enjoyed a qualitative advan-
tage over the Soviets, in the talents of our people, their training, their winning tradi-
tion, and in the superiority of our technology, that advantage is shrinking. The Soviets
are getting better fast. They have operated in proximity to our Navy for many years,
have watched and learned, and they have improved. And what they haven’t been able to
earn for themselves, they have tried—successfully in the case of Walker-Whitworth and
others—to steal.
That navy is out on the oceans every day. It does its level best to influence the decisions
of any government with maritime interests. It poses a direct threat that it can back up
its demands with airplanes overhead, troops on the beaches, or missiles inbound. It
doesn’t care about the human element or about the niceties of civilized behavior. It
didn’t stop to pick up the boat people of Southeast Asia; it steamed right by them. It
doesn’t respect territorial boundaries, a fact to which millions of Swedes can attest,
after repeated sightings of Soviet submarines in Swedish home waters.
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On the landmasses, the threat is just as significant. In Europe and Asia, the Soviets and their
surrogates have stationed the largest armies and air forces in the world. The people are
good, the equipment is even better, and you see it everywhere you look, for hundreds of
miles. They train every day, and they practice not defensive maneuvers, but attack, the all-
out assault.
Elsewhere in the world, in many cases inspired by the Soviets and in most cases equipped by
them, are governments of fanatics whose national policy is to destroy what they consider
“The Establishment”—the U.S. and our allies. There have always been governments like this
(the entrance of Libyan bandits onto the world stage appears to be a cyclical phenomenon),
but the difference today is that they have access to technology nearly as good as our own,
and they are less inhibited about using it than the people who supply it to them. Like the
Soviets, the fanatics move in wherever they perceive a weakness. They use terrorism as an
instrument; they use it coldly and deliberately. In many ways these governments are an even
more visible threat to us than the Soviets who manipulate and succor them.
Every naval officer understands the reality of the global situation—the reality of a world
where the vital interests of the United States extend into every region, the reality of a world
where even the smallest and most innocent presence of things American is at considerable
risk. The challenge is to get everyone to understand.
In our modern life we are confronted with a spectrum of violence that ranges from the real
to the potential, from isolated terrorist bombings and kidnappings, to communist insurrec-
tions in friendly countries like the Philippines, to the threat of all-out assaults in Europe or
Asia. As Senator Patrick Moynihan said in his book about the United Nations, the world is
truly “a dangerous place.”
National Defense Strategy: Given the situation, our country needs and has a national strat-
egy—a number of directives signed by the President and a body of thought that supports
them—whose purpose is to help guide policymakers, civilian and military, in carrying out
the responsibilities of the United States in the world today. Our national strategy has consis-
tently rested on three pillars: deterrence, forward defense, and allied solidarity. Obviously,
our number one responsibility is to deter war. That has been the centerpiece of American
policy for more than 40 years. We have been successful in deterring general war because we
have been strong. By the same token, we have been more or less successful in deterring lim-
ited conflicts depending on how strong and resolute we were perceived to be in the region at
the time.
While we deter war, our strategy is to control crises as they come up, and to support our
allies. Both objectives require us to maintain a forward presence. For this reason, we do
things such as stationing garrison forces in Europe and Korea and deploying naval forces in
international waters, where they can be available at a moment’s notice.
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In addition, we in the military are charged with considering, on a daily basis, how we
would go to war if deterrence were to fail. This is not a case of gazing into the future
but one of considering our own interests and those of our allies, the importance of alli-
ance solidarity, the geopolitical situation, the capabilities of the threat, and our
resources-in-being to deal with that threat. Among those resources we include our
economy, our industrial base, the advantages of our own geography, the utility of any
forward positions from which we are operating, and our national resolve. That is strat-
egy: a way of looking at the world situation. It is not a “game plan” with the first 20
plays already charted.
Sea Power in the National Defense: In this world situation, there is a particular need
for American sea power. We are not a fortress, but an island nation, dependent upon
other countries for vital raw materials. The sea lines of communications are our life’s
blood. Water is all continuous. The oceans of the world give us the opportunity to pro-
tect our interests through forward-deployed ships—but by the same token, these ships
provide the only barriers to threats from overseas. Twice in this century an enemy’s sea
power has brought war home to our shores. In 1915, the sinking of the liner Lusitania
shook this country out of its reverie. In 1942, Americans could look out to seaward
from the Boardwalk in Atlantic City and see the fires of ships burning from German
submarine attacks.
To avoid such a debacle in the future, we need to maintain a ready, capable Navy, which
can bring to bear against any problem—or against several problems at once—sufficient
force to carry out our national strategy of deterrence, crisis control, and support of our
allies. We have such a Navy today. It is the finest, readiest instrument that I have seen in
my more than 37 years of service. It does the job wherever and whenever the assign-
ment takes it, and then if necessary it steams away to do another job somewhere else.
Operating in international waters, it enjoys the unique advantage of being able to signal
menace without violating sovereignty, and once the need is past, of being able to sail over
the horizon without signalling retreat. For this reason, the Navy has been the force of
choice in the overwhelming majority of the 200-plus crises our country has faced since
World War II.
But the Navy has not always been so capable. Just a few years ago, our worldwide com-
mitments were more than the Navy could meet. The ships were operated until they fell
apart, and they couldn’t be repaired because there weren’t enough spare parts and there
wasn’t enough money for overhauls. Even more important than the ships was the per-
sonnel situation. Sooner or later a feed pump can be replaced, but the human being to
operate it is a perishable commodity. He must be educated in the civilian sector,
recruited into the Navy, trained, challenged to excel, coordinated with others, given a
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chance to be with his family in between six-month deployments, and then, when his
period of enlistment is over, retained as a professional. If he leaves the Navy, years of
investment go with him, and his replacement is not someone one can hire off the street.
Just five or six years ago, people were leaving the Navy by the thousands, and we had
ships that weren’t safe to operate simply because they didn’t have enough trained sail-
ors on board. Our capabilities were contracting. At the same time, the Soviets were car-
rying out a long-prepared program of expansion.
Now we have turned that situation around, and the difference is well understood
beyond our own shores. Credit goes to everyone concerned: to our people on the deck
plates, whose performance has stirred so much admiration; to those in support, from
whom many resources have been diverted to meet the requirements of the fleet; to the
planners, who have gotten the most out of every dollar appropriated; and finally, to the
Congress, entrusted with their constitutional responsibility for raising and maintaining
a capable Navy.
The Development of the Maritime Strategy: The rebirth of American sea power and the
origins of an American Maritime Strategy have been mutually supportive events. It is
hard to distinguish between the two, and it is dangerous to think that one exists with-
out the other. As we were developing a ready, capable Navy, structured to meet the
threat with all its variety, taking into account such things as overseas commitments,
personnel and operational (out of homeport) requirements, called PERSTEMPO/
OPTEMPO, and the level of risk of having a reduced force structure with limited reten-
tion of trained/skilled personnel—as we were creating an appropriate capability, we
continued to ask ourselves how this revitalized instrument met the national security
objectives.
This was not a new question, and when it was asked in the late 1970s, we weren’t asking
it for the first time. Over the years our Maritime Strategy has been very much like the
British Constitution—unwritten but thoroughly understood by those who must prac-
tice it. Even in the years when we had a so-called written strategy, for example, the
Rainbow plans just before World War II, the strategy was fluid and had to be adapted to
events. Had there not been a Douglas MacArthur in addition to a Chester Nimitz, there
wouldn’t have been a twin-track offensive in the Pacific. And had we not had the ships
and airplanes to support the offensive, we would have had to come up with a new set of
plans. In those days the strategy recognized what we were capable of doing—both the
Navy and the industrial base behind it—and where we needed to go. Strategies always
do this. In the late 1970s, as we began to evolve the present Maritime Strategy, capabili-
ties and requirements went hand in hand.
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As we developed the 600-ship Navy, a general-purpose force sized to meet both a spe-
cific and a general threat, we were reviewing the mission of the Navy in support of our
national security objectives. Out of this review came the Maritime Strategy. It was
not—and is not—a force-builder, and it was certainly not the origin of the 600-ship
Navy. Most of the Maritime Strategy is simple common sense. It is not great literature
(although the stacks of criticism about it would do justice to Shakespeare), but it does
make good reading if one wants to understand our country’s worldwide commitments
and the Navy’s vital contribution to their defense.
The Maritime Strategy represents a consensus of professional opinion and carries the
acceptance of both the U.S. Government and the governments of our allies. It repre-
sents a consensus because, for the most part, naval officers, experienced and knowl-
edgeable in their profession, wrote and revised it. It has been accepted by the President
and the Secretary of Defense and by our allies, whose local security interests depend on
integrated, common defense plans with the United States. The Maritime Strategy is an
intellectual counterpart to those plans, but is not subordinate to them.
The Essence of the Maritime Strategy: Although it is a brief concept, the Maritime Strat-
egy contains several elements that should be looked at as unexceptionally American.
First, it deals with the forces we have at our disposal today. It is not a “wish list.” Ameri-
cans play the hand they’ve been dealt. In the Navy, carrying out one’s assignment to the
best of one’s ability with the resources at hand is an almost sacred tradition. As we built
a more capable Navy, we built the strategy to address it. Subsequent revisions always
take into account what forces are available.
Second, it is a forward strategy, forward in the sense of meeting our treaty obligations
and other commitments by operating away from our own shores. This is typically
American as well, as the history of the 20th century shows us. It reflects an American
attitude that the best way to solve a problem is to go right to the heart of it. “The best
defense is a good offense,” we say; or as General Nathan Bedford Forrest put it in the
Civil War, “I always make it a rule to get there first with the most. . . .” We operate for-
ward because this is where the action is, where our allies are, and where they need us.
To this end, we are fortunate because our people and technology give us every confi-
dence that we can operate and win in the forward areas. This was clearly demonstrated
during the recent air attack on Libya, in which one of the world’s best air defense sys-
tems, alerted both by a high level of diplomatic tension and by rumors of impending
attack, was unable to achieve a single hit upon our aircraft from the more than 100
high-quality missiles fired. Aegis antiair warfare cruisers, the F-14/E-2C combination,
and our outstanding submarines, along with many other factors, give us confidence
that our forward strategy would be highly effective in the event of hostilities. During
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peacetime operations, and in dealing with conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum, of
course, a forward presence is equally advantageous.
Third, the strategy is operative worldwide. In any conflict, Europe would be the vital
arena: our culture tells us that. But even then we would have responsibilities in the
North Pacific, the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and the South Atlan-
tic—anywhere that naval forces can operate in support of our national interests. As
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has pointed out, trans-Pacific communications are
currently the most active in the world, and this region is a rival to the Atlantic for our
attentions.
Finally, the strategy is flexible, as strategies always must be to be effective. It is not a
game plan. Many people who have assailed various aspects of it have confused strategy
with employment of forces. The Maritime Strategy discusses a framework of forward
operations; anyone who wishes to dispute the correctness of such a framework, assum-
ing that he wishes to challenge a basic tenet of our national outlook, can certainly do
so. But to talk about numbers of carrier battle groups or submarines in the context of a
particular scenario is misleading. The basis for deterrence is the creation of doubt in
the enemy’s mind as to what we would be capable of achieving if he breaks the peace.
We have undoubtedly been successful at this. If deterrence fails, what our actions would
be at that time is a matter for the commanders involved to determine at that time. Wars
are not fought by automatic, preprogrammed responses under the direction of a video
game computer. Right now, we can’t say what our exact response would be to a Soviet
attack. It would depend on where, when, and how big it was, and who was involved.
Even if we knew, we wouldn’t tell. The same message should be understood by any
evilly disposed country. Let them worry about what we are capable of doing, and let us
not give them any easy assurances ahead of time. The Maritime Strategy reserves the
employment of forces to the absolutely indispensable element of the evaluative process.
Antisubmarine Warfare—Mining the Mother Lode: The Maritime Strategy is a part of
our overall national strategy to exactly the same extent that sea power is a part of
national security. The doctrine of the strategy is a product of the equation that con-
tains our nation’s worldwide interests and responsibilities, the worldwide threat, and
the resources at our disposal to meet that threat.
In the same way, the Navy’s missions support national strategy by employing sea power.
One mission area of vital importance, in which the challenge of the future is particu-
larly pressing, is antisubmarine warfare (ASW). If we are going to enjoy the advantages
of sea power in the 21st century, we must maintain our lead in this area.
The threat is particularly formidable—more than 350 Soviet submarines. When we
consider what the Germans were able to achieve in two world wars and what we were
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able to achieve in the four years of the Pacific campaign; and when we consider that in
each case the number of submarines available at the start of the conflict was from one-
fifth to one-tenth the size of today’s Soviet submarine force, we have to respect the
potential of the Soviet Navy to disrupt the sea lines of communications linking us to
our allies.
Until now, our antisubmarine capabilities have maintained a comfortable lead over
Soviet submarine capabilities because of superior individual quality: again, people and
technology. Passive acoustic detection has been the “mother lode” of ASW ever since
the advent of the nuclear submarine. Today, our sensors are able to detect and track
Soviet submarines at ranges much beyond those at which they themselves can be
detected; we have much better sea-legs and endurance than the Soviet submarine force;
and we think our weapons are the best in the world. But the advantages are decreasing.
Soviet submarines are getting quieter and harder to detect. At some point in the future,
it can be postulated that they will become as quiet as the ambient sea, and then we will
have to turn to other methods of detection. In the meanwhile, we must continue to
mine the mother lode wherever that takes us. We must not relax our present strong
commitment to the ASW challenge, and we must continue to make good decisions
about the kind of ASW forces we want in the future. This will be one of my principal
priorities as Chief of Naval Operations, part of my overall goal of retaining the great
Navy that we enjoy today.
In the same way, the Maritime Strategy, a good concept already, will become better as
we continue to develop our capabilities. The debate over what those capabilities should
be is a healthy one, and I welcome it. But those who would use this one concept to
prove some separate hypothesis—perhaps a political hypothesis—about the state of
America’s defenses, need to look beyond the strategy to the reality of the dangerous
world in which we live.
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The Maritime Strategy
The Maritime Component of the U.S. National Strategy,
1988–1989
The original plans to revise the Maritime Strategy on an annual basis did not come to
fruition, and several years elapsed after the publication of the 1985 version before a new
version appeared. Revisions had been considered in the fall of 1986 and again in the fall
of 1987, but in neither instance had come to fruition. By early 1988, the last version of
the strategy no longer fully reflected the emerging circumstances with regard to the
Soviet navy. In addition, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman had left office in April of
1987 and had been succeeded briefly by James Webb, who in February 1988 resigned in
protest that the administration would no longer support the six-hundred-ship goal. With
further budget declines in the offing, the Navy needed to have a revised strategy that
more closely fit the political realities at home and the changing circumstances in the
world.
Two versions of the Maritime Strategy appeared in close succession, one in December
1988* and another in February 1989.† Both versions were signed by Admiral Carlisle A. H.
Trost, as Chief of Naval Operations. The two versions are very close in content, but con-
tain some significant changes in wording and small additions. In the following text, the
1989 version has been used as the basic text with annotations that point out the differ-
ences from the 1988 version.
In distributing the new document superseding the 1985 strategy, Admiral Trost used his
prefatory letter to explain the main differences between the new version and the 1985
version.
* The Maritime Strategy, revision IV, OPNAV 60 P-1-88, distributed by CNO letter serial 00/
8U500502, dated 20 December 1988. This publication was approved for declassification by the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 7 February
2007.
† The Maritime Strategy, revision IV, OPNAV 60 P-1-89, distributed by CNO letter serial 00/
9S500091, dated 23 February 1989. This publication was approved for declassification by N3/N5
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The Maritime Strategy, as a component of our national military strategy, supports national goals
in peace, crisis, and war. In this revision greater emphasis is placed on the Pacific region and low
intensity conflict,[*] without[†] subtracting from the validity of the Maritime Strategy as it
applies to other regions. Within the Maritime Strategy the basic concepts of forward posture and
movement, seizing the initiative and directly pressuring the enemy remain valid. The present
updated version has been refined to address more directly:
a. Soviet intentions and capabilities, as well as,
b. The current security environment and major trends which will shape our Navy in the
future.‡
In the following paragraph, Trost’s letter stated: “The Maritime Strategy serves as the
basis for tactical development and provides the intellectual underpinning for the devel-
opment of Fleet warfighting plans as well as representing our contribution to joint and
allied cooperative planning efforts. Additionally, it is the basis for the development of the
Navy POM and testimony on Navy programs and budget.”§ The letter concluded: “Strat-
egy cannot be written in a vacuum, nor can it remain dormant without risk to those who
must, of necessity, be its implementors. Your comments and discussion are invited. They
should be submitted to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Opera-
tions) (Op-06).”**
In the late spring of 1988, the action officer in the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603),
Commander Richard “Mitch” Brown had completed a new draft and sent it up the chain
of command for final approval and release by Admiral Trost. In the routing, Vice Admi-
ral Henry C. Mustin, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Opera-
tions, reviewed the document and made a number of changes to it before forwarding it to
the Chief of Naval Operations on 2 or 3 June 1988. The CNO’s executive assistant, Cap-
tain Thomas Paulson, held the document without taking any action on it until Mustin’s
replacement, Vice Admiral Charles R. Larson, arrived nearly four months later. At that
point, the document was returned to the action officers for its reconsideration. Com-
mander Brown and others in OP-603 removed most of the additions that had been made
by Vice Admiral Mustin and added some new items from both the Marine Corps and
others. Admiral Trost approved this version and issued it in December 1988.††
The 1988 version only lasted a few days, and its distribution was limited. Upon review-
ing it, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray, asked Admiral Trost to
rescind it and strengthen the sections on contemporary strategic thinking with additional
information about revised Marine Corps plans and operations. Acting on this request,
Admiral Trost immediately recalled the December 1988 version and requested a newly
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revised version with additional Marine Corps input. In addition, the action officer,
Commander Brown, also added some additional themes on the global security environ-
ment to the version published on 23 February 1989. These changes were also subse-
quently reflected in the Navy’s response to the new George H. W. Bush administration’s
National Security Review (NSR) 12 of March 1989.*
This final version of the Maritime Strategy made the first mention in any of the Navy’s
post–Vietnam War capstone documents of humanitarian assistance operations, drug
trafficking threats, and nonstate actions as categories for naval operations. Since that
time, all have remained at some level of importance in naval strategic planning.
In addition, the 1988 and 1989 versions of the Maritime Strategy, through both graphics
and wording, began to shift emphasis from a mainly Eurocentric focus to a more bal-
anced emphasis on the Pacific as well as the Atlantic theater. While service-directed cou-
pling to national intelligence estimates regarding the Soviet threat kept this version
classified, its sections on contemporary strategic thinking, the future global security envi-
ronment, and defense implications show, on reflection, that it was in reality a transition
strategy that showed the need to refocus on post–Cold War issues.†
In the text that follows, the insertions “This section is new” and “End of new section”
show the 1989 additions to the 1988 version. 
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* National Security Review 12 of 3 March 1989. See www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsr/nsr12.pdf.
† Fax message from Mitch Brown to Hattendorf, 25 August 2008.
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[THIS SECTION IS NEW]
This is the Maritime Strategy, describing the global contribution of the Navy and the
Marine Corps in carrying out U.S. National Security Strategy across the entire spec-
trum of conflict.* It is a statement of the application of U.S. seapower through a cogent
Strategy. It represents the collective judgment of the senior leadership in the Navy and
Marine Corps as to how best to employ U.S. naval forces to meet our national objec-
tives in peacetime, crisis, and war. The Maritime Strategy adapts and evolves to accom-
modate new threats and capabilities.
[END OF NEW SECTION]
The Maritime Strategy is the maritime element of a national security strategy based on
deterrence, forward defense and alliance solidarity. It is a concept of employment of
maritime forces that can be applied across the full spectrum of conflict. It calls for early
global positioning of maritime power both to deter war and to achieve U.S. war aims
should deterrence fail. It prescribes aggressive forward operation of naval forces to
complicate Soviet planning, best ensure access to Eurasia, help cement alliances, deny
the Soviets free access to the open oceans, provide useful offensive options to the
National Command Authorities (NCA) and best protect the sea lines of
communication.
[1 PARAGRAPH DELETED HERE:]
The Maritime Strategy represents the collective judgment of senior Navy and Marine
Corps leaders about how best to employ U.S. naval forces in response to national
2 7 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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guidance, alliance commitments, and joint strategic direction during peace, crisis, and
war. The Maritime Strategy adapts and evolves to accommodate new threats and
capabilities.
[END OF DELETED PARAGRAPH]
The Maritime Strategy is drawn from both U.S. and alliance strategies. It is a useful coun-
terpoint to Soviet strategy. In particular, it attacks the Soviets’ preferred one-front war
strategy, while at the same time remaining flexible enough to deal with Soviet capabilities
should they change their own strategy. It is accepted as valid within the NATO alliance
itself. The strategy is executable now, in the professional judgment of the theater CINCs.
It emphasizes the global capabilities inherent in a strong maritime posture, and in par-
ticular, provides the perspective to consider other theaters beyond just the Central
Region in Europe.
The Maritime Strategy has several purposes. Primarily it provides a global view of fleet
operations, for deterrence and crisis control. Should deterrence fail, it shows how fleet
operations can be integrated for a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. It
also provides a context for the day-to-day U.S. fleet operations: routine fleet
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deployments, exercises, war games and frequent requirements from the NCA for rapid
response in times of international crises. The strategy also acts as a framework for
operational requirements which shape the Navy and Marine Corps inputs to the Plan-
ning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). These in turn drive the priorities of
our research and development programs and govern decisions regarding future force
structure. As such, the Maritime Strategy is a dynamic concept which both influences
and reacts to fleet operations and budgetary issues.
The Maritime Strategy supports our national security goals. It is the nation’s and the
Navy’s global architecture for naval force employment.
Principal sources of U.S. national military strategy are National Security Decision
Directives (NSDDs), which are Presidential decisions on national security policy, and
our alliances, treaties and agreements.
Several other sources are also illustrated here. The Defense Guidance (DG) is the Secre-
tary of Defense’s biennial direction on strategy and programs. Through the Joint Stra-
tegic Planning System, the JCS recommend strategy to the NCA and provide planning
guidance to the Unified and Specified Commanders. The concepts of operations and
operational plans of the CINCs reflect this strategic guidance.
[THIS SECTION IS NEW]
Coalition defense, represented by alliances and treaties, is an essential part of our stra-
tegic thinking. U.S. Maritime Strategy is consistent with the December 1988 Revision
to NATO’s Tri-MNC of Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) which was
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approved by all 16 NATO member nations. Close relationships and cooperation with
allies in every theater are increasingly important to maintaining our overall military
capability in this era of constrained defense resources.
[END OF NEW SECTION]
The Strategy flows from alliances, treaties and other formal agreements with countries
around the world. These alliances and treaties together form a global coalition defense,
one of the essential elements of our national military strategy. It is fundamental that by
defending our allies, we defend ourselves.
We have seven formal defense treaties with forty-three separate nations, and we have
common military interests with a number of other countries. These result in a set of
shared global partnerships and interests among the United States and most other coun-
tries throughout the free world.
[THIS SECTION IS NEW]
Forward presence of naval forces visibly demonstrates U.S. commitment to honor its
alliances and partnership agreements. Conducted on a regular basis, our routine port
visits and multinational exercises are integral to this coalition structure.
[END OF NEW SECTION]
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Our national strategy is based on joint and combined operations. To succeed against the
combined forces of the Warsaw Pact in the event of war, it is essential that U.S. air, land and
naval forces operate jointly and in conjunction with our allies. The Maritime Strategy explic-
itly recognizes this imperative.
In peacetime, the Department of the Navy has strengthened its partnership with the Air
Force, Army, and Coast Guard in the area of joint operations through interservice coopera-
tive initiatives.
To improve interoperability in peacetime, the Department of the Navy pursues multiservice
procurement programs in the areas of weapons systems and command and control.
Through foreign military sales and such programs as NATO armaments cooperation, we
increase commonality and cooperation with our allies. Similarly, we have greatly increased
participation in joint and combined exercises to develop the tactics necessary to operate
with our sister services and allies.
[THIS SECTION IS NEW]
The payoff has been evident in recent successful joint operations throughout the world, where
naval forces routinely operate in combined, joint task forces, such as in the Persian Gulf today.
The ability of naval forces to operate successfully in a joint and/or combined environ-
ment will significantly determine the outcome of future U.S. military involvement in
regional conflicts, as well as global war.
[END OF NEW SECTION]
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National and NATO commanders are responsible for military operations in support of
national and alliance defense objectives in peace and war. [THIS SECTION IS NEW]
The strategy provides a conceptual framework for the warfighting CINCs to employ
naval forces and execute operations on a global scale, commensurate with NCA direc-
tion. [END OF NEW SECTION]
[THIS SECTION (INCLUDING BULLETED LIST) IS NEW]
Strategy must address the perception of the threats to our security interests. Based on
our assessment of the probable future international security environment, there are
two distinct categories of threats that must be considered.
“Glasnost”, “perestroika”, and “reasonable sufficiency” notwithstanding, war with the
Soviet Union remains the worst-case scenario for which we must plan. Our Strategy
and warfighting capabilities will continue to be gauged against the requirements of this
unlikely, but possible, occurrence.
At the same time, we must recognize that more probable challenges will face us at lower
levels of conflict. Regional conflicts, as well as non-state actions, such as international
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 2 7 7
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYING FORCES
THREATS TO U.S. AND ALLIED INTERESTS
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:32:59 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
terrorism and drug trafficking, will likely require U.S. military response. Capabilities to
deter and defend against a wide range of diverse challenges must be considered in
establishing priorities for the 1990’s.
[END OF NEW SECTION]
The Soviet Union poses the greatest challenge to the security of the United States. Tra-
ditionally a strong land power, over the past 20 years the Soviets have built a balanced
“blue water” naval force, capable of accomplishing a broad range of wartime and
peacetime tasks. Today the Soviet Union possesses the largest navy in the world. And it
continues to grow and modernize at a rate that surpasses all reasonable defensive
requirements.
As shown above, the Soviet Navy is organized into four fleets which provide wartime
defense-in-depth for the sea approaches to the USSR. In peacetime, the Soviet Navy
maintains a continuous out-of-area presence in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian
Ocean, the South Atlantic (off West Africa) and the South China Sea. They also deploy
to the Caribbean once or twice a year. Their peacetime operational posture and the
patrol areas of Soviet missile-firing submarines off the U.S. coasts are notionally repre-
sented above.
Soviet out-of-area naval operations support friendly regimes, expand their influence in
the Third World (especially in areas of Western sensitivity), balance or eliminate West-
ern presence, and expand foreign involvement.
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The Soviet peacetime maritime posture recruits surrogates. Soviet forward maritime
presence also enhances the perception of Moscow as an expanding power whose inter-
ests must be considered globally. Concurrently, Soviet intelligence and warning (I&W)
capabilities are strengthened through an expanded network of intelligence gathering,
early warning and support facilities.
Soviet naval forces deployed out-of-area could not by themselves influence the out-
come of a general war with the West, and they are not a significant factor in overall
Soviet general staff planning. They do, however, have a growing capability to compli-
cate U.S. military planning and to impede, disrupt, or delay Western military opera-
tions at the outset of war. Moreover, they constitute a day-to-day presence that has to
be considered in every aspect of U.S. defense planning.
Soviet naval forces are complemented by the more than 1700 globally deployed ocean-going
Soviet merchant ships. This is the most militarily adaptable merchant fleet in the world.
These merchant ships have access to virtually all the major world ports and can per-
form intelligence collection and a variety of other missions against Western security
interests.
The current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval wartime strategy is
the agreed upon, best estimate by the U.S. intelligence community. According to that
estimate, the Soviets believe war with the West would be global in scope. Although they
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believe there is the potential for a prolonged conventional phase, they state that nuclear
escalation is likely, because they believe NATO would escalate.
Accordingly, the premier elements of the Soviet military are strategic nuclear forces.
The Soviet Navy’s contribution to this strategic capability is its powerful ballistic mis-
sile nuclear submarine (SSBN) force. The main wartime task for the Soviet Navy, there-
fore, is to deploy this strategic offensive force and to protect it with general purpose
forces. The Soviets expect NATO to come after these submarines in a conventional
phase, just as they plan early conventional attacks on our nuclear capabilities during
the opening phase of conflict. Thus we see no evidence of a “use it or lose it’’ mentality
that means escalation automatically if their SSBNs are attrited!
Other initial tasks for general purpose forces include defending the maritime
approaches to the USSR from sea and air strikes—which includes attacking NATO’s
nuclear forces—support of ground force operations from seaward flanks, and interdic-
tion of the enemy’s sea lines of communications (SLOCs). The Soviet Navy’s strategic
offensive task, however, takes precedence over all other missions.
Soviet wartime operating areas include sea control areas ranging out to 1000 kilome-
ters and sea denial areas to 2000 kilometers from the Soviet homeland. Over the next
15 to 20 years, these areas will probably be extended to 3000 kilometers. The sea denial
areas already engulf most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and those of sev-
eral of our allies, as they extend far out into “blue water.” If secured by the Soviets, the
net result would sever our vital sea lines of communication and undercut our ability to
reinforce/resupply our allies worldwide.
The Soviet Navy has made great quantitative and qualitative strides in all warfare areas:
naval construction programs emphasize modern ships with increased endurance and
advanced weapons and electronic systems. The most significant improvement has been
in undersea warfare, where submarine quieting and sensor improvements have reduced
the acoustic advantage previously enjoyed by western navies. Soviet sea control capabil-
ity will be enhanced by new cruiser, destroyer, and frigate classes expected to join their
fleets between now and the year 2000. They are also building a new class of aircraft car-
rier which will eventually carry catapult-launched, high performance aircraft. Finally,
the introduction of more and better Backfire bombers and Fencer fighter-bombers will
increase the complexity of the maritime air battle.
U.S. Maritime Strategy must be sufficiently flexible to counter whatever strategy the
growing Soviet capabilities enable them to choose. If we focus solely on intentions,
however firmly grounded, and ignore enemy capabilities, the history of war tells us that
we would be inviting defeat. Thus, while our strategy is designed to counter the Soviet
strategy as we understand it, our force structure—which includes units that may
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remain in our inventory for 30 years or more—must be able to deal both with per-
ceived Soviet intentions and Soviet capabilities. Moreover, that same force structure has
to be capable of dealing with low intensity conflicts, which are not necessarily a lesser
included case of the Soviet problem.
The Maritime Strategy emphasizes our traditional and enduring strengths—sea power,
geography, and American leadership in technology.
The Soviets are a formidable foe. Several of their strengths are listed here. They have a
large force designed for combined arms operations. Their preferred tactics feature
deception, surprise and massive strikes.
But the Soviets are not invulnerable, and they have weaknesses that can be exploited. We
define sensitivities as those things about which the Soviets are especially concerned, and
vulnerabilities as the weaknesses that we perceive to be particularly troublesome to the
Soviets. Our objective is to exploit Soviet sensitivities and vulnerabilities in ways that
promote extended deterrence, even in crisis situations.
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This chart shows how maritime forces support U.S. interests across the conflict
spectrum.
The U.S. Navy routinely deploys about 100 ships in day-to-day operations around the
globe, and the Marine Corps approximately one third of its Fleet Marine Forces outside
of CONUS. These forces are at a high level of readiness, as demonstrated in recent
naval operations off Libya and in the Persian Gulf. The objectives of this peacetime
posture are to achieve deterrence, meet alliance and treaty commitments, support
national diplomatic objectives, and to be ready for the rapid response essential to meet
the requirements of our overall strategy.
The U.S. Navy peacetime posture is key to conventional deterrence. We see about 20 cate-
gories of commitments that require naval force on scene worldwide, 24 hours a day.
[THIS SECTION IS NEW] Also an essential element of naval peacetime posture is its
contribution to worldwide surveillance and intelligence collection. Forward-based
naval collection facilities, aircraft, ships and submarines provide critical coverage in
support of our national intelligence collection effort. [END OF NEW SECTION]
Our forward presence is a visible demonstration of U.S. political will that encourages
allies and friends, deters and reduces the influence of enemies, influences neutrals, and
asserts and reinforces the principles of international law and freedom of the seas.
Low intensity conflict (LIC) is a limited political-military confrontation to achieve
political, social, or economic objectives. It usually involves protracted struggles and
events ranging from diplomatic and economic pressures through terrorism and
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insurgency. Lower level conflict (LLC) includes combat at a level above LIC but short
of general war, generally involving regional conflict, normally in the Third World. Nei-
ther “low intensity” nor “lower level” translates to either “low tech” or “low violence.”
The general proliferation of high technology weapons world-wide means that the dif-
ference between naval forces designed to fight the Soviets and naval forces designed to
fight anyone else has narrowed significantly. Moreover, planning to deal with Third
World regional and low intensity conflicts underscores one of the most significant
geostrategic changes of the past few years—the decrease in American (and Western)
access to bases and overflight rights around the world. For example, the U.S. had bases
in about 100 countries right after World War II; today we have bases in fewer than 40.
And we see more problems on the horizon, with NATO countries and the Philippines
raising thorny base negotiation issues. All of this, in turn, will limit the U.S. options to
cope with Third World or terrorist threats with military means other than naval forces.
Throughout the conflict spectrum, a bedrock requirement of naval forces is strategic
deterrence. As the most survivable element of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad, the Navy
SSBN force provides that strategic deterrence that forms the backdrop for [SENTENCE
REWORDED] all other activity in support of our national security interests.
This slide shows the five key areas in which the fleet operates today. Hot spots are high-
lighted. These same areas are also key in wartime, that is, the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps train in peace where they must operate in war. The Soviet Navy, which also
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operates in these areas in peacetime, simply cannot sustain long term operations there
in war.
Continuing naval presence is maintained in the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, the
Northeast Atlantic, North Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Those are regions
where the U.S. Government has determined it needs forces to protect its interests. Due
to political constraints affecting the use of land-based forces, in many areas naval forces
are the only forces that can conduct these missions. Roughly one third of the fleet with
over 110 thousand sailors and 30 thousand marines are either at sea or forward-based
on the average day. Our global commitments and alliance responsibilities result in
increased demands for naval forward presence, particularly in developing world areas.
The Navy and Marine Corps do not generate these commitments, they execute them.
Another element of the Maritime Strategy in peacetime involves global employment of
naval forces in military exercises. Dozens are conducted each year, enabling U.S. naval units
to operate with sister services and allied forces to update joint and combined tactics and
procedures. This chart depicts only a few of the more important scheduled exercises.
These exercises provide the U.S. and its allies the opportunity to evaluate current tac-
tics and doctrine. They strengthen alliance cohesion, enhance interoperability, and
improve combat effectiveness. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] In addition, these vigorous
demonstrations of the credibility of our naval capability is possibly our greatest deter-
rent to potential adversaries. [END OF NEW SECTION]
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Contingency response is a major role for U.S. naval forces. Due to their flexible force
structure and forward posture, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces have been used
more frequently in this role than those of any other service. In so many crises in recent
years, the first question asked was, “Where are the carriers?” During contingency oper-
ations, forward-deployed naval forces fulfill the dual missions of sustaining the U.S.
deterrent posture and supporting national policy objectives. They provide flexible mili-
tary options to the NCA. Naval carrier battle groups and amphibious forces have long
served as the primary instruments of national contingency response policy. The unique
characteristics of these forces provide leverage to control escalation, often under diffi-
cult circumstances. This use affords the NCA unmatched military options to counter
any perceived Soviet encroachment aims and similarly, to counter and respond to state-
sponsored terrorism. Naval forces are often employed in crisis in conjunction with
other U.S. services, and to a lesser extent with allied forces, usually outside the normal
alliance framework. The recent setup in the Persian Gulf, in which our NATO allies
made major force commitments well beyond the NATO boundaries, is a good example.
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This chart shows some of the over 200 crises in which U.S. naval forces have been
involved since World War II. The majority of these crises have occurred in the Middle
East (including the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf), Western Pacific, and Caribbean/Central
American regions. Third World regional and low intensity conflicts are likely to con-
tinue. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] The special characteristics of naval forces make them
uniquely well-suited to protect U.S. interests in this lower range of the conflict spec-
trum. [END OF NEW SECTION] Naval contributions to these lower level and low
intensity conflicts aim to reduce Soviet influence, discourage terrorism, provide effec-
tive counter-strategies to drug trafficking and insurgencies, and promote favorable eco-
nomic growth conditions in the Third World. Forward, ready and mobile, U.S. naval
forces provide a broad range of options for the NCA. These forces, operating without
restriction in international waters, are able to demonstrate U.S. and/or alliance com-
mitment and display military power without the political problems of violating territo-
rial sovereignty. The global disposition and characteristics of naval forces in peacetime
allow timely response with the right level of force to match whatever requirements our
NCA might have.
[THIS SECTION (INCLUDING FIGURES) IS NEW]
Highly versatile, mobile naval forces operating routinely in forward deployment areas
can adopt a wide range of military profiles in support of diplomatic initiatives. The
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broad spectrum of discriminate force employment options they offer are uniquely
suited to match NCA requirements across the lower levels of conflict.
These capabilities extend from providing military presence, forward surveillance opera-
tions and demonstrating a show of military force to the evacuation of noncombatant
civilians and the conduct of other humanitarian support operations. When required,
naval forces can also establish sea-based quarantine or blockade operations or conduct
power projection missions ashore through use of naval gunfire, cruise missiles, air
strikes, or expeditionary forces.
Capability improvements in naval weaponry and battle force management enable the
NCA to direct naval forces to achieve local air superiority, suppress defenses and con-
duct either coastal raids or deep penetration air and cruise missile attack missions vir-
tually anywhere in the world in support of vital U.S. interests. A particular strength in
using maritime forces for such purposes is the ability to rapidly constitute the required
forces in a forward area and maintain the perceived threat of direct military action for
an extended period of time. This can be done with minimal impact on friendly host
nations for support. Most significantly, maritime forces can be withdrawn unilaterally
when that serves national policy objectives, without incurring heavy political costs
associated with other primarily land-based force options.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 2 8 7
REPRESENTATIVE MARITIME POWER PROJECTION OPTIONS
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:06 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Finally, along the conflict spectrum, the strategy articulates the key roles played by
Navy and Marine Corps forces in the event of serious confrontation or global war with
the Soviet Union. Although deterrence remains the foremost objective, should deter-
rence fail, maritime forces must be capable and ready to fight successfully and defeat
the enemy. Once hostilities have commenced, deterrence of unintentional nuclear use
during a conventional conflict remains a prime objective, while seeking early and favor-
able war termination.
[END OF NEW SECTION]
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Conceptually, in a confrontation or war with the Soviets, one can envision events
unfolding in three general phases. Phase I can be considered as a period of rising ten-
sions. Operations during Phase I would be conducted for the primary purpose of
deterrence. The objective in Phase I is to control escalation of a crisis and to deter the
outbreak of hostilities.
If deterrence fails, we believe the Soviets would initiate hostilities, which would signal
entry into Phase II. During this phase U.S. and allied maritime forces would seize the
initiative. The objective during Phase II is to establish maritime superiority in key
ocean areas through the conduct of naval campaigns.
In Phase III, maritime forces would take the fight to the enemy. The objective of Phase
III operations is war termination on favorable terms as soon as possible.
There are no timelines associated with the three notional phases: they simply describe
the general direction in which the Navy and Marine Corps senior leadership think we
should go. We have no timetable; actual wartime decisions and phasing of operations
would be determined by warfighting commanders.
Phase I deals with reinforcing deterrence and contains options while simultaneously
addressing transition-to-war actions.
A period of rapidly rising tensions would be marked by considerable ambiguity.
Although indications and warning (I&W) centers would probably send copious
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information on global Soviet force movements, there would be disagreement on how to
interpret them. Naval forces are ideal for such uncertain conditions—they can rapidly
be sent forward in number without crossing any borders, and they can be withdrawn
just as fast and as easily.
In this phase we would expect Soviet naval forces to sortie into their sea control and sea
denial areas. They could also reinforce their Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and/or
South China Sea forces, particularly with submarines. We would detect such move-
ments fairly early, and expect about two weeks warning before the Soviets would be
fully ready to conduct initial worldwide attacks.
Soviet aviation strike forces would redeploy to dispersal bases, and the Black and Baltic
Sea fleets and the four other Warsaw Pact navies would prepare to support joint opera-
tions ashore. The Soviet merchant fleet would chop to naval control to provide intelli-
gence, lift, and other functions as directed. The Soviets, in short, would posture their
forces for global war.
During Phase I, we envision one or more crises, a serious confrontation between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union, or an escalation of low intensity conflict involving U.S. or
Soviet forces. Deterrence goals are listed on the left, while actions to transition to war
are shown on the right. This phase might very well be the final phase, effective responses
might be able to defuse a crisis or prevent a limited war from spreading.
Tough decisions will have to be made during Phase I. Even a 600 ship navy is not suffi-
cient to accomplish every required wartime task simultaneously, so we will be forced to
conduct key operations sequentially. This means that during Phase I, the U.S. must





Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:09 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
decide which of our allies will have the greatest need for early support, and position
forces accordingly. Some tradeoffs are inevitable.
Timely political decision-making will be crucial. The NCA must act decisively to ensure
no vital areas are ceded by default, probably under very ambiguous warning. Without
political speed and decisiveness, all possible military and political incentives cannot be
brought to bear to control the crisis. Key actions during Phase I will include:
• Early forward movement of naval and air forces.
• Increased combat readiness, mobilized reserve forces.
• Enforcement of U.S. maritime defense zones.
• Requisition of civilian airlift and sealift assets.
• Early reinforcement by ground forces and land-based tactical air.
• Expansion of advanced logistic support, with activation of host nation support
agreements.
• Maximum I & W/countersurveillance/countertargeting.
• Conduct of other deterrent options.
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Alliance solidarity, enhanced by such actions, is also vital to their effectiveness, and will
yield the maximum political and military leverage to forestall U.S./Soviet conflict.
In Phase I there would be a global forward movement of Navy and Marine Corps forces, a
complex and demanding operation. Some of our SSNs would challenge Soviet sea control
and sea denial zones, thereby placing Soviet naval forces, including SSBNs, at risk. Forward
deployed battle groups and surge forces from U.S. ports would form into multi-carrier bat-
tle forces. Battleship and surface action groups, amphibious task forces, land-based mari-
time patrol aircraft and special warfare units would intensify surveillance, increase
readiness, and execute other deterrent options in support of the balanced fleet. Maritime
defense zones would be activated, with the Coast Guard transferred to the Navy, for coastal
defense duties and protection of coastal SLOCs and ports. Forces would be positioned by
the CINCs in readiness to execute forward mining and mine-countermeasure plans. While
forward deployed amphibious task groups would increase their readiness, air-landed ele-
ments of Marine expeditionary brigades would begin moving to join pre-positioned equip-
ment [THIS SECTION IS NEW] aboard Maritime Pre-positioning Ships or stored ashore.
[END OF NEW SECTION] Sealift would be assembled to start moving components of all
Services to carry out the warfighting CINCs’ reinforcement plans.
The surge in maritime deployments would underpin the full range of our deterrent
options. Again, the purpose of this global forward movement would be to strengthen
deterrence, but if deterrence should fail, forward naval forces can rapidly shift to a
warfighting posture.
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U.S. Army and Air Force units, as well as allied land, sea and air forces, would also
begin moving. U.S. reinforcements and their allied counterparts would move by airlift
and sealift to join units already forward deployed, in accordance with U.S. and allied
war plans. While the primary focus will be on reinforcement of NATO in Europe, plan-
ning to support a surge of ground and air forces underpins the forward defense con-
cept in all theaters, commensurate with the potential threat projections.
As shown, an essential pre-condition for this movement is the recall and requisition of
U.S. and allied merchant shipping, which is normally dispersed world-wide in com-
mercial trade. Availability of this shipping pool is an absolute requirement for the rein-
forcement of forward deployed units—approximately 95 percent of reinforcement
material must travel by sealift. The time required to assemble these merchant ships in
the proper ports of embarkation also drives the need for timely political decision-
making.
On a worldwide basis, ASW tracking would intensify and readiness could be increased.
The result of all the reinforcements and forward movement, simultaneously converging
at strategic locations and providing mutual combined arms support, would create
strong, focused leverage to control crises. However, should these deterrent actions prove
insufficient, the resultant movements of U.S. and allied forces during this phase would
also lead to full preparedness for coalition defense.
This chart shows some illustrative times involved in moving forces into position, and
highlights the importance, as has been emphasized, of timely political decisions. The
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Panama and Suez canals are important factors in Phase I operations, because their use
substantially reduces closure times. The ability to achieve a strong forward posture any-
where on the globe, by employing both forward-deployed and surge maritime forces,
provides unmatched crisis response and escalation dominance capabilities. [THIS SEC-
TION IS NEW] The key to success during Phase I is readiness: readiness of naval forces
to move forward quickly on short notice. [END OF NEW SECTION]
Naval combat operations cannot be sustained at great distances without support from
both mobile and shore-based forward logistics forces. Such support is essential in all
three phases of the strategy. The logistical components depicted show the notional
requirements needed to support high tempo operations.
Afloat logistics support consists of navy combat logistics forces, supported by strategic
(or inter-theater) air and sealift and by intra-theater lift—shuttle shipping and COD/
VOD aircraft. These afloat logistics forces, just like naval power projection forces, can,
if necessary, operate largely independent of peacetime ports of entry, shore bases, and
inland lines of communications such as railroads and highways. As U.S. access to over-
seas bases continues to diminish, the self-sustainability of naval logistics support for
seabasing becomes increasingly important.
2 9 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
PHASE I
DETERRENCE/TRANSITION TO WAR
FORWARD LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO NAVAL FORCES
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:19 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Ashore, advanced logistic support bases and forward logistics sites in theater provide res-
ervoirs of critical commodities, staging and transhipment facilities, and repair and
maintenance capabilities. Wartime host nation support agreements would be activated
worldwide for support such as medical care and repair facilities. A large percentage of
the personnel who would operate this forward logistics infrastructure are comprised of
naval reserve units. These would be among the first reservists called to active duty by
the President.
The war at sea cannot be isolated from the land battle. This chart shows the likely Soviet
initial combined arms attack posture in global war. While the primary Soviet thrust
would likely be in Central Europe, attacks could also occur elsewhere on the Soviet
periphery, such as attempts to seize Northern Norway, Iran, the Turkish Straits, or
Northern Italy. The Soviets may also attempt to attack/seize Iceland to deny Western use
or extend their own air defense umbrella.
The Pacific Basin is the one region in which major change in the world balance of
power will occur in the next 20–30 years. As a result, Soviet planners face in the Pacific
a more complex strategic problem than anywhere else in the world. The Soviets must
deal with other major powers, namely, the United States, Japan, PRC, and South Korea.
The relatively few, widely separated, key Soviet facilities in the Far East are more
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vulnerable to attack and less survivable than is the case in European Russia. In the Far
East, there exists no buffer zone comparable to Eastern Europe.
Japan and South Korea can contribute to denying the Soviets control of the Sea of
Japan and naval egress to the Pacific Basin. This factor, coupled with the prospect of
direct attack by very capable U.S. maritime and air forces from additional threat axes,
must be factored into Soviet planning. Another uncertainty is the potential threat of
nuclear-capable and manpower-intensive Chinese military forces.
In the event of war, the Soviets would attack U.S. forces in the Pacific while simulta-
neously pressuring the Japanese and South Koreans to deny U.S. use of naval and air
facilities. If this were unsuccessful, they would probably attack these facilities, initially
by air. Other possible Soviet attacks could be conducted against U.S. facilities in the
Philippines and in Alaska (Aleutians). The Soviets would not seek to provoke the Chi-
nese into entering the war against them, but could not afford to discount that factor in
determining wartime force reallocation decisions.
The objective in Phase II is to seize the initiative, with the overall goal of establishing
forward maritime superiority.
The strategy’s priority actions then would be to counter all attacks on friendly forces,
destroy enemy forces, and to protect vital U.S. and allied sea lines of communications
(SLOCs) by establishing sea control as far forward as possible. This is a critical prereq-
uisite to ensuring that forward deployed forces receive required reinforcement and
resupply. Throughout this period naval forces would improve their positioning, thereby
achieving a forward posture for Phase III.
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Phase II would focus on strengthening nuclear deterrence, through efforts aimed at bol-
stering our flexible response capability, to which dual-capable (nuclear) naval assets
make an important contribution. This is interlinked with the mission task of achieving
forward sea control in those water areas where forward-positioned naval forces also
offer the CINCs potent options for power projection. Achievement of forward sea con-
trol using this approach also permits us to continue strategic sealift and reinforcement,
which began in Phase I.
Aggressive maritime operations as part of theater naval campaigns in Phase II contrib-
ute directly to alliance cohesion by demonstrating U.S. commitment to alliance defense
in forward maritime areas, including key waters linking our allies, which might other-
wise be effectively ceded to Soviet control.
The same maritime operations will contribute to allied air and land campaigns by
complicating Soviet decision making, assuring vital supplies and reinforcements can
readily flow to the NATO Central Front and other land campaigns, and by strengthen-
ing the ability of alliance forces in key flank areas to mount a sustained defense. The
combined effects of forward maritime operations in Phase II would generate strategic
leverage by demonstrating to the Soviets that the war could not be confined simply to a
preferred single theater of operations.
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Sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are critical throughout Phase II. Sealift from
CONUS is essential to success. Over 95% of the American reinforcement and resupply
dry cargo and 99% of petroleum resupply must go by sea. Additionally, the oil SLOCs
would remain important for long-term prosecution of any war, especially by our allies.
Conduct of forward ASW and AAW is axiomatic to successful sea control. Ceding the initia-
tive at sea to the Soviet Union, thereby enabling them to choose the times and places of
engagement, would spell disaster for numerically inferior Western forces. Ultimate control
of the transatlantic SLOCs, for instance, will be determined in the Norwegian Sea. As
USCINCLANT/SACLANT told NATO and the U.S. Congress in 1987, if we fight the next
“Battle of the Atlantic” in the Atlantic, we may lose that battle. If we lose the Atlantic—and
its SLOCs —we will ultimately lose the land war in Europe.
The destruction of the Soviet submarine fleet is fundamental. A coordinated ASW
effort is a complex undertaking, involving a wide variety of platforms, weapons sys-
tems, and tactics—all properly the purview of the responsible CINCs. In general, for-
ward and barrier ASW operations would have as their goal the destruction of Soviet
submarines which could break out to attack U.S. reinforcement and resupply shipping.
Similarly, key goals of the carrier battle forces would be to provide the necessary air
umbrella for surface and air ASW forces to form combined arms units with our submarines
well forward, and to support the land campaign early. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] Marine
Corps land-based aviation will support coordinated fleet defense as necessary. Marine avia-
tion command and control assets can be used to integrate maritime and land-based
TACAIR, thus adding depth to the maritime battlefield. [NEW SECTION ENDS HERE]
Land-based joint and combined force tactical aircraft could complement these efforts to a
degree, but that would depend on the flow of the land battle. Concurrent maritime opera-
tions in various theaters would present the Soviet leadership with competing demands for
commitment of forces. These demands may disrupt timelines for preplanned use of
reserves or alter previously intended theater priorities.
The success of U.S. and allied maritime forces in achieving forward sea control and assur-
ing safe transit for strategic sealift would help maintain alliance cohesion. As an example,
early introduction of the air-landed MEB in Norway and carrier air power can make the
difference between winning and losing the defensive campaign in North Norway.
Early U.S. and allied maritime successes may also help influence decisions in neutral
states, as well as effectively deny the use of global sea lines of communication to the
Soviet Union. This latter effort would restrict or forestall many Soviet actions which
would otherwise be underwritten by the wide-ranging Soviet merchant marine and
fishing fleets that increasingly dominate global shipping and trade patterns.
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As a result of attrition, and the improving position of U.S. and allied maritime forces,
Soviet options will have been diminished and the combat stability of their forces
threatened. Therefore, their willingness to continue the war may be subject to internal
reevaluation. U.S. and allied maritime forces would now be in position, to provide sus-
tained power projection according to the directions of the NCA and the CINCs.
A critical objective is to afford the CINCs the means to exploit potent conventional
capabilities through the leveraged use of dual-capable CVBGs, BBBGs and SSNs, along
with Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and special warfare units. These mari-
time operations would provide critical defensive capabilities to Pacific and NATO flank
allies, responsive military options for neutralizing threats from Soviet surrogate or cli-
ent states, and build on sea control–related efforts to effectively raise the nuclear
threshold. Taken as a whole, maritime forces provide the means to begin controlling
the pace and timing of military campaigns at the times and places of our choosing.
The objective in Phase III is to carry the fight to the enemy. Priority actions would
include keeping the initiative seized during Phase II operations, destroying Soviet
forces, and retaining or regaining allied territory. The SLOCs must be kept open for
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reinforcement and resupply while maritime forces increase their support of land and
air campaigns. Finally, Phase III operations must continue emphasis on raising the
nuclear threshold, thereby discouraging the Soviets from escalating to the use of
nuclear weapons.
3 0 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
PHASE III
“CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY”
PHASE III




Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:27 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Operations during Phase III could be employed at key locations along the Eurasian
landmass to increase strategic leverage as the long-term correlation of forces gradually
tilts to the West.
Maritime contributions to war termination leverage stem from several Phase III results.
The first is thwarting Soviet desires for short war: naval power provides a means of
fighting a protracted conventional war, in which the Soviets are explicitly denied their
preferred strategy of a single-theater conflict. The strategy amputates Soviet global
reach, thus reducing their threat options against the U.S. and its allies, while simulta-
neously enforcing the isolation of client states from their Soviet support. In the event
of a protracted non-nuclear war, forward sea control, which will enable full access to
global markets and materials using secure sea lines of communications, can be the
means for victory.
Although maritime capability underwrites a credible conventional warfighting strategy,
the nuclear weapons of the U.S. Navy also play an important role in nuclear deterrence.
The U.S. SSBN force is the linchpin of deterrence and stability. Our SSBN force when at
sea is the most survivable and cost-effective leg of the triad and will remain so. Fifty per-
cent of our national on-line strategic nuclear warheads are at sea, with the cost of these
warheads comprising only one-fourth of the DOD defense budget allocated for strate-
gic assets. The existence of a secure U.S. strategic nuclear strike force capable of threat-
ening key Soviet military, industrial, and leadership targets deters nuclear war, impedes
Soviet incentives to continue a nuclear conflict once begun, and provides strong mili-
tary leverage for war termination. With a START agreement, remaining nuclear forces
must meet the criteria of cost-effectiveness, survivability, flexibility, mobility, respon-
siveness and hard target kill capability. The SSBN force satisfies all of these
requirements.
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The contribution of U.S. maritime forces to NATO’s nuclear deterrent posture will
become increasingly vital in a post-INF threat environment. Carrier-based, dual-
capable tactical aircraft, ballistic missile submarines and sea-launched cruise missile–
capable surface combatants and submarines, which are not included in the INF treaty,
remain available for employment in NATO’s strategy of “flexible response.” Not tied to
garrisons ashore or subject to host government approval to operate from overseas
bases, naval forces are highly leveraged for alliance support while remaining free to
respond quickly and unilaterally to crises that threaten NATO or U.S. national interests.
The key value of the Navy in theater nuclear war lies in its ability to mount credible nuclear
land strikes from the sea—principally through available CV aircraft nuclear striking power
and from TOMAHAWK land attack nuclear cruise missiles (TLAM/N). If theater nuclear
war is initiated on land, dual-capable naval forces positioned on the Soviet flanks are
available forward to strike enemy targets in support of the land battle. Deterrence is there-
fore strengthened by forward employment of our survivable, flexible theater strike forces
because additional uncertainty is forced into Soviet planning—sea-based nuclear weap-
ons can be considered to be the ultimate mobile system.
Soviet writings, exercises and doctrine show that they do not intend to initiate nuclear
war at sea unless nuclear war already has been initiated on land. If they chose to do so,
our alerted, dispersed and mobile naval theater nuclear warfare forces are extremely
difficult to locate and attack. Soviet attempts could widen usage—hence escalation,
because our sea based forces could strike new targets deep in the Soviet Union from
multiple axes. This prospect of more U.S. nuclear counterattacks ashore is the prospect
which concerns them most. Hence, the threat of sea-based nuclear strike operations
can favorably influence the land battle as well as provide additional incentive to keep a
nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union limited.
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No strategy can address all of the unknowns that comprise the fog of war. However, we
have considered five broad areas of uncertainty.
We assume approximately two weeks of warning time and a transition to global war.
Difficult decisions will have to be made in an environment replete with uncertainty
and ambiguity. In such a situation, the timeliness and decisiveness of political decisions
will be a major concern. Early forward positioning of naval forces can reinforce deter-
rence and signal firm commitment in the absence of full alliance political consensus.
The unpredictability of the Soviets is another uncertainty. Questions include their reac-
tions to precursor crises, the role their surrogates might play, use of nuclear weapons,
and an early flush of their naval forces into the open ocean. National intelligence esti-
mates conclude that the Soviets will adopt an echelon defense strategy while still main-
taining some out-of-area forces. The Maritime Strategy shows how one could limit the
options available to the Soviets by moving our forces forward early, which would be a
powerful disincentive to initially flushing large numbers of their forces into the open
ocean.
The Maritime Strategy addresses, predominantly, conventional war with the Soviet
Union because it seeks to offer non-nuclear alternatives and avoid escalation to nuclear
war. The areas of uncertainty include the question of whether NATO can or will, in
fact, sustain a conventional war of long duration; whether Soviet technological
advances (e.g., improved submarine quieting) will result in modification or replace-
ment of the bastion concept, and what effects the major change in the balance of power
among the Soviets and the U.S., the PRC, Japan, and South Korea will have on the out-
come of conflict in the Pacific theater.
How will the war be terminated? The duration of conflict, character of military opera-
tions during negotiations, and the transition from fighting to the “new peace” all
remain areas of uncertainty. The nature of any post-war environment is inherently
uncertain. The assumption is that whatever the outcome of a land campaign in NATO
Europe, the United States will endeavor to remain the dominant politico-military force
in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.
Finally, the world is changing rapidly, with major trends emerging which will alter the
future global security environment. An overall smaller U.S. military force structure
may be dictated due to fiscal realities. At the same time, the security demands for U.S.
forward presence and capability worldwide will increase, despite declining access to
overseas bases. Additionally, U.S. involvement in Third World and regional conflicts
will likely increase in the future. The Maritime Strategy recognizes these emerging
trends and will continue to evolve in this changing world. The flexibility, mobility and
versatility of maritime forces will continue to provide multiple options against diverse
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threats. Forward deployed naval forces, capable of applying discriminate force on a
global scale, bolster deterrence and reinforce our various commitments worldwide,
thereby enhancing global stability.
U.S. defense planning has centered for many years on a foundation of these three ele-
ments: nuclear deterrence, forward deployment of U.S. forces, and alliances with key
nations around the globe.
Two general planning scenarios have tended to dominate U.S. notions about the kind
of war we should plan to fight—as well as ideas about force structure development.
These scenarios focus primarily on:
• A massive, bolt-from-the-blue Soviet nuclear attack against many targets overseas
and in the U.S., and
• A massive conventional Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe.
These two scenarios, no matter how they are refined or repackaged, do not adequately
take into account a world in which nuclear weapons are becoming relatively less and
less a factor in Soviet decision making and in which high technology weaponry is pro-
liferating in a more regionally volatile world. Simply put, the two “worst case” scenarios
listed above have led to a disproportionate focus on NATO’s Central Front. They have
fostered neglect of NATO’s flanks as well as critical areas outside of NATO. These
areas—in particular, the Pacific Basin, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—will
loom even larger in the future U.S. security environment.
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The basic national strategy of forward-deployed forces, backed by strong reserves and
maintenance of a credible nuclear threat to protect our allies will remain valid. But, a
long range strategy must take into account the realities of changing conditions and
threats.
Major trends emerging to alter the future security environment will change some of the
fundamental assumptions upon which our national military structure has been devel-
oped. These trends include:
• A major shift in balance of economic power, as Asian economic growth rates
continue to outpace all others. And we know economic strength underpins military
strength.
• As a result of virtual equivalence in nuclear capabilities, a form of nuclear gridlock
has evolved which has decreased the credibility of nuclear weapons. All trends
indicate, however, that such weapons, along with high tech accurate ordnance and
chemical weapons, will spread in the Third World.
• U.S. involvement in the more likely Third World and regional conflict scenarios is
likely to grow, resulting in increased diversion of U.S. security efforts and resources.
• A reduced sense of threat, especially in Europe, is likely, where “glasnost” has been
most effective in reviving a spirit of detente. A weakening of military commitment
and vigilance in the Western alliance could result.
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• It has become increasingly apparent that Soviet ocean policy and arms control
proposals seek to limit the capability and mobility of U.S./NATO maritime forces.
These proposals aim at maintaining Soviet military advantages in ground forces
while negating NATO’s maritime edge and eliminating U.S. forward presence,
particularly in the Northern European region.
• Geopolitical realities will increasingly foreclose the overseas basing infrastructure
from which U.S. land and air forces operate, and
• Finally, fiscal constraints will beset U.S. and NATO defense budgets, in particular,
which will reinforce the imperative for a military force structure that is flexible and
capable of performing a variety of missions.
These changes and emergent challenges in the security environment will have enor-
mous impact on basic American military strategy. The changing balance of world
power will mean that the Pacific will compete increasingly for U.S. commitments—
while at the same time the U.S. must be concerned that there is no erosion of our cou-
pling to NATO. Instability and conflict in the Third World will require greater U.S.
involvement—while the declining access to overseas basing could, in general, force
greater limits on our range of options for land based force projection. The result is that
maritime forces may increasingly be called upon to ensure regional stability and pro-
tect U.S. worldwide interests.
The emerging security environment and U.S. strategic objectives have profound
implications for U.S. defense planning. U.S. strategic objectives will continue to
encompass the following:
• Deter war, and should deterrence fail, fight as far forward as possible.
• Foster robust alliances to preserve Western political identity and institutions,
maintain international stability, and prevent hostile domination of vital areas.
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• NUCLEAR DETERRENCE REMAINS A BEDROCK REQUIREMENT
• MUST MAINTAIN WORLDWIDE LINKS TO ALLIES
• ENHANCED ALLIED SUPPORT/CAPABILITIES ESSENTIAL
• MUST EXPAND HORIZONS OF NATO AND PACIFIC ALLIES
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• Maintain maritime superiority in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic Basin and
ensure the continued economic health of that region is protected.
• Ensure global stability, especially in cases where Third World conflicts affect
Western interests.
Key defense implications are as follows:
It remains essential that deterrence of a U.S. (NATO)/Soviet (Warsaw Pact) conflict
remains intact. Indeed, as we pursue the nuclear reductions intended by the INF treaty
and START negotiations (50 percent reduction in ICBMs/SLBMs), the importance of
survivable nuclear capability increases to help offset conventional force imbalances and
to foreclose the possibility of nuclear blackmail by the Soviets or anyone else.
This imperative must be met in the face of declining access to overseas bases and over-
flight rights. The U.S. must maintain secure links to allies worldwide in order to deal
with the defense realities of increasing economic interdependency (particularly in the
Pacific) and to reinforce/resupply smaller sized U.S. ground and air forces overseas
when required. Enhanced allied support and capabilities will be essential to ensure
coalition capabilities are not diminished, particularly in an era of increasing fiscal con-
straints. The U.S. must persuade our NATO and Pacific allies to confront changes in the
global security environment from a unified alliance perspective. The fact is that events
outside the geopolitical “boundaries” of NATO (e.g., in Southwest Asia and the Pacific
Basin) can have direct and dramatic impact on the alliance.
Finally, these defense implications should emphasize the requirement for a U.S. force
structure that is more mobile, flexible and interoperable. The capability for the world-
wide employment of joint forces, often on very short notice in the face of ambiguous
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warning, is a firmly established requirement. It has been reconfirmed by each of the
United States’ most recent uses of military force [THIS SECTION IS NEW] and must
not be allowed to atrophy. [END OF NEW SECTION]
The world environment will continue to undergo change—global military and eco-
nomic power shifts will be increasingly affected by economic and social factors, partic-
ularly those emanating from the Third World. The strategic concepts embodied within
the Maritime Strategy will remain valid for U.S. National Security Strategy within this
complex global arena. Maritime forces are uniquely suited to provide the flexible
options needed by U.S. security interests.
In peacetime, crisis, and war, the Maritime Strategy provides a design for deterrence. It
describes the Navy’s view of how best to deploy the maritime forces that we have, using
their unique abilities to confront potential aggressors with a broad range of options for
military action at the conventional level. At the same time, the strategy recognizes the
continuing requirement to assure flexible response across the conflict spectrum,
including deployment of survivable, enduring nuclear forces at sea. The flexible strate-
gic design to employ forces across a broad scope in geography, time, and intensity,
inherently complicates the Soviet strategic problem. Maritime forces offer a means to
preserve U.S. linkage with strong NATO defenses as we simultaneously contend with
the demands of diverse national commitments throughout the world.
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Maritime Strategy for the 1990s
This article appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings on 1 May 1990,* just two
months before Admiral Carlisle Trost retired as Chief of Naval Operations. This was the
last important official public statement about the Maritime Strategy, and it reflected
both the recent revisions to the classified versions of the strategy (see document 7) and
the first reactions to the changes in the world order.
At the time, the Soviet Union was pushing the United States for agreements on naval
arms control, but American officials had varying reactions to this. Secretary of Defense
Richard Cheney in the new administration of President George Bush still saw the Soviets
as the enemy, while the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, saw
them no longer as the major threat they had been. By this time, it was clear that Con-
gress would not fund the plans for the six-hundred-ship navy. At the same time, the
Marine Corps had turned away from the world-war scenario, and the Commandant,
General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., seeking more autonomy and equality for the Marine Corps
within the Department of the Navy, had moved the Marine Corps to thinking about
third-world contingencies rather than general war.
Admiral Trost had this article prepared for his signature as a reaction to growing public
pressure for a “peace dividend” that some thought should be found in cutting the Navy’s
existing force structure. Significantly, this article was written after Admiral Trost had
become the first U.S. Chief of Naval Operations to visit and to lecture in the Soviet
Union, in October 1989. In this May 1990 article Trost was attempting to reach those
who neither fully understood nor appreciated the U.S. Navy’s continuing roles and mis-
sions as an instrument for international stability and crisis control, even when the Soviet
threat was declining, the Berlin Wall was down, and the Warsaw Pact was beginning to
collapse. As Trost explained, “I was determined to maintain our posture at a level which













* Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost, U.S. Navy, “Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,” U.S. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings (May 1990), pp. 92–100.
† Adm. C. A. H. Trost, letter to Hattendorf, 2 September 2007.
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As with his previous Naval Institute Proceedings article in 1987, Admiral Trost provided
an outline and verbal instructions to the CNO Executive Panel staff (OP-00K), then
headed by Captain Michael McDevitt, who served as its director from September 1988 to
February 1990, and Captain James R. Stark, who was director from February 1990 to
May 1992.* This article was drafted at the CNO Executive Panel by staff officers who,
among other duties, had also prepared Trost’s annual posture statements and policy and
strategy papers.† By the time this article appeared, the available unclassified literature on
the Maritime Strategy was already quite widespread. 
We have all seen the images in the news media in recent months. They remind us that
the world is a constantly changing place. The U.S. Navy must change with it but guard
against changing too quickly.
Each week Eastern Europe seems to experience changes that just a year ago would have
been only distant hopes for the future: the democratization of previously totalitarian
regimes, the opening of the Berlin Wall, the new openness in international communi-
cations, the emergence of independent political parties, and the new tack in Soviet for-
eign and domestic policy. In addition, an emerging spirit of cooperation between East
and West offers the greatest opportunity to move beyond the Cold War since it began.
We have witnessed a declining perception of the Soviet threat, both at home and
among our allies, adding to the already strong desire to reduce the defense budget. We
cannot, however, afford to react precipitously to the euphoria that these events inspire.
We cannot forget that the United States faces a very real threat from regional conflicts,
international terrorism, narcotics, and a variety of other challenges that fall outside the
scope of the U.S.-Soviet balance.
Clearly, the nature of our political and military environment is changing, and we need
to examine closely how we will proceed as the United States moves into the 1990s.
From a naval perspective, one of the most important aspects of this examination is the
degree to which the Maritime Strategy will remain valid as a key component of our
national military strategy in a security environment shaped by continuing changes
overseas.
Although the Maritime Strategy has become a major topic of public discussion only in
the past few years, its origins predate the Cold War. While most notably associated with
a strategy for global war with the Soviet Union, the Maritime Strategy is designed to
support the entire spectrum of actions needed to represent U.S. global interests as a
maritime nation and a world superpower.
3 1 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Swartz, dated August 2008.
† Trost, letter to Hattendorf.
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Accelerating Events, Enduring Principles: The Maritime Strategy is a concept of opera-
tions rather than a war plan. It is based upon three broad principles governing the
global employment of naval forces.
The first of these is deterrence. We want to convince any potential adversary that an
attack on the United States or our allies would result in unacceptable consequences for
the aggressor. This requires a strategic nuclear force, the capability to defend ourselves
in a global conventional war, and a crisis-response capability to deal with lower levels
of conflict that are localized or regional in nature.
Second is the principle of forward defense. It enhances deterrence by ensuring that
naval forces are in a position to respond to crises quickly, and it maximizes our
response options should deterrence fail. Many of our allies and trading partners are
located on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. If the United States is to participate
effectively in the mutual defense of our own interests and those of our allies, it is
imperative that we have forces deployed in the regions where those interests lie.
Third, the strategy rests firmly upon a network of alliances. Since World War II, the
United States has established agreements with more than 40 countries—in Europe and
in the Pacific—to provide mutual security. By defending our allies we defend ourselves.
Each individual nation benefits from the combined strength of all the alliance partners.
Keeping a Watchful Eye . . . : Arguing for a strong defense in the face of the destruction
of the Berlin Wall can seem like shouting into a strong wind. Yet the thawing of the
Cold War has been accompanied by other more sobering and tragic events such as the
Tiananmen Square massacre; the murder of Marine Lieutenant Colonel William R.
Higgins; the drug war; attempts to overthrow democratic governments and the demo-
cratic process in the Philippines, Panama, Colombia, and El Salvador; and continued
attacks by terrorists around the world. As we plan for the future, we need to consider
all aspects of the global political and economic environment.
Despite all the changes we see around us, certain facts endure. The United States is
essentially an island nation. It is the leader of a global maritime coalition for an array
of allies, trading partners, and political interests across the oceans. Global economic
interdependence is a fact of life. The majority of our trade routes, our economic and
political lifelines, are oceanic. Over 70% of our total trade by value and 99.7% of our
overseas export and import tonnage move by sea. Our economic well-being has been
made possible by and depends upon political stability.
Maintaining our maritime alliances will be increasingly important as power and influ-
ence become more diffuse globally. In the 1990s, the two superpowers will remain the
first among equals, but they will not be as dominant as they have been. Political and
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economic power will be more broadly distributed in the world, and existing alliance
systems will become more political than military in their orientation.
Low-intensity conflicts must be considered; they can involve protracted struggles or
sharp outbreaks of violence. They run the gamut from terrorism to regional wars with
limited objectives. As we saw in the Persian Gulf and are seeing today with drug inter-
diction efforts, regional conflicts affect our vital interests and those of our friends and
allies. We must be prepared to act in support of U.S. interests throughout the world if
we are to protect our citizens and economic prosperity.
The most worrisome aspect of the increasing diffusion of global political and military
power is the accompanying spread of high-technology weaponry. The availability of the
most modern weapons and the growth of indigenous arms industries add a new
dimension to the security calculations of these regional powers, and our own as well.
Today, 41 Third World nations collectively possess more than 250 attack submarines,
102 have antiship cruise missiles, 41 have a sophisticated naval mining capability, and
40 are arms producers.
The threat to U.S. and allied maritime interests is not exclusively naval. A number of
Third World nations that are potentially hostile to western interests are well situated to
pose a land-based maritime threat. Survival in such an environment requires advanced
electronics and weapon systems and does not allow the luxury of “low-mix” platforms.
The “hi-tech,” advanced military capability of the world’s nations is underscored by the
British experience in the South Atlantic and our own in the Persian Gulf.
The spread of arms technology becomes even more sobering in view of the develop-
ment of nuclear and chemical weapons by emerging regional powers. By the year 2000,
at least 15 nations will be producing, or will have acquired ballistic missile technology,
and at least six are actively developing nuclear weapons. Fourteen now possess chemi-
cal weapons or the capability to produce them, and 11 more are suspected of develop-
ing the capacity. As the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War shows, some of
these nations are willing to employ such capabilities despite international
condemnation.
With or without superpower involvement, low-intensity conflicts will be increasingly
violent and involve high technology. The proliferation of sophisticated weapons world-
wide means that the types of naval forces designed to prevail in the most technically
sophisticated and modern threat environment, exemplified by Soviet capabilities, are
increasingly the same types of naval forces required to fight anyone else. The main dif-
ference is in the number of ships and aircraft that must be brought to bear, rather than
their individual combat capability.
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Planning for regional and low-intensity conflicts highlights a broadening of the
national strategic focus in the past few years. The decrease in American access to bases
and overflight rights around the world has further underscored the versatility and
capabilities of our naval forces. At the end of World War II, the United States had bases
in about 100 countries; today we have bases in fewer than 40. Moreover, more reduc-
tions are on the horizon in both Europe and the Pacific. As U.S. access to overseas bases
diminishes, naval forces and their afloat logistic support become increasingly impor-
tant. They can demonstrate military power without raising sensitive political issues of
territorial sovereignty, a natural outgrowth of dependence upon overseas base and
overflight rights.
. . . And Our Powder Dry: From a military perspective, we must consider a potential
enemy’s capabilities as well as his intentions. This is especially true for naval force plan-
ning. We must respond to crisis and wartime tasking to a large extent with the ships on
hand. The time required to build a modern warship (as much as seven years for a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier) and our highly consolidated national shipbuilding
industry would effectively preclude new-construction ships from joining the fight in
any future war. Simply put, future wars will be “come-as-you-are” affairs for naval
forces.
The Soviet Union represents the most severe military threat addressed by the Maritime
Strategy. As welcome as the possibilities presented by General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev’s restructuring and openness might be, prudence and history dictate that
we continue to gauge our strategy and war-fighting capabilities against this least likely,
but ultimately most potent threat.
The Soviet Union today possesses an impressive ocean-going navy that continues to
modernize. The most significant Soviet naval improvements have been in undersea
warfare. Soviet submarine quieting and sensor improvements have dramatically
reduced our ability to localize and track their submarines. The tactical edge in antisub-
marine warfare that we have enjoyed for the past three decades continues to erode, and
our first priority is to find the most effective means to counter the submarine threat to
our sea lines of communication.
The Soviets are also improving in other areas. Their sea control capability is being
enhanced by the development of better integrated air defenses, supported by new
cruiser, destroyer, and frigate classes that will join their fleet between now and the
year 2000. They are also building a new class of aircraft carrier which will carry high-
performance fixed-wing jet aircraft in both fighter and attack configurations. Finally,
the addition to the Soviet naval inventory of land-based Blackjack and improved Back-
fire bombers, Fencer fighter-bombers, and Mainstay AWACS (airborne warning and
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control system) aircraft is expanding their ability to threaten our key sea lines of com-
munication in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.
Thus, despite Soviet pronouncements of naval force cutbacks, Soviet naval capabilities
are improving. Under the guise of arms reductions, they are scrapping old units that
have limited military utility. Having addressed the problem of block obsolescence, the
Soviet Navy will emerge as a smaller, but thoroughly updated and modern force, more
sustainable and extremely difficult to defeat.
While we applaud the direction of recent political developments within the Soviet
Union, and find encouraging the Soviets’ pronouncements of a defensive national
strategy, intentions are influenced by both world and domestic events and can change
very quickly. We need to see where Soviet internal political developments lead, assure
ourselves that openness and democratization are permanent features of Soviet interna-
tional behavior, and carefully assess both Soviet military capabilities and political
intentions before making any major course changes in our own maritime programs.
We must remember, as we have learned so many times in the past, that political inten-
tions can change overnight, while naval force structure, once relinquished, takes much
longer to rebuild.
Aspects of Deterrence: The Maritime Strategy articulates in broad terms how American
naval forces are able to support national policy across this entire spectrum. While sup-
porting nuclear deterrence, the strategy also provides a structured framework for the
day-to-day peacetime business of the Navy and Marine Corps—routine fleet deploy-
ments, exercises, and frequent response to regional and international crises. It inte-
grates balanced fleet operations with our sister services and allies in peacetime to
achieve deterrence of conventional conflicts and, if deterrence fails, to fight a conven-
tional war in a global context.
Nuclear Deterrence: Nuclear deterrence is the keystone on which the rest of our conven-
tional strategy depends. Soviet doctrine leads us to expect that nuclear weapons would
be used at sea only in conjunction with their use in a land war. Nevertheless, other
nations also are capable of using nuclear weapons at sea, and current trends suggest
that such threats will continue to proliferate. Declaratory U.S. doctrine states that
enemy initiation of nuclear war at sea will not limit a U.S. response to the use of
nuclear weapons at sea, but may include their use against appropriate land targets.
Therefore, we expect naval forces to retain their critical role in both strategic and tacti-
cal nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future.
The U.S. force of ballistic missile submarines is and will remain the most survivable leg
of the nuclear triad. As such, it is a significant factor in strategic stability. Fifty percent
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of our national on-line strategic nuclear warheads are at sea, at one fourth the cost of
the total strategic force.
As we move with the Soviet Union to reduce our strategic nuclear arsenals, remaining
nuclear forces must be cost-effective, survivable, flexible, responsive, and have hard-
target kill capability. The fleet ballistic missile force satisfies all of these requirements.
Similarly, U.S. naval forces also contribute to deterrence of theater nuclear warfare
through their ability to mount credible nuclear land strikes from the sea. We have dis-
persed strike assets that were previously concentrated only in manned aircraft on board
carriers. Today, submarines and surface combatants armed with nuclear-capable long-
range cruise missiles are also available to support the strategy of flexible response.
Guarding the Peace: The objectives of the peacetime posture of the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps are to achieve deterrence, meet alliance and treaty commitments, sup-
port national diplomatic objectives, and to be ready for the rapid response essential to
deal with any crisis. These global commitments and alliance responsibilities require a
substantial degree of forward naval presence to protect our interests in troubled areas.
Roughly one third of the fleet, with over 110,000 sailors and 30,000 Marines, is either at
sea or forward deployed on an average day. Because these forces have the necessary
combat capability and are at a high level of readiness, we can influence events through-
out the world—as demonstrated in naval operations in the 1980s off Libya, Lebanon,
and in the Persian Gulf.
Pressure to reduce defense spending has been a fixture in our budget debates for some
time; however, in the past it has been counterbalanced by the Soviet threat. A decreas-
ing Soviet threat would add impetus to budgetary pressures to reduce the size of our
military forces. Smaller naval forces will of necessity affect our deployment posture.
Consequently, responding to the reduced Soviet threat, naval forces could be deployed
within key overseas theaters to provide a nearly continuous flexible forward presence.
Although military response times may be less prompt and involve an increased degree
of risk, we believe this is acceptable in a worldwide environment of reduced super-
power tensions.
Additional factors, such as expansion of the naval services’ role in drug interdiction or
a decrease in force levels to meet fiscal constraints, will require further adjustment of
our traditional forward-deployed global presence in order to maintain personnel sta-
bility and fleet readiness.
In the late 1970s, as we concentrated forces in response to events in Iran, the nuclear
aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) spent 247 days of a 252-day
deployment at sea. This was an extreme case of what was happening throughout the
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 8 0 S 3 1 5
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:30 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
fleet. We did not have an adequate force to support our needs. Long at-sea periods fol-
lowed by short turn-around times resulted in equipment breakdowns, personnel tur-
moil, and a loss of experienced enlisted personnel at the end of their obligated service.
By the late 1970s we had a middle management shortfall of 22,000 petty officers, and
overall fleet readiness was only half of what it is today.
In order to avoid a repetition of that experience, we have established personnel and
operational requirements that define employment limits. The Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of the Navy, recognizing that this policy ultimately preserves our person-
nel and warfighting readiness, strongly support these guidelines. The turn-around
ratios for forward-deployed units guard our most precious asset, our highly skilled and
trained naval personnel, but they also affect our ability to meet national peacetime
naval commitments.
Being There—the Value of Presence: Just as the forward presence of U.S. naval forces has
contributed to the deterrence of conflict with the Soviet Union, it has also enabled us
to promote regional stability throughout the world. This is especially apparent in the
Pacific. Apart from the primarily land oriented military stalemate on the Korean pen-
insula, the Pacific is essentially a naval and air theater. Since the Vietnam war, U.S. mili-
tary presence there has been represented most visibly by forward deployed naval forces.
Carrier and battleship battle groups, along with forward-deployed Marines, have come
to represent the commitment and resolve of the United States to preserve regional sta-
bility and freedom of the seas for all nations.
This role is distinct from the requirement to counter any potentially hostile naval
power in the Pacific. While Asian nations are concerned with the Soviets because of
geographical proximity, they are also concerned with purely regional issues. Local
objectives—unrelated to East-West issues—could disrupt the regional stability so nec-
essary for the expansion of free markets and the growth of democracies. The countries
of the region accord substantial credit to the United States for having maintained a
potent and visible presence and thus fostering the Pacific basin stability needed for eco-
nomic prosperity. The U.S. Seventh Fleet has played a crucial role in maintaining the
peace and security of the Western Pacific.
Crisis Response Roles and Capabilities: Despite the documented deterrent value of for-
ward naval presence, crises do occur. As demonstrated so many times in the last 40
years, forward-deployed naval forces are particularly well suited for limiting the expan-
sion of a crisis and facilitating a return to normalcy. They can move into position rap-
idly and in strength without violating any borders or raising national sensitivities over
territorial sovereignty. If the situation warrants, our Navy and Marine forces, in concert
with those of our allies and friends, can apply appropriate force to protect our
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common interests. Once the crisis is resolved, naval forces can be withdrawn unilater-
ally without giving the appearance of retreat.
Naval forces have proven to be the military force of choice for Presidents in more than
50 crises in the last decade, and in nearly 200 instances since World War II. This repre-
sents more than 80% of the crises which the United States has faced during this period.
In order to ensure that naval forces will be available to provide appropriate options for
crisis response, we have operated our fleets around key “deployment hubs” where the
majority of these crises have occurred: the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, Indian
Ocean, and Caribbean.
There is no indication that crisis response requirements in these crucial areas will
diminish in the future. In fact, the move toward increasing politico-military
multipolarity and the expanding counter-narcotics effort may well increase naval
taskings. Overseas regional powers, terrorists, and drug smugglers would be bolstered
rather than deterred were we to withdraw naval forces from forward positions and to
operate closer to home ports in the United States. Being present in the immediate
region enables naval forces to provide a timely response at the outset of future crises.
Consequently, only by maintaining a balanced fleet that is forward deployed and com-
bat ready can we fulfill the role of providing regional stability while preserving U.S.
economic and foreign policy interests.
Combat Readiness . . . : When a crisis confronts the nation, the first question often
asked by policymakers is, “What naval forces are available and how fast can they be on
station?” This requires that we maintain our forces in a high state of readiness, posi-
tioned as close to the scene of action as possible. Readiness is the key factor in this
equation. Sending units that are poorly trained, undermanned, or equipped with inad-
equately maintained, obsolete equipment is an invitation to disaster. Our forces must
not only be there, they must also be capable of conducting successful combat
operations.
In order to maintain high levels of readiness and combat capability, we actively partici-
pate in a host of joint and combined exercises. In fiscal year 1989, for example, U.S.
naval forces participated in more than 300 major and minor exercises, of which 113
were joint exercises with other services and 121 were combined exercises with our allies
and friendly navies. These strengthen alliance cohesion, enhance inter-operability with
our allies and sister services, and improve combat effectiveness.
. . . And Capabilities: While we have had naval forces in the Persian Gulf continuously
since 1948, our recent operations there in response to the Iran-Iraq War served as a
pointed illustration of naval capabilities in crises. Whether tracking air contacts over
the Gulf, escorting U.S.-flag tankers, sweeping mines, or engaging in military strikes,
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Navy and Marine Corps units have given the United States a flexible and responsive
instrument of national policy.
Operations in the Persian Gulf before and after the 1987 decision to escort re-flagged
tankers were oriented around our forward-deployed naval forces, but significant
interservice cooperation and interoperability were hallmarks of the entire effort. Fleet
Marine Forces were represented by a special Marine air-ground task force embarked
aboard an air-capable amphibious ship. Army helicopters and Air Force AWACS, recon-
naissance, and tanker aircraft contributed significantly to the success of the entire
operation.
International cooperation was also extensive. We worked well in coordinated opera-
tions with a number of our western allies. Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and the
Netherlands all had military forces operating in the Persian Gulf. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization duties of the deployed allied units were performed by other allies.
Examples of this maritime cooperation included the deployment of West German frig-
ates to the Mediterranean and Norwegian minehunters to the North Sea.
This demonstration of how naval forces operate in distant locations, in support of air
and ground forces and in conjunction with allies, is a clear example of the flexibility
that the regional application of our global Maritime Strategy provides in times of crisis
and contingency response.
The Worst Conventional Case—Global War: Since the end of 1945, the United States
and its allies, despite numerous crises and regional conflicts, have been able to prevent
a major war with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This very success has some-
times been used as an argument for reducing military forces and avoiding the necessity
to “think the unthinkable.” Nevertheless, the reality is that for the past four decades it
has been our strong military capabilities, the cohesion of our alliances, and our
strength of will that have preserved a world free from the horror of global war. We
must continue to maintain sufficient combat-ready forces to prevail in a major conflict.
The degree to which we are able to do this is, in fact, the real measure of our future
deterrent capability.
The changes occurring today in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have lowered
superpower tension and hold the promise of achieving significant reductions in the
forces facing each other in Europe. These developments require a careful reassessment
of our defense planning in such areas as warning time, mobilization capability, rein-
forcement requirements, available base structures, and overall opposing force levels.
Yet, in looking at the nature of any potential or future major war, several elements will
remain constant.
3 1 8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP33-JH80s 121608.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP Marstrat80s\_Ventura\NP33-JH80s 121608.vp
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:30 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
First and foremost, the Soviet Union, with or without its other Warsaw Pact allies, is
the only single power with the ability to threaten the continued existence of the United
States. Whatever the eventual level of Soviet military and naval forces, and however
greatly the superpowers reduce their conventional and strategic nuclear forces in the
immediate future, the Soviet Union will almost certainly remain our most dangerous
potential adversary.
Second, the basic principles that have guided our naval war-fighting strategy through
the Eighties will remain valid during the Nineties. This means reliance upon deter-
rence, forward defense, and global coalition warfare. In the event of regional or global
conflict, U.S. and allied fortunes would continue to depend on our ability to control
the seas. Maritime forces would be relied upon to support and resupply our allies and
deployed forces as far forward as possible. In any conflict, we would seek leverage to
achieve early favorable conflict resolution, while taking every measure to avoid crossing
the nuclear threshold unless such a step were forced upon us.
Maritime Superiority: While naval forces alone cannot win a war against a predomi-
nantly continental power, maritime superiority makes two contributions that are nec-
essary for victory by a maritime nation.
The first is that maritime superiority, and the unimpeded use of the seas which it guar-
antees, provides a means of fighting a protracted conventional war overseas. Most cru-
cially, the sea-lanes must be kept open for the reinforcement and resupply of forward-
deployed U.S. and allied ground and air forces. Successful forward sea control can best
secure sea lines of communications, and thereby ensure full access to global industries
and resources in order to fuel the wartime economies of the maritime coalition.
Second, maritime superiority enables us to deny an opponent the option of a single-
theater strategy in a global war. It would make no sense to allow an opponent to attack
us at a point of his choosing without moving to threaten him in areas where he may be
more vulnerable. Naval forces allow us to enforce the enemy’s isolation and expand our
own strategic options. It is hard to imagine warships passing peacefully in the night
while we are engaged in a shooting war ashore.
This does not imply that the Navy and Marine Corps would proceed simultaneously with
forward maritime campaigns throughout the world’s oceans. We do not have sufficient
forces to do that today, and we are unlikely to have them any time in the foreseeable
future. Instead, we would concentrate our forces in sequential maritime campaigns in
order to exploit our own mobility and the vulnerabilities of any would-be enemy, while,
in conjunction with our allies, keeping any adversary engaged wherever he may be.
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The ability to move into forward areas is a necessity if we are to protect our allies, pre-
vent enemy interdiction of our sea lines of communication, destroy his navy, and force
him into a defensive posture. In addition, the ability of naval power projection forces to
threaten large areas of an enemy’s homeland, whether or not they are ever actually
employed against it, ensures that he must tie down large numbers of forces in response.
This limits his options to mass forces in support of main offensive and defensive
operations.
Naval operations in support of this forward strategy will require significant contribu-
tions from our allies and the other U.S. military services, particularly the Air Force.
Naval forces have operated in three traditional dimensions—air, surface, and under-
sea—and increasingly in space, which provides important new warfighting advantages.
The use of space will become more significant to the United States as other countries
enter this realm as users and potential competitors, and interservice cooperation will
be particularly important in this area. We will also rely heavily upon our allies in a host
of areas.
Just what does this mean for the actual wartime employment of our naval forces? In the
most basic terms, we must attempt to position our forces forward early—prior to any
hostilities, if possible. Forward positioning, combined with other measures, may extend
deterrence and forestall the outbreak of war. If deterrence fails, we must quickly gain
unfettered use of the seas once hostilities are initiated against us, in order to support
the land war and as a precursor to possible strike operations ashore.
The forward movement of our forces in the early stages of a crisis serves two purposes.
First, it adds to deterrence by signaling national political resolve, showing support for
local allies, and demonstrating readiness. Second, it gets our forces into position so
they are not caught in port during the critical early stages of a war, reduces our transit
times, severely complicates an enemy’s targeting problem, and ensures that we can
immediately begin to affect the course of the war.
If deterrence fails, we must establish sea control as far forward and as early as possible.
Control of the narrow seas through which an enemy must transit in order to reach the
open ocean is a strategic necessity, a force multiplier that exploits geography to our
advantage. At sea, the best defense remains a good offense. Taking the fight to the
enemy as far from our own shores as possible is a basic tenet of the Maritime Strategy.
We want any adversary to react to our initiatives, rather than the other way around.
Although often portrayed as separate from sea control, power projection and the initial
campaign to gain control of the seas are actually complementary and closely linked. Air
strikes, forcible entry amphibious operations, and the destruction of the enemy fleet
and naval air arm are essential elements of the initial sea control campaign.
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Once the threat to our naval forces has been brought down to an acceptable level, U.S.
and allied naval forces can step up the pace of their campaign against targets ashore.
Carrier battle groups will support the land battle, augmented by Marine Corps expedi-
tionary aviation operating from forward land bases. In addition, Marine aviation com-
mand and control assets can be used to integrate sea- and land-based tactical air power,
adding depth ashore to the maritime operating area in both the sea control and power
projection missions. Air Force and allied tactical aircraft may also be available to com-
plement these efforts.
The coalition warfare goal of these forward operations is the support of our exposed
allies. An additional important advantage is their role in disrupting enemy time lines
for the preplanned commitment of reserves. This diminishes his ability to concentrate
on a single theater of operations, and complicates his calculation of allied intentions
and force balance.
Strikes against the enemy’s homeland remain an option open to the President and
allied decision-makers. The far-reaching political and military ramifications of such a
decision are obvious. Our potential to place an enemy’s homeland at risk in a conven-
tional conflict, and our publicly stated willingness to consider this option, are intended
to reap significant strategic benefits. Regardless of whether we would ever decide to
employ such a capability, the enemy would be forced to allocate scarce resources to
protect its own exposed flanks. Most importantly, such a capability adds markedly to
deterrence.
Conclusion: This discussion began by asking whether the Maritime Strategy would
remain valid during the coming decade in light of the momentous changes we see
occurring today. Without question, developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union are encouraging and may drastically alter the politico-military environment that
we have known since 1945. On the other hand, trends toward a more multipolar, frac-
tious, and turbulent political environment elsewhere in the world mean that we will
continue to face difficult challenges. Additionally, all this must be viewed against the
background of a tightened fiscal climate and severe budgetary strictures.
Our examination of the Maritime Strategy has established several salient points. First,
the strategy is flexible. Rather than laying out a set course of action, it is a general
frame of reference to guide our decisions in an uncertain future. Second, the strategy
rests upon a solid bedrock of sound facts and principles that will remain valid even as
our political and economic surroundings change. Geography and geopolitics still deter-
mine our maritime character, deterrence and crisis management remain critical
national security imperatives, and our global ties and alliances still require that we sup-
port our friends in distant regions. Finally, the military principles that have guided our
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strategy in the past retain fundamental validity. We will continue to rely on deterrence,
flexible forward deployments, and close cooperation with our allies as part of a global
coalition.
Maritime Strategy has helped to provide the security and stability we have enjoyed
these last 40 years, and has brought us to the beginning of a new era. As I look at this
next decade, I am convinced that the Maritime Strategy and the balanced forces we
have built to execute it provide a solid foundation for the future. Maritime superiority
has made the “strategic difference.” The Navy and Marine Corps of the 1990s continue
on watch, standing ready to protect the values and interests of the United States, our
allies, and friends into the next century.
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
A AAA antiair artillery
AAW antiair warfare
ABFC Advanced Base Functional Component
ADCON administrative control
ADGE Air Defense Ground Environments
AE afloat element [of MEF/MAB]
AEW air early warning
AGI intelligence collector (auxiliary) [Soviet]
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States [alliance]
ARG amphibious ready group
ASAT antisatellite system




ATSS auxiliary training submarine
AVCAL aviation consolidated allowance list
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
B BB battleship
BBBG battleship battle group
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C C3 command, control, and communications
CASREP Casualty Report
CAST Canadian Air-Sea Transportable [Brigade]
CENTMED central Mediterranean Sea
CGN guided-missile cruiser (nuclear powered)
CINC [CinC] commander in chief
CINCEUR Commander in Chief, Europe
CINCLANT
[or USCINCLANT]
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
CINCLANTFLT Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCUSNAVEUR Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CNOR command not operationally ready
COD carrier onboard delivery
COMIDEASTFOR Commander, Middle East Force
COMSEVENTHFLT Commander, Seventh Fleet
COMSIXTHFLT Commander, Sixth Fleet
CONMAROPS concept of maritime operations
CONUS continental United States
COR command operationally ready
CTOL conventional takeoff and landing
CV aircraft carrier
CVA attack aircraft carrier
CVAN aircraft carrier (nuclear powered)
CVBF carrier battle force
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CVBG carrier battle group
CVV aircraft carrier (vertical takeoff)
CW chemical warfare




DLG guided-missile frigate [destroyer leader]
DLGN guided-missile frigate [destroyer leader] (nuclear powered)
DON Department of the Navy
DPQ Defense Planning Questionnaire [NATO]
E EASTLANT Eastern Atlantic [NATO]
EASTMED eastern Mediterranean Sea
EMPSKD employment schedule
F FBM Fleet Ballistic Missile [program]
FER Fleet Employment Planning Operational Data Report
FLEETEX fleet exercise
FLEXOPS flexible operations
FLTCINC fleet commander in chief
FMS foreign military sales
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FY fiscal year
FYDP Five Year Defense Program
G GIN [G-I-N] Greenland-Iceland-Norway [gap]
GLCM ground-launched cruise missile
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H HUMINT human intelligence
I I&W indications and warning
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
INDRON Indian Ocean squadron [Soviet]
INF Intermediate Nuclear Force
IO Indian Ocean
IOC initial operational capability
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
J JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPD Joint Strategic Planning Document
L LAMPS Light Airborne Multipurpose System
LANT Atlantic [Ocean]
LANTCOM [U.S.] Atlantic Command
LCAC landing craft (air cushion)
LHA assault ship
LHD assault ship/dock landing ship
LIC low-intensity conflict
LLC lower-level conflict
LOC line of communications
LPD landing platform dock
LSD landing ship dock
M MAB Marine amphibious brigade
MAF Marine amphibious force
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
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MAU Marine amphibious unit
MC Military Committee [NATO]
MCM mine countermeasures
MDZ maritime defense zone
MEB Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF Marine expeditionary force
MEU Marine expeditionary unit
MIDEASTFORCE Middle East Force
MIW mine warfare
MK mark
MLSF Mobile Logistics Support Force
MNC major NATO contingency [or commander]
MOA memorandum of agreement
MOVREP Movement Report
MPA maritime patrol aviation
MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPN Military Procurement (Navy) [account]
MPS Maritime Prepositioning Ship [or Squadron]
MSC Military Sealift Command
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFORSTAT Naval Force Status [report]
NCA national command authorities
NCAPS naval control and protection of shipping
NCCS Navy Command and Control System
NCS naval control of shipping
NIE national intelligence estimate
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NM nautical mile
NORLANT northern Atlantic Ocean
NPS naval protection of shipping
NRF Naval Reserve Force
NSDD national security decision directive
NSOF Naval Status of Forces [database]
NTPF Near-Term Prepositioning Force
NWP naval warfare publication
O O&M Operations and Maintenance [account]
OOB order of battle
OPAREA operating area
OPCON operational control




OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTH-T over-the-horizon targeting
OVHL overhaul
P PAC Pacific [Ocean]
PACOM [U.S.] Pacific Command
PERSTEMPO personnel tempo
PG patrol gunboat
PGH patrol gunboat (hydrofoil)
PGM patrol gunboat (missile)
PHM patrol hydrofoil (missile)
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POM program objectives memorandum; preparation for overseas
movement
PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PRC People’s Republic of China
R R&D research and development
READEX readiness exercise
RE/RE resupply/reinforce
RFS ready for sea
RFT refresher training
RN Royal Navy [U.K.]
ROE rules of engagement
ROH regular overhaul
ROK Republic of Korea
S SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe [NATO]
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic [NATO]
SAG surface action group
SAM surface-to-air missile
SCN Ship Construction, Navy [account]
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIMA shore intermediate maintenance activity
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLEP Service Life Extension Program
SLOC sea line of communication
SNA Soviet Naval Aviation
SOA speed of advance
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SOJ Sea of Japan
SOLANT South Atlantic
SOSS Soviet Ocean Surveillance
SOSUS Sound Surveillance System
SPECWAR special warfare
SPECWARGRU special warfare group
SS submarine (conventional)
SSBN ballistic-missile submarine (nuclear powered)
SSGN nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine
SSN attack submarine (nuclear powered)
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SUBROC submarine rocket
SWA Southwest Asia
T TACAIR tactical aviation
T-ACS crane ship [MSC]
TAD temporary additional duty
T-AGOS ocean surveillance ship [MSC]
T-AH hospital ship [MSC]
TAO [T-AO] oiler [MSC]
TAP [T-AP] transport [MSC]
TASM theater antiship missile
T-ATF fleet tug [MSC]
TFS tactical fighter squadron
TLAM-C theater land-attack missile (conventional)
TLAM-N
[TLAM/N]
theater land-attack missile (nuclear)
TYCOM type commander
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U UCP Unified Command Plan
ULMS Underwater Long Range Missile System
UNCLOS III Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
URG underway replenishment group
USA U.S. Army
USAF U.S. Air Force
USCG U.S. Coast Guard
USMC U.S. Marine Corps
USN U.S. Navy
USNR U.S. Naval Reserve
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V VISTA Volunteers in Service to America
VOD vertical onboard delivery
VP maritime patrol [squadron]
VSS VSTOL support ship
VSTOL [V/STOL] vertical/short takeoff and landing
W WESTMED Western Mediterranean Sea
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